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General Aviation (GA) is a catchall term for all aircraft operations in the US that are not
categorized as commercial operations or military flights. GA aircraft account for almost
97% of the US civil aviation fleet. Unfortunately, GA flights have a much higher fatal
accident rate than commercial operations. Recent estimates by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) showed that the GA fatal accident rate has remained relatively
unchanged between 2010 and 2015, with 1566 fatal accidents accounting for 2650 fatalities.
Several research efforts have been directed towards betters understanding the causes of GA
accidents. Many of these efforts use National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
accident reports and data. Unfortunately, while these studies easily identify the top types
of accidents (e.g., inflight loss of control (LOC)), they usually cannot identify why these
accidents are happening. Most NTSB narrative reports for GA accidents are very short
(many are only one paragraph long), and do not contain much information on the causes
(likely because the causes were not fully identified). NTSB investigators also code each
accident using an event-based coding system, which should facilitate identification of
patterns and trends in causation, given the high number of GA accidents each year.
However, this system is susceptible to investigator interpretation and error, meaning that
two investigators may code the same accident differently, or omit applicable codes.
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To facilitate a potentially better understanding of GA accident causation, this research
develops a state-based approach to check for logical gaps or omissions in NTSB accident
records, and potentially fills-in the omissions.
The state-based approach offers more flexibility as it moves away from the conventional
event-based representation of accidents, which classifies events in accidents into several
categories such as causes, contributing factors, findings, occurrences, and phase of flight.
The method views aviation accidents as a set of hazardous states of a system (pilot and
aircraft), and triggers that cause the system to move between hazardous states. I used the
NTSB’s accident coding manual (that contains nearly 4000 different codes) to develop a
“dictionary” of hazardous states, triggers, and information codes. Then, I created the
“grammar”, or a set of rules, that: (1) orders the hazardous states in each accident; and, (2)
links the hazardous states using the appropriate triggers. This approach: (1) provides a more
correct count of the causes for accidents in the NTSB database; and, (2) checks for gaps or
omissions in NTSB accident data, and fills in some of these gaps using logic-based rules.
These rules also help identify and count causes for accidents that were not discernable from
previous analyses of historical accident data.
I apply the model to 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US between 1982 and
2015. First, I identify the states and triggers that are most likely to be associated with fatal
and non-fatal accidents. The results suggest that non-fatal accidents, which account for
approximately 84% of the accidents, provide valuable opportunities to learn about the
causes for accidents.
Next, I investigate the causes of inflight loss of control using both a conventional approach
and using the state-based approach. The conventional analysis provides little insight into
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the causal mechanism for LOC. For instance, the top cause of LOC is “aircraft
control/directional control not maintained”, which does not provide any insight. In contrast,
the state-based analysis showed that pilots’ tendency to clip objects frequently triggered
LOC (16.7% of LOC accidents)—this finding was not directly discernable from
conventional analyses.
Finally, I investigate the causes for improper autorotations using both a conventional
approach and the state-based approach. The conventional approach uses modifiers (e.g.,
“improper”, “misjudged”) associated with “24520: Autorotation” to identify improper
autorotations in the pre-2008 system. In the psot-2008 system, the NTSB represents
autorotation as a phase of flight, which has no modifier—making it impossible to determine
if the autorotation was unsuccessful. In contrast, the state-based analysis identified 632
improper autorotation accidents, compared to 174 with a conventional analysis. Results
from the state-based analysis show that not maintaining rotor RPM and improper flare were
among the top reasons for improper autorotations. The presence of the “not possible”
trigger in 11.6% of improper autorotations, suggests that it was impossible to make an
autorotative landing. Improper use of collective is the sixth most frequent trigger for
improper autorotation. Correct use of collective pitch control is crucial to maintain rotor
RPM during an autorotation (considering that engines are generally not operational during
autorotations).
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

"The idea of a vehicle that could lift itself vertically from the ground and hover motionless
in the air was probably born at the same time that man first dreamed of flying."
–Igor Ivanovitch Sikorsky
The Greek words helix (for spiral) and pteron (for wing) led to the genesis of the French
term hélicoptère meaning “device for enabling airplanes to rise perpendicularly”.
Helicopters have demonstrated their operational versatility by their ability to execute
vertical takeoffs and landings (VTOL), and hovering capability. In addition to military
operations, helicopters have found application in multiple civilian missions including
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), search and rescue, transport to off-shore locations,
external load operations, law enforcement, and aerial application (including firefighting)
missions. Since helicopter missions can often be time-critical and involve flights in
proximity to terrain/objects, they impose demanding requirements on both crew and
machine.
Analysis of General Aviation (GA) accident data by several researchers and safety teams
generally arrive at a common conclusion—Inflight loss of control (LOC) is the top cause
for GA accidents. Harris et al. (2000) analyzed over 8000 helicopter accidents that occurred
during 1963–1997. They found that LOC was the cause for 625 out of 5371 (approximately
12%) accidents involving civilian helicopters. In 2010, the US Joint Helicopter Safety and
Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001,
and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons for selecting the aforementioned years for their
analysis). In their analysis, they found that inflight loss of control was the top cause—
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accounting for over 41% of the accident in their dataset (US JHSAT, 2011). In a related
study, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation Measurement Data Analysis Team (US
JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US
JHIMDAT, 2014). Their analysis showed that inflight loss of control was not only the top
cause, but accounted for greater proportion of accidents when compared to the US JHSAT
study (47.5% compared to 41%). A 2012 study by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to improve GA safety termed LOC as the most frequent “defining event” in GA
accidents. In fact, recently, we (Rao and Marais, 2015) analyzed 5051 helicopter accidents
that occurred in the US in 1982–20081, and identified LOC as the most frequent singlenode occurrence chain.
While all of these studies indicated that LOC was the top reason for GA (fixed wing and
helicopter) accidents, they did not provide any information on “why” the accident-aircraft
(and pilot) experienced loss of control.
Despite the best efforts of airframe manufacturers, safety teams, and regulatory authorities,
helicopter (and more generally fixed wing General Aviation (GA)) accidents continue to
occur, often resulting in severe injury and damage consequences. The relatively high
frequency of GA accidents (compared to commercial operation accidents) suggests that we
(the safety community) have a limited understanding of the causes for GA accidents—
raising the question:
Why are we not learning as much as possible from GA accidents?

1

The NTSB established the accident database in 1962. The database underwent a major recording overhaul
in 1982 and another change in 2008. This thesis uses data from accidents that were recorded after 1982.
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There could be multiple potential answers to this question. One of the reasons could be that
the nature of GA accident investigations and reporting potentially limits our understanding
of accident causation. A combination of the high frequency of GA accidents and limited
investigative resources results in GA accident reports not having the same depth of
information when compared to commercial (Part 121) accidents. Another reason for our
limited understanding of GA accident causation could be due to the tendency to analyze
limited datasets (e.g., specific injury severity, helicopter model) and draw conclusions from
them. In many cases, subject matter experts use the results from these analyses to propose
specific intervention strategies and safety enhancements. While these measures address
specific safety concerns (e.g., developing fire-resistant fuel tanks to prevent post-crash
fires), they do not help us better understand accident causation in a large set of accidents.
A third possible reason for the limited understanding of GA causation could be due to the
setup of the NTSB accident coding system.
In this research, I focus on developing a new approach to modeling aviation accidents. This
thesis aims to steer the accident analysis community towards a path to potentially better
understanding accident causation. Our pursuit of reducing the number of accidents raises
the following question:
The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete
and omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and
potentially removes the omissions?
This thesis revolves around using historical accident data to better understand aviation
accident causation in general. I use a state-based approach to modeling aviation accidents,
and illustrate this new approach by using historical helicopter accident data. The remainder
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of this chapter is laid out as follows: I begin by giving the reader some relevant background
on GA and helicopter safety (Sections 1.1 and 1.2). Then, I lay out the research goals and
provide an outline of the thesis in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively.

1.1

What is General Aviation (GA)?

General Aviation (GA) is a catch-all term for all aircraft operations in the US that are not
categorized as commercial operations or military flight (Shetty and Hansman, 2012). The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines GA operations as “as all civil
aviation operations other than scheduled air services and non-scheduled air transport
operations for remuneration or hire” (ICAO, 2009). In 2014, GA aircraft comprised
approximately 97% of the US civil aviation fleet (Fala and Marais, 2016).
In its most recent General Aviation and Part 135 Survey, the FAA (2014) estimated that
there were 204,408 aircraft in the GA fleet—78.9% were fixed-wing aircraft, while 4.9%
were rotorcraft. The FAA classified 12.8% of the fleet as experimental aircraft and the
remaining 3.4% in the other (gliders and lighter-than-air) aircraft category. The GA fleet
is composed of aircraft ranging from homebuilt aircraft that generally use steam gauges
(e.g., Piper Cub) to state-of-the-art aircraft (e.g., Gulfstream G650) with modern avionics
and on-board Flight Data Recorders (FDRs).
GA operations cover a broad variety of aviation activities that include emergency air
medical services, student pilot instructional activities, and personal use flights. Generally,
these operations can be categorized as either local or itinerant (Shetty and Hansman, 2012).
The FAA defines local operations as “those operations performed by aircraft that remain
in the local traffic pattern, execute simulated instrument approaches or low passes at the
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airport, and the operations to or from the airport and a designated practice area within a
20−mile radius of the tower” (FAA, 2016a). Operations that involve personal flight,
instructional activities, or aerial observation missions could be classified as local
operations, while corporate or business flights are classified as itinerant operations
(Shetty and Hansman, 2012).
Table 1: Breakdown of Active GA Aircraft Based on Primary Use (FAA, 2014)
Type of Operation
Personal use

Proportion of Total GA Aircraft
66.4

Business

7.7

Instructional

6.4

Corporate
Remaining operations (<5% each)
Total

5.8
2

13.7
100.0

In its General Aviation and Part 135 survey, the FAA categorizes GA operations into 15
different operation types. I grouped the 11 operation types that individually accounted for
less than 5% of the total active GA aircraft, and placed them under Remaining Operations,
as shown in Table 1. These operations included air taxi (3.4%), aerial observation (2.9%),
and aerial application (1.5%). The personal use category accounted for more than twothirds (66.4%) of all active GA aircraft in 2014. Personal use operations typically involve
flights by aviation enthusiasts and hobby flyers. Many GA flights involve student pilots
operating aircraft with (or without) the supervision of certified flight instructors (CFIs). In
2014, the FAA estimated that 6.4% of GA aircraft were used for instructional flights.

2

Each of the remaining 11 categories accounted for less than 2% of the total active GA aircraft. Some of the
remaining categories include air taxi (3.4%), aerial observation (2.9%), other (2.4%), and aerial application
(1.5%),
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1.2

Vertical Flight Safety: Background and Motivation

In the latter part of the 19th Century, the modern-day term “helicopter” was born. Historical
literature shows (Figure 1) that efforts to build a powered lift system were well underway
before the conception of the fixed-wing airplane (Harris, 2012).

Figure 1: Timeline showing early efforts by inventors to build helicopters [adapted from
Harris (2012)].
Between 1900 and 1939, several inventors and vertical flight enthusiasts experimented
with different designs with limited success. The 1930s saw the first steps towards the
development of the modern helicopter. In May 1940, the US Army Air Corps successfully
test flew Sikorsky’s VS-300 helicopter. In the years that followed, the Vought-Sikorsky
company designed helicopters such as the XR-4, which had a gross weight of 2700 lb. and
cruised at an altitude of 5000 ft.—capturing the attention of the US Navy. Then, with the
development of the R-4, the Department of the Interior recognized the potential of using
helicopters in forest and wildlife management.

7
While initial development and designs were tailored for military purposes, the work of a
few vertical flight pioneers resulted in the introduction of helicopters in the commercial
sector. Arthur Young and Lawrence “Larry” Bell’s persistence led to the design of Bell
Ship-1. The Bell 47, which was a derivative of the Bell Ship-1 became the first civilian
certified helicopter in the US. Other noteworthy individuals include Charles Kaman, and
Stanley Hiller, Jr.
As the years progressed helicopters were used in a variety of missions including coastguard
search and rescue, aerial application (e.g., crop dusting), law enforcement, air-taxi
operations, and personal use. With increased use of helicopters came safety issues. Initially,
loss of engine power, mechanical failure of on-board systems/components, and the absence
of crash-resistant safety features were among the top reasons for helicopter accidents and
injuries. However, the so called fly-fix-fly approach to helicopter safety has helped reduce
the accident rate. Advancements in helicopter design, improvements in engine technology
through the introduction of the turbine engine (which is considered more reliable than the
piston engine), and higher standards for certification are some of the reasons that have
helped reduce the number of accidents related to mechanical failures.
In recent years, regulators and safety analysts have shifted their attention to better
understanding the role of the pilots/crew and organizational influences in helicopter
accidents. In their annually-published “Most Wanted List”, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) called for improvements in helicopter safety in two successive years
(2014 and 2015). Recently, the NTSB also expressed their concern over the increasing
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number of loss of control (LOC) accidents in General Aviation (GA) operations3. They
highlighted the key role of pilots, operators, and ground crews in improving safety by
implementing sound risk management practices.
A large body of literature is dedicated to analyzing historical accident data to improve
helicopter/GA safety. Many studies have considered helicopter risk arising from various
sources such as pilot behavior, mechanical systems, mission types, times of operations (e.g.,
Manwaring et al., 1998; DeVoogt, et al., 2009; Dempsey et al., 2007; Atkinson & Irving,
1995).
Generally, historical helicopter accident analyses use limited data sets and rely on expert
knowledge to identify key safety concerns. These studies restrict their analyses to specific
injury severity levels (e.g., fatal accidents), mission types (e.g., emergency medical service
flights), modes of mechanical failure (e.g., fatigue failure), or specific airframe
manufacturers (e.g., Augusta Westland or Robinson). Some studies analyze the role of the
operator and machine independently. Both Rasmussen (1997) and Leveson (2004) argue
that to better understand accident causation, we (safety analysts) should focus on the
mechanisms or factors that influence human action, and not fixate on the role of the human
in accidents.
Many safety working groups have focused exclusively on the causes for fatal accidents in
fixed-wing General Aviation (GA) aircraft and helicopters. In 1997, the Helicopter
Accident Analysis Team (HAAT) was tasked by the Safe All-Weather Flight for Rotorcraft

The NTSB’s 2015 and 2016 “Most Wanted List” call for strategies to reduce the number of Loss of Control
(LOC) accidents in GA operations.
3
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(SAFOR) program with establishing the chain of events that led to fatal accidents and to
propose interventions that might have eliminated one or more links, thus preventing the
accident (HAAT, 1998). They chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents that occurred between
1989 and 1996, and found that poor pilot judgment was responsible (in part) for 50% of
the accidents in their sample. Violation of flight procedure by pilots (41.2%) and
inadequate or misdirected management oversight resulting in risk-taking by pilots (38.2%)
were the other top problems. To reduce the number of fatal accidents, the FAA (2016)
initiated a Rotorcraft Safety Initiative (RSI) in 2013. The goal of this initiative was to
identify the causes for a set of fatal helicopter accidents, and come up with intervention
strategies that could prevent “similar” fatal accidents. While the efforts of these groups
might have helped reduce the fatal helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight hours4, there
continue to be fatalities—reaching a 20-year high in 2013 (44 deaths).
Historical accident analysis techniques, in general, have sought to determine the “root
cause” for an accident (Taylor and Adams, 1986), or establish the chain of events that
preceded an accident. Some research explores the role of these events or occurrences5 in
aviation accidents. Most of this research considers fixed-wing aircraft, or does not
explicitly highlight the role of occurrence chains (or sequences of occurrences) in
helicopter accidents (Houston et al., 2012). In an effort to better understand the proximate
causes for helicopter accidents, I explored the different chains of occurrences and ranked
them based on different risk perspectives (e.g., injury severity, mission types). Chapter 3

4

Fatal accident rate reduced from 1.43 in 2001 to 0.67 in 2014—a 53.2% reduction.
The NTSB defines as an occurrence as “A distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an
accident or incident.”
5
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of this thesis presents details of this approach and the lessons learned (see also Rao and
Marais (2015)).
Historical accident analysis is dependent on the data reported by accident investigators.
The value of the lessons learned from historical accident analysis is limited by the level of
detail in accident reports. Generally, investigators collect data on accidents through
witness/survivor interviews and examining other evidence. Assuming that all accident
investigations receive the same amount of resources (manpower and time), accident reports
could be a potentially rich source of information. Unfortunately, in the US, the high
frequency of GA accidents and the lack of flight data recorders (“black boxes”) makes it
infeasible to obtain detailed information on the causes for each accident. In many cases,
investigators do not travel to an accident site (colloquially referred to as a “desk top” audit),
but make a determination of the probable cause based on the data available. Some of these
accident reports are characterized by limited information that focuses on proximal events,
and tend to leave out less obvious contributing factors that could have yielded valuable
insight into the accident.

1.3

Research Goals and Thesis Outline

Despite many years of retrospective accident analysis, helicopter (and fixed wing GA)
accidents continue to occur frequently, often resulting in fatalities and damage to property.
One possible reason is that we (the accident analysis community) are limiting the lessons
learned from historical data for a variety of reasons I outlined in Section 1.2.
This thesis aims to address the following gap:
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The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete and
omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and potentially
removes the omissions?
To address this gap, this thesis presents a multi-year analysis of historical accident data to
better understand aviation accident causation in general, specifically helicopter accidents.
The fundamental question can be broken down into two research questions:
1. The current accident coding system limits our understanding of accident
causation—can a different approach help?
2. Can we provide a more correct count and hence a more accurate ranking of the
causes for accidents in the NTSB database?
To answer the above questions, this thesis develops an approach to model aviation
accidents using a state-based approach. I use aviation accident data from the NTSB
database to build a state-based accident model. Then, I use this model to potentially better
understand accident causation.
Chapter 1 provides the reader with the requisite background in fixed wing GA and
helicopter safety. Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part reviews literature on
helicopter safety, with particular emphasis on previous work in historical accident analysis.
The second part of Chapter 2 provides background on commonly-used aviation accident
modeling techniques. It reviews the techniques and summarizes their strengths and
shortcomings.
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The first half of Chapter 3 serves as a “beginners’ guide to the NTSB aviation accident
database”. This chapter is motivated by the fact that I, in my years researching the database,
have not found a user-friendly guide for any first-time database user. It lays out the NTSB’s
accident coding systems and also highlights some key issues with the data. The second half
of Chapter 3 identifies sequences of occurrence or occurrence chains that most frequently
ended in accidents. It presents some of the key conclusions and highlights the shortcomings
of the chain of events approach—motivating the need for a better representation of
historical accident data.
Chapter 4 presents a state-based aviation accident model. I begin the chapter by providing
definitions for the basic elements of a state-based approach. Then, I build the state-based
model by creating a dictionary of hazardous states and triggers. After creating the
dictionary, I provide the grammar that links hazardous states and triggers.
In Chapter 5, I use three examples to demonstrate the application and investigate the
potential usefulness of the state-based model. I do one high-level analysis of the 6200
accidents in the database to identify the most frequent states and triggers—i.e., the states
and triggers that are most likely to be associated with, or lead to, accidents. Next, I
investigate the causal patterns associated with two of the most hazardous states—loss of
control and improper autorotation.
Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this research and provides recommendations for
future work.

1.4

Terminology

This section defines the various terms that will be referred to in this thesis.
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Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such
persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death, or serious injury, or in
which the aircraft receives substantial damage.
Incident: An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of aircraft,
which affects or could affect the safety of operations.
Occurrence: A distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an accident or
incident.
Safety: Freedom from accident or losses.
Hazard: A state or set of conditions of a system that, together with other conditions in the
system's environment, will lead inevitably to an accident.
Risk: The future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. It can be viewed
as future uncertainty created by the hazard. It can also be defined as the likelihood and
consequences of an accident occurring in a system.
Risk Assessment: The process of determining the likelihood and consequences associated
with a risk.
Risk Management: The process that ensures that the risk is maintained at an acceptable
level during the lifetime of a system.
Exceedance: A deviation in a flight parameter beyond an established bound/limit (upper
or lower), which can result in an accident.
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Safety Event: One or more exceedances that take place concurrently along with
parameters during a specified phase of flight and directly relate to a safety of flight
condition.
Fatal Injury: Any injury that results in death within 30 days of the accident.
Serious Injury: An injury that (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours,
commencing within seven days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a
fracture of any bone (except simple fracture of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe
hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves injury to any internal organ;
or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the
body surface.
Minor Injury: If an injury does not meet the criteria for fatal or serious, select minor.
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CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on helicopter safety and highlights key accident
modeling techniques. Through this chapter, I intend to provide the reader with essential
background on various efforts to improve helicopter safety, and some highlights from
different approaches to modeling accidents.
The primary emphasis of the review is on studies that have used historical accident data.
Sections 2.2–2.4 review various accident modeling techniques that have been used to
understand the causes for aviation accidents. Section 2.5 captures the key elements of the
models reviewed in and summarizes their merits and shortcomings.

2.1

A Review of GA and Helicopter Safety Literature

A large body of research has been dedicated to improving helicopter safety through
historical analysis of helicopter accidents. Several studies have considered helicopter risk
arising from various sources such as pilot behavior, mechanical systems, mission types,
and times of operations (e.g., Manwaring et al., 1998; DeVoogt, et al., 2009; Dempsey et
al., 2007; Atkinson and Irving, 1995). Some of their recommendations to improve
helicopter safety include better crew resource management, enhanced pilot training, fuel
management, and frequent maintenance to ensure healthy operating components.
Some research has explored the role of occurrences in aviation accidents. Most of this
research considers fixed-wing aircraft, or specific events or causes in accidents (Houston
et al., 2012). The US Joint Helicopter Safety and Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and
analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001, and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons
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for selecting the aforementioned years for their analysis). They found that loss of control
(41% of the accidents), autorotations during practice and emergency (28% of the accidents),
and system component failure (28% of the accidents), were the top three occurrences in
helicopter accidents in these years (US JHSAT, 2011).
Similar to the US JHSAT’s methodology, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation
Measurement Data Analysis Team (US JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that
occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US JHIMDAT, 2014). They carried out a “high-level”
statistical analysis on the selected accidents to identify differences from the US JHSAT
analysis (again, they do not mention the reasons for focusing on 2009–2011). Compared to
the US JHSAT results, they noted a relative increase in the proportion of loss of control
(LOC) (47.5% compared to 41.5% in US JHSAT study) and controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) accidents (6.7% compared to 3.1%), while accidents associated with system
component failure decreased.
Some researchers analyzed accident data to identify initiating events (or first events) in
accident chains, while other focused on “breaking” the chain of events. Harris et al. (2012)
reviewed over 8000 US helicopter accidents from 1963 to 1997. They categorized the
accidents based on the 21 first-event categories used by the NTSB, and identified loss of
engine power, inflight collision with object, and loss of control as the top-three first-events.
In 1997, the Helicopter Accident Analysis Team (HAAT) was tasked by the Safe AllWeather Flight for Rotorcraft (SAFOR) program with establishing the chains of events that
led to fatal accidents and to propose interventions that might have eliminated one or more
links, thus preventing the accident (HAAT, 1998). They chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents
that occurred between 1989 and 1996 and that covered a diverse range of missions and
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equipment. Further, their report states that the sample was not representative of all (nor
fatal) rotorcraft accidents in 1989–1996. After selecting their sample, they proceeded to
identify “problems” (e.g., preflight planning, safety culture, or pilot training) that
contributed to the accidents. Not surprisingly, they found that poor pilot judgment was
responsible (in part) for 50% of the accidents in their sample. Violation of flight procedure
by pilots (41.2%) and inadequate or misdirected management oversight resulting in risktaking by pilots (38.2%) were the other top problems.
Several studies have focused on the causes for fatal accidents in fixed-wing General
Aviation (GA) aircraft and helicopters (e.g., Conroy et al., 1992; ATSB, 2004; Li et al.,
2008; Baker et al., 2011; Bazargan and Guzhva, 2007). A study by the Australian
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) looked at 215 fatal Australian GA accidents between
1991 and 2000—24.2% of which involved helicopters (ATSB, 2004). These accidents
were generally caused by engine failure, incorrect control inputs by pilots, and low-level
flight in proximity to objects (e.g., power lines). Li et al. (2008) developed a Fatality Index
in Aviation (FIA) score to predict fatality risk in aviation crashes. They analyzed 44,628
accidents, of which 7889 (18%) involved pilot fatalities. In an effort to improve the EMS
safety record, Baker et al. (2011) focused their attention on 182 fatal EMS accidents in
1983–2005. Crashes during the dark accounted for 56% of the accidents, while 77% of
fatal EMS crashes happened during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). They
recommended improved crashworthiness and reduced operations during hazardous
conditions to reduce fatalities.
O’Hare et al. (2006) analyzed 190 rotorcraft accidents that occurred in New Zealand in
1988–1994 to identify risk factors in fatal and serious-injury accidents. They reported post-
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crash fire and nature of terrain as the biggest risk factors in fatal accidents, while pilots’
failure to obtain weather briefings prior to flights was an important factor in serious-injury
accidents. They added that the nature of operations (e.g., short-haul flights) and the volatile
New Zealand weather might have exacerbated the risk associated with not getting a
preflight weather briefing. Safety organizations and regulators have also made efforts to
reduce the fatal helicopter accident rate. The Helicopter Accident Analysis Team (HAAT)
chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents that occurred between 1989 and 1996, and found that
poor pilot judgment was responsible (in part) for 50% of the accidents in their sample.
Violation of flight procedure by pilots (41.2%) and inadequate or misdirected management
oversight resulting in risk-taking by pilots (38.2%) were the other top problems. In 2013
there were 37 fatal helicopter accidents (out of 161 total accidents)—the highest number
of fatal accidents in a calendar year since 1994. In response to the high number of fatal
helicopter accidents, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) started a Rotorcraft
Safety Initiative (RSI). This initiative focused efforts only on fatal helicopter accidents.
Their goal was to identify intervention strategies that could prevent “similar” fatal
accidents.
Aviation maintenance tasks are complex undertakings in which individuals perform varied
tasks in an environment with time constraints, minimal feedback, and sometimes difficult
ambient conditions (ICAO, 1999). Several researchers have carried out historical analyses
of fixed wing accidents in the GA and commercial sectors (e.g., Marais and Robichaud,
2009; Goldman et al., 2002; Tsagkas et al., 2014; Franza and Fanjoy, 2012). Marais and
Robichaud (2009) showed that in commercial aviation, maintenance-related accidents were
more deadly than accidents in general, and that in a maintenance-related accident, the risk
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was dependent on the nature of the maintenance activity. Goldman et al. (2002) showed
that 7% of GA accidents between 1988 and 1997 could be attributed at least in part to a
maintenance-related cause or factor. Their findings revealed that the most common
accident cause factors involved installation errors, general maintenance, and maintenance
inspection. Tsagkas et al. (2014) identified specific factors that guided maintenance
technicians towards alternative courses of action during maintenance activities. Franza and
Fanjoy (2012) conducted a statistical study on the probable causes for accidents involving
Cirrus SR20 and Piper PA28-161 aircraft. They found that mechanical malfunction (not
specified further) accounted for 20% of the probable causes for fatal accidents in the PA28161 fleet.
The human role in aircraft maintenance has received attention from multiple researchers.
Fogarty and Saunders (2000) used the SHEL (software, hardware, environment, and
liveware) model to classify 250 military aviation incidents in Australia between 1996 and
1998. They reported that inadequate supervision (40.4%) by supervisors and incorrect
procedures followed (32.0%) by maintenance personnel were the most common
maintenance errors. Rashid et al. (2010) analyzed 58 helicopter accidents that (1) were
exclusively maintenance related and reflected human factors issues, (2) occurred in 1995–
2005, (3) involved maintenance crew with similar training, resources, and technical
competence, (3) and represented currently used helicopters. Unsurprisingly, they found
that when parts failed due to unsafe maintenance actions, the failed parts were more likely
to be those that required higher cognitive skills during assembly, installation, alignment,
or adjustment.
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Some studies have looked into the role of maintenance specifically in helicopter accidents.
Haaland et al. (2009) identified 59 tour-helicopter crashes in Hawaii between 1981 and
2008, and found that 34 (~58%) of the accidents were due to poor maintenance. Baker et
al. (2011) investigated 178 helicopter crashes related to the oil and gas operations in the
Gulf of Mexico in 1983–2009. Their analysis revealed that 10.3% of the accidents
associated with mechanical malfunctions were due to maintenance errors. They found that
critical rotorcraft systems such as main rotors and transmission systems were most often
exposed to maintenance errors. Majumdar et al. (2009) analyzed causal factors for 237
helicopter accidents in the United Kingdom in 1986–2005, and 54 in New Zealand in 1996–
2005. They concluded that despite improvements in the reliability of rotorcraft engines,
engine failure continued to be one of the main causes for maintenance-related, rotorcraft
accidents.
In summary, I reviewed multiple historical studies that directed their efforts at improving
GA and helicopter safety. They highlighted loss of control (LOC), controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT), flight into poor weather, and engine failure among the top reasons for
helicopter accidents. Researchers in these studies focused their attention on specific
sources of helicopter accident risk such as mechanical failures, mission types, and injury
severity. Many of these studies tended to identify “a root cause” or “an initiating event” for
accidents. Generally, these studies lacked multi-year reviews (with the exception of
Harris et al. (2012) and Bazargan et al. (2012)); making it difficult to discern any trends in
accident causation. As noted earlier, many studies focused on accidents that involved
fatalities. Comparing the causes for fatal and non-fatal outcomes could potentially yield
valuable insight into unsafe situations during flight.
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2.2

Literature on GA Flight Data Recorder (FDR) Data Analysis

To improve safety levels, regulators and safety analysts called for a shift from reactive to
proactive safety management techniques. While the former technique responds/makes
adjustments to operations/processes after an unacceptable outcome (e.g., accident), the
latter makes adjustments to operations/processes before anything bad happens. Flight Data
Monitoring (FDM) provides one such avenue for proactive flight safety. Flight Operations
Quality Assurance (FOQA) or FDM is a process in which flight data is captured and
analyzed to improve flight operation safety. The International Helicopter Safety Team
(IHST) defines Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) as “a systematic method of
accessing, analyzing and acting upon information obtained from flight data to identify and
address operational risks before they can lead to incidents and accidents” (IHST, 2009).
Proactive FDM techniques rely on the collection and analyses of flight data records to
identify hazardous patterns during flights and/or key flight parameters to monitor.
There have been some studies on the safety of commercial operations by analyzing Flight
Data Recorder (FDR) data. Li and Hansman (2011, 2013) used a combination of data
mining algorithms and expert review to identify anomalies during flight, such as low
altitude and slow speed during approach, from a set of 365 B777 flights with various
origins and destinations. Cohen et al. (1999) and Smith et al. (2000) developed and tested
an aircraft performance risk assessment tool. They used aircraft Quick Access Recorders
(QAR) and Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) data to calculate the risk of
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents from a combination of safety events. The
output of their risk model provides an estimate of severity, consequence, and probability
of occurrence.
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While many operators in the commercial aviation sector have embraced FDM analysis,
applying these techniques in the GA sector poses technical, economic, and operational
challenges. Challenges include the diverse GA fleet composition, ageing GA fleet, costs of
upgrading/retrofitting existing GA aircraft, and complex nature of GA missions (e.g., GA
operations do not necessarily follow well-defined phases of flight like in commercial
operations).
Recognizing the potential safety improvements from FDR data analysis, the FAA recently
initiated projects [Safety Analysis for General Aviation (SAGA) and Rotorcraft-Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (R-ASIAS)] to collect and build a database of
voluntarily-contributed FDR data.
Initial research using GA-FDR data has shown promise (e.g., Goblet et al., 2015; Harrison
et al., 2015, Puranik et al., 2016a; Puranik et al., 2016b). Goblet et al. (2015) highlighted
the challenges associated with fixed wing GA operations and proposed a set of algorithms
to identify flight phases as a first step in identifying non-nominal events (or safety events)
during flight. In an effort to characterize unsafe behavior during the approach phase of
flight, Fala and Marais (2016) analyzed FDR records from 23 instructional flights. They
suggested refinements to the existing safety event definitions and called for the creation of
pilot-friendly safety metrics. Related research by Puranik et al. (2016b) used energy
management techniques to define a “nominal” or safe approach profile for GA aircraft.
There has been limited research in analyzing (non-military) helicopter flight data records.
Gavrilovski et al. (2016) used a model-based approach for safety event definitions. They
used a lateral dynamic model along with flight data to identify potential precursors to a
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dynamic rollover. They also developed a helicopter performance model to assess safety
during autorotations. In this approach, they used the performance model in conjunction
with flight data to estimate flight parameters that were not captured by the on-board FDR.

2.3

An Overview of Accident Modeling

Literature on accident causation and modeling is extensive, but often fragmented. This
chapter begins by providing an overview of accident modeling. Then, I review key
modeling theories6 that have shaped our understanding of aviation accident causation, and
conclude this chapter by comparing and contrasting the different modeling techniques.
Accident models help us better understand the causal mechanisms in accidents during posthoc analysis. They aid in depicting the relationship between causes and consequences
(outcomes of an accident), and are frequently used as tools in understanding and assessing
the risks associated with a system.
Figure 2 summarizes the history and evolution of accident modeling. Initial efforts to
understand accident causation viewed accidents as the culmination of a linear sequence of
events. These simple linear approaches suggested that accidents could be prevented by
eliminating any one of the causes. With time, researchers realized that accidents were more
a combination of unsafe actions and latent (or already prevalent) hazards—resulting in
epidemiological models. In the more recent past, researchers recognized the need for non-

6

While this section reviews some of the models used to describe aviation accidents, it does not serve as an
exhaustive review of the different accident causation models. The interested reader is pointed to works by
Qureshi (2008), Al-shanini et al. (2014), and Salmon et al. (2012) for a more comprehensive review of
different models.
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linear accident models. These models attempt to capture the interactions between the
different components and actors in a system (operating in a particular environment).

Figure 2: Summary of accident model methods [adapted from (OHS, 2012)].
The Domino model proposed by Heinrich et al. (1931) in the 1940s was among the first
accident models. This model represents accidents as a sequence of discrete events that
occur in a particular order. Heinrich’s model falls under the category of other sequential
event-based models such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). While these models help represent simple
accidents, they cannot explain accidents in complex systems.
Efforts to explain accidents in complex systems paved the way for a new class of accident
models called epidemiological models. This class of models, as the name suggests,
borrowed ideas from the field of medicine and disease prevention. Epidemiological models
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attempt to explain accident causation as a combination of active and latent factors that
come together at a particular instant of time. One of the noteworthy models of this class is
Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model”, which highlights the relationship between proximate
causes and latent factors. Reason’s model is widely used by the aviation industry to explain
accident causation. Later in this Chapter, I present the merits and shortcomings of this
model.
Traditional accident modeling approaches tended to focus on component or hardware
failure, and employed the analytic reduction principle7 (Leveson, 2016). These approaches
often failed to consider the role of human or social factors in accidents. Complex
sociotechnical systems exhibit non-linear relationships and dynamics between components
(technical, human, and organizational). These relationships are not captured by sequential
or epidemiological models. A new class of models based on systems theory or systemic
models was developed to model the behavior of complex sociotechnical systems.
Sociotechnical models are an improvement over the sequential models because they
describe accidents using complex networks of events rather than simple cause-effect chains.
Some of the noteworthy systemic models include Rasmussen’s hierarchical sociotechnical
network and Leveson’s Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP).

7

The analytic reduction principle involves: (1) breaking down the system into individual parts; (2) analyzing
each of the parts independently; and, (3) combining the different parts to provide results for the whole system
(Leveson, 2016).
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Section 1.3 describes the various traditional accident modeling approaches that viewed
accidents as a linear combination of events. Section 1.4 presents accident models that are
based on systems theory8.

2.4

Linear and Epidemiological Accident Models

2.4.1

Domino Model

This model explains accidents as a chain of discrete events that occurred in a particular
order. Heinrich’s Domino Theory was among the earliest event-based models. It compared
an accident sequence to five dominoes shown in Figure 3. This model suggests that the
social environment leads to fault of the person, which in turn is the proximate cause for
unsafe act or condition. This unsafe act/condition leads to an accident, which results in
injuries (Figure 2).

Figure 3: Heinrich’s Domino Model of accident causation [adapted from Leveson
(2001)].
This model suggests that there exists a single cause that triggered the sequence of events
leading to the accident, and that eliminating this root cause could prevent future accidents;
however, most accidents generally involve multiple causes. Focusing our efforts on
eliminating a single cause might lead to missed opportunities (missing other relevant

8

In contrast to analytic reduction, systems theory views the system as a whole, and not as individual parts.
One of the basic tenets of systems theory is that “the whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts.
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causes), thereby not helping prevent future accidents. Leveson (2001) and Perrow (1984)
cite the example of the DC-10 crash at Chicago O’Hare in 1979 to highlight the peril of
focusing on a single cause. In this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) blamed a “maintenance-induced crack” as the reason behind the accident.
However, the NTSB failed to identify “faulty design” as one of the reasons for the accident,
leading to future accidents with the same design flaw.
2.4.2

Fault Tree Analysis

A fault tree is a logical diagram that is used to represent the relationship between a system
failure and the causes for the failure (Qureshi, 2008). It is a deductive analysis that looks
“backward” at the causes for an undesired event. Some of the key objectives of an FTA
include: (1) identifying the causes of a failure; (2) expose weaknesses in the operation and
design of the system; (3) prioritize the reason for failures; and, (4) calculating failure
probabilities (Vesely et al., 2002).
This technique employs Boolean logic (e.g., AND, OR gates) to analyze and model
accidents. This technique begins by identifying an undesired event for a system, and then
resolving the undesired event into its causes. The event is resolved until the “basic” causes
are deduced from the logical event tree (fault tree).
2.4.3

Chain of (Time-Ordered) Events

The chain of events model, in which accidents are represented as a series of time-ordered
events, is one of the most commonly used accident models. These events almost always
include human error or mechanical failure. Unlike the domino model that considers only a
single chain of events, the event-based model can also include multiple event sequences in
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the form of parallel or converging chains. For example, the Multiple Events Sequencing
(MES) model includes a time sequence of events and conditions associated with each actor
in an accident (Benner, 1975).
The relationship between the events in a chain of events model is generally linear,
suggesting that a preceding event must be present in order for the subsequent event to
happen. It is difficult (if not impossible) to capture the non-linear of accident causation in
complex systems. This model also suffers from backward chain propagation, where the
assignment of an initiating event can be arbitrary as it is dependent on the stopping point
when going backward in the event chain.
2.4.4

Swiss Cheese Model

Reason explained accident causation in complex sociotechnical systems using an
organizational model. The organizational view recognizes that accidents are generally not
caused by a single error; rather they are caused by a combination of errors that occur at
different levels of the organization. Reason (1997) describes organizational accidents as:
Situations in which latent conditions that arise from aspects such as management decisions
that combine adversely with local triggering events (e.g., weather) and with active failures
(errors and/or procedural violation) committed by individuals or teams at the sharp end of
an organization, to produce the accident (Qureshi, 2008).

29

Figure 4: Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [adapted from Reason (1998)].
This model represents the safeguards (or defences) as layers of cheese that are
superimposed over each other as shown in Figure 4. The holes in the defences arise due to
either latent 9 (e.g., decision made by designers) or active failures (e.g., slips, fumbles,
violations). Accidents occur when the holes in the different layers of cheese line up—
releasing the accident trajectory.
Unlike the chain of events model, which focuses on error events in a chain leading up to
the accident, the Swiss cheese model focuses on the system’s role in accident occurrences
and prevention. The preventive measures from the Swiss cheese model include changes to
the operating conditions, organizational decisions, system configurations, and improving
the defences against accidents.

Latent conditions are sometimes referred to as “resident pathogens”. These pathogens arise from
decisions made by management, designers, or builders. These latent pathogens may remain dormant
in the system for many years before combining with active failures and local triggers to result in
accidents
9
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Despite wide application of Reason’s model, there are also many criticisms of the model
(Dekker, 2002; Qureshi, 2008; Luxhoj and Kauffeld, 2003; Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000).
Multiple researchers (Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000; Dekker, 2002) suggested that the
model does not describe in sufficient detail the nature of the holes in the Swiss cheese.
Luxhoj and Kauffeld (2003) stated that the inability of the model to account for the
interrelationship between the different causal factors reduced the practical significance of
the model—a view echoed by Shorrock et al. (2003). Saleh et al. (2013) suggested that the
frequent use of the Swiss cheese metaphor might have resulted in a flawed understanding
of accident causation. They added that Reason’s model might have contributed to a false
impression that an accident sequence is instantaneous (when the holes line-up) and does
not progress in jerks, which is often the case. Young et al. (2004), while not advocating
discarding the model, called for increased awareness among investigators about the
applicability of the model and to not adhere to it “dogmatically”. This model does not help
better understand an accident—for example, why did the holes form, or why did the holes
line up (even if in jerks). All it really does is explain why things can be wrong (the holes)
and yet nothing bad happens (the holes have not lined up yet).
2.4.5

Human Factors and Classification System (HFACS)

Building on the model proposed by Reason, Shappel and Wiegmann (2000) developed the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification system. They used this system to not only
categorize unsafe acts by the human operators at sharp end of the accident, but to describe
the pre-conditions for these unsafe acts. Figure 5 illustrates the HFACS framework.
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Figure 5: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [adapted from
(Shappel and Wiegmann, 2001)].
Unsafe acts are the lowest level of the framework. Unsafe acts can be broken down into
errors or violations. Errors represent the activities that fail to achieve the intended outcome,
and violations refer to the disregard for rules and regulations (Shappel and Wiegmann,
2001). The further classify errors as decision-based, skill-based, and perceptual errors.
Violations are classified as routine (or habitual) and exceptional (or one-off). To illustrate
the difference between the two types of violation, Shappel and Wiegmann provide the
example of motorist violating speed limits. They state that driving at 64 mph in a 55 mph
speed zone, while considered a violation, is acceptable to the authorities. However, driving
at 105 mph in a 55 mph zone is a gross violation (of an isolated nature) of the speed limit,
and is unacceptable to the authorities.
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Preconditions for unsafe acts constitute the second level of the HFACS framework. As the
name suggests, this level identifies substandard operating conditions and poor practices
followed by the operators.
The third level, unsafe supervision, highlights supervisory shortcomings and their
influence on safety. Unsafe supervision is further classified as: (1) inadequate supervision;
(2) planned inappropriate operations (e.g., overworking employees); (3) failure to correct
problem; and, (4) supervisory violations. Supervisory violations occur when the
management is aware of an existing problem, but it chooses to disregard the rules and
continue operations.
The top most level of the HFACS framework is used to identify organizational influences.
This level can be broken down into resource management, organizational climate, and
organizational process. The framework shows that the decision and policies of the upper
management percolate down to the lower levels. Incorrect handling of resources (monetary,
equipment, and human), improper use of authority (or failure to claim responsibility), and
insufficient safety management can result increased organizational risk.

2.5

Systemic Accident Models

Accident models based on systems theory are termed systemic models. One of the key
differences between systemic and epidemiological/sequential accident models is that the
former attempts to describe an accident as a complex network of human-machine
interaction while the latter represents accidents as a simple cause-effect sequence. Some
noteworthy systemic accident models are Rasmussen’s (1997) hierarchical socio-technical
framework (and Accimap) and Leveson’s (2004) systems theoretic accident modeling and
process (STAMP). Some accident models such as Hollnagel’s (1998 and 2004) Cognitive
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Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) and Functional Resonance Accident
Modeling (FRAM) focus on human performance and cognitive abilities while operating
complex systems.
2.5.1

Rasmussen’s Socio-Technical Framework and AcciMap Method

Rasmussen developed a systems-based framework that modeled different levels of a
system (e.g., government, regulators, organization, management, staff, and work). He
considered system safety as a property that emerges from the various interactions between
the different levels of the system.

Figure 6: Rasmussen’s risk management framework [adapted from Rasmussen (1997)].
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Figure 6 shows the hierarchical model of this socio-technical model used in risk
management. Level-1 represents the government, which controls safety through legislation.
Level-2 represents the regulators who implement the legislations prescribed by the
government. Level-3 describes the activities of a company, while level-4 represents the
company management and the decisions that influence the working of their employees/staff.
Levels 5 and 6 represent the actions taken by company staff when working with
machines/technology, and the application of engineering disciplines in designing the
machines, respectively. The arrows represent the flow of information between the different
levels. According to this framework, a system can operate safely when legislations,
regulations, and decisions made at the higher levels of the system are reflected through the
actions of employees. Similarly, information about the system at the staff level should flow
up the hierarchy to inform decisions taken at the higher levels.
Figure 6 also shows that various environmental stressors can affect different levels of the
system at any instant of time. For the system to remain safe, the different levels would need
to coordinate with each other and balance the constraints imposed at each level.
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Figure 7: Rasmussen and Svedung’s AcciMap model for analyzing accidents [adapted
from Underwood and Waterson (2014)].
Rasmussen and Svedung (2002) developed AcciMap as a control theory-based systems
thinking approach to modeling accidents (Underwood and Waterson, 2014). Accimap
provides a graphical representation of the failures in a system, and the actions/decisions
that precipitated the failures. It combines the cause-consequence chart and risk
management framework (Rasmussen, 1997). Investigations that use Accimap (Figure 7)
generally focus on six organizational levels: (1) government policy and budgeting; (2)
regulatory bodies and associations; (3) local area government, company management
planning and budgeting; (4) technical and operational management; (5) physical processes
and activities; and (6) equipment and surroundings.
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2.5.2

System-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP)

Figure 8: Hierarchical safety control structure in the STAMP model [adapted from
Leveson (2004)].
Leveson (2004) proposed the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP)
to analyze accidents using a systems theory approach (Figure 8). This approach views
system safety as a control problem where an accident is caused due to failed enforcement
of safety-related constraints at various levels of a socio-technical system. This model can
also help demonstrate how complexity within a system influences events leading up to an
accident (Underwood and Waterson, 2014)10.
STAMP helps provide a description of a system’s control structure, and helps identify
failures in the different levels of the system that contributed to the accident. As shown in
Figure 7, the STAMP model has a system development and system operations control

10

The interested reader is directed to Underwood and Waterson (2014) for a more comprehensive application
of the STAMP model. They compared and contrasted multiple accident models while analyzing the Grayrigg
rail accident that occurred in the UK in 2007.
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structure. Leveson (2004) gives the example of an aircraft manufacturer to explain the
working of the model. While the aircraft manufacturer has the development of the system
under its control, system operation is the domain of the aircraft operator (e.g., airline).
Leveson added that system safety could be achieved by interaction between the two control
structures (as depicted in the lower half of Figure 8)—by designing safety into the system,
and by correct operation. This model facilitates iterative improvement of safety through a
dialogue between manufacturers and operators. The manufacturers communicate some of
the assumptions about the operating environment, and the operators provide feedback
about the system’s performance in the actual environment.
2.5.3

Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM)

Hollnagel (1998) proposed CREAM as a practical approach to analyze the cognitive
performance of a human operator, predict the probability of an error by the operator, and
assess the consequences on the system. It can also be used for retrospective analysis of
accidents. This technique comprises a human error classification scheme and a model.
CREAM employs the Contextual Control Model (COCOM), which focusses on the actions
that are chosen by an operator (Figure 9). The four control modes that are specified by the
control model are: (1) scrambled; (2) opportunistic; (3) tactical; and, (4) strategic. A
comprehensive description of these control modes can be found in Hollnagel (1998, pp.
155–157). COCOM assumes that an operator has variable degrees of control over his
actions, and that the level of operator performance is directly proportional to the degree of
control over the actions (Hollnagel, 1998).
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Figure 9: The Contextual Control Model (COCOM) [adapted from Hollnagel (1998)].
This approach allows for the classification of human action into groups that help describe
the phenotypes (error mode) and genotypes (causes) 11 of these actions. There are eight
observable phenotypes in CREAM (i.e., timing, duration, sequence, object, force, direction,
distance, and speed), which can be further divided into four sub-groups that further describe
the nature of the erroneous action. It classifies the phenotypes of causal mechanisms into
either individual, technological, or organizational. In addition to the error modes and their

11

Hollnagel (2016) describes phenotypes as the observable forms of erroneous actions, while genotypes refer
to the mechanism for erroneous actions. Saleh et al. (2010), in their review of accident literature, state that
phenotypes represent threshold-based classification of accidents (e.g., based on severity), while the accident
genotype represents the fundamental mechanism of an accident. Both sets of authors agree that while
phenotypes are observable, genotypes can only be inferred.
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underlying causes, CREAM uses a set of common performance conditions (CPC) that help
the investigator/analyst describe the context in which the erroneous action was carried out.
2.5.4

Functional Resonance Accident Modeling (FRAM)

Building on the work in CREAM, Hollnagel (2004) proposed the Functional Resonance
Accident Modeling (FRAM) technique in 2004. This technique attempts to describe
variability in human performance using the idea of functional resonance. Hollnagel
suggests that successes and failures do not result from actions that are fundamentally
different. He adds that while the outcomes might be different, the underlying process does
not necessarily change. He argues that success and failure are emergent phenomena that
result from human performance variability while performing these actions. A combination
of the variabilities in different functions could reinforce (or resonate) the variability in a
specific function.
A FRAM-based analysis consists of four steps: (1) identifying key system functions and
characterize the functions using six basic parameters 12 ; (2) use a checklist to identify
potential variability; (3) identify dependencies between the different functions and define
functional resonance; and, (4) suggest potential barriers and performance monitoring
strategies.
This technique helps provides a better understanding of the working of a complex sociotechnical system. It does not specify the characteristic of each component in the system,
thereby avoiding the tendency of “identifying a solution for each cause” (Hollnagel, 2016).

12

The six basic parameters are obtained from the Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT). They
are: (1) inputs; (2) outputs; (3) resources; (4) controls/constraints; (5) preconditions; and, (6) time. Hollnagel
(2013) provides detailed explanation of each of the parameters.
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One of the major shortcomings of this approach is that it is time-intensive. The qualitative
nature of the FRAM analysis raises questions about the applicability of this approach in
quantifying failure; for example, the probability of a component failing.

2.6

State-based Accident Modeling

State-based models find their origins in finite state machines. State-transition diagrams
have been extensively used in the software domain to develop and understand software
interfaces, and interactive systems. Harel (1987) introduced the statechart formalism to aid
with the design of complex discrete-event systems. Statecharts extended the capabilities of
finite state machines by avoiding the “exponential blow-up” problem—a scenario where
the number of possible states for a system grows exponentially.

Figure 10: Generic state-based representation of a system.
Figure 10 shows a generic state-based representation of a system. States are segments of
time wherein a system exhibits a particular behavior. Control theory literature (Chen, 1995)
defines “the state of a system at time 𝑡0 is the information at 𝑡0 that, together with the
input 𝑢(𝑡), for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0 , determines uniquely the output 𝑦(𝑡) for all 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0 .” The nodes in
Figure 10 represent the different system states. The arrow at the top of each node represents
a possible “default or start state” for a system. Triggers occur at precise instants of time
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and cause a system to transition between states. The links with arrows represent state
transitions. A system can transition between states or self-transition, where it goes back to
the same state. In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed explanation of a state-based model applied
to historical accident data.
Some researchers have used state-based approaches to model system safety (e.g., Ariss et
al, 2010; Reif et al., 2010; Landry et al., 2009; and Jian, 2011). In an effort to integrate
fault trees into statecharts, Reif et al. (2000) used the example of a radio-controlled railway
crossing. They suggested that fault trees and statechart models of a system should be
constructed separately; however, the construction of both models should be interdependent.
Building on this work, Ariss et al. (2010) successfully integrated fault trees and statecharts.
They provided a set of state-transitions rules to model the logic gates that appear in fault
tree analysis (FTA). They demonstrated their approach by modeling the failure of gas
burner unit.
Favaro’ and Saleh (2016) used a control-theoretic approach to model system safety. Their
research used a state-space formalism to model the dynamics of a system. They defined set
of equations that modeled the different states of a system (over a period of time), and used
this information (about the states) to identify and monitor the “hazard levels” of the system,
and to develop a “time-to-accident” metric.
Some studies have applied a state-based approach to model air traffic safety (e.g., Landry
et al., 2009; Jian, 2011). Landry et al. (2009) modeled human-integrated systems to using
modified statecharts. They defined safety of the system as the ability of an agent (human
or automated) in the system to control the state of the system such that it does not reach an
“undesirable” or “unsafe” state. To make the distinction between states from which a
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system cannot recover (e.g., midair collision) and their precursor states (e.g., loss of
separation), they termed the unrecoverable states as unsafe and the precursor states as
undesirable. They leveraged the orthogonal 13 property of statecharts to represent the
current and future states of a system. They specified a set of conditions, which when
satisfied, permitted the transition from one state to another. In addition to developing a
predictive model, the researchers demonstrated the capability of their approach to be used
with conventional reliability-based calculations.

2.7

Summary

In this chapter, I reviewed several key accident models; many of these models have been
used to analyze aviation accidents. This section summarizes the different accident models
presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Table 2 serves as a quick reference guide on the
characteristics, merits, and shortcomings of different accident model.
Table 2: Summary of Accident Models
Accident Model

Description

Shortcomings


Domino model
(Heinrich, 1931)

Describes accidents as a
sequence of five factors
including social environment,
personnel fault, unsafe
conditions or actions, and injury.

13



Suggests that accidents result from
a single cause
Attributes accidents to human error
or failure

Harel (1987) defines the orthogonal property of statecharts as being in a state where the system must be in
all of its AND components. In other words, if a system state A can be divided into two components C and D,
then the system can enter state A only if enters each of the components C and D. The interested reader is
directed to Harel (1987, pp. 242–250) for a more comprehensive explanation.

43
Accident Model

Description

Shortcomings


Chain of events

Describes accidents as a
sequence of time-ordered events.
It considers human and
mechanical failure. Accidents
can be represented by multiple
chains.






Fault Tree Analysis

Swiss Cheese model
(Reason, 1998)

Rasmussen’s model
(Rasmussen, 1997)

A deductive method to identify
the most basic causes for an
accident. It represents an
accident by a tree diagram that
uses Boolean logic.

An epidemiological model that
represents that barriers between
a hazard and accident by slices
of Swiss cheese. The holes in the
cheese slices represent the latent
conditions (or resident
pathogens). An accident occurs
when the holes in the cheese
align.

System-based framework where
risk management is viewed as
control problem where injuries
and damage result from a loss of
control of the physical process.
It is difficult to establish a fixed
procedure in a dynamic
environment. Accidents take
place when there is a loss of
control at the safety boundary












Linear model which suggests that
the preceding event needs to be
present for the subsequent event to
happen
Assumes that “breaking the chain”
by eliminating one of the events
(links) can prevent an accident
The assignment of an initiating
event can be arbitrary as it is
dependent on the stopping point
when going backward in the event
chain

Assumes linear relationship
between causes and accident
Fault trees can get large and
complicated for a large system
Difficult to apply to systems/subsystems that can operate with partial
failure

No clear description of the holes in
the cheese, or when and why they
appear
Incapable of identifying relationship
between the different causes
Can lead to misinterpretation that
all accidents result from mistakes
by management

This model is qualitative in nature.
It does not provide mathematical
basis for predictive analysis
Relies on detailed information in
accident reports
Problematic to apply to large-scale
accident analysis
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Accident Model

Description

STAMP
(Leveson, 2004)

A system-theoretic approach that
uses elements of Rasmussen’s
model. Views system safety as a
control problem where an
accident is caused due to failed
enforcement of safety-related
constraints at various levels of a
socio-technical system.

CREAM
(Hollnagel, 1998)

Hollnagel developed CREAM to
model human performance, and
potentially predict the
probability of an error being
committed. This model focuses
more on the impact of human
performance on a system, and
does not consider technical
aspects. This model can be
applied to qualitative and
quantitative analyses.

FRAM
(Hollnagel, 2004)

FRAM is a qualitative accident
model that attempts to describe
variability in human
performance using the idea of
functional resonance. It helps
develop a better understanding
of the working of a complex
socio-technical system

Shortcomings











Dependent on detailed information
from accident reports
Qualitative model that makes it
difficult to apply techniques to large
scale accident data analysis

Can be complicated and time
consuming to implement
Does not suggest remedial measures
to improve human performance
Requires domain-specific
knowledge; i.e., human factors and
human cognition

Qualitative approach that can be
highly time consuming
This model does not allow for
conventional probabilistic failure
analysis—focuses on likelihood of
human performance variability
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CHAPTER 3.

NTSB ACCIDENT DATABASE AND
OCCURRENCE CHAINS

This chapter discusses the NTSB’s accident database and the use of occurrence chains to
understand accident causation. Most helicopter accident research focuses on single root
causes or most frequent causes for accidents. In this chapter, I attempt to better leverage
the information in the accident database by identifying the “stories” (or trajectories)
associated with each accident. Sequences of occurrences (or occurrence chains) represent
these accident trajectories. Specifically, I seek an answer to the following question:
Can we learn more about GA accident causation by counting and comparing these
occurrence chains?
The first part of this chapter serves as a quick guide to the NTSB’s accident recording
system for the past three decades. I also present some of the key issues that analysts should
bear in mind during their analyses (and the conclusions that are drawn). The second part of
this chapter explores the concept of occurrence chains in helicopter accidents14. I present
key results and important lessons learned.

3.1

Layout of Accident Database

The NTSB established a publicly-available accident database in 1962 15 . Accident
investigators enter accident investigation data in a coded format using an automated data
entry system (NTSB, 2002). Major revisions were made to the database in 1982, adding

14

This chapter builds and expands on the work presented in Rao and Marais (2015).
Accidents that occurred before 1982 are beyond the purview of this thesis. The interested reader is directed
to Robichaud (2012) for a description of the NTSB database in 1962–1982.
15
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additional features that aided in better describing accidents. The NTSB records accident
information on their database, which includes fields related to aircraft type, geographic
location of accidents, phases of flight, severity of injuries and damage, crew details, and
type of maintenance. In addition to coded information, the database also contains accident
narratives, which could potentially provide additional insight into accidents.
The NTSB uses occurrences to summarize the events leading up to the accident. They
define an occurrence as a distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an
accident or incident (NTSB, 1998). Figure 11 summarizes the NTSB accident recording
system. Accident reports place each occurrence in a sequence (occurrence chain) leading
up to the accident. In general, the final occurrence in a chain can be interpreted as the
accident—that is, each preceding occurrence still leaves a possibility (though it may be
remote), of escaping without injury or damage.

Figure 11: Summary of the NTSB accident recording system.
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To record the findings (why the accident happened) for each accident, the NTSB uses
subject codes and modifiers. The subject codes are designated as causes, factors, or events
in accidents. For accidents with multiple causes and factors, the NTSB has no provision to
show the magnitude of each cause or factor with respect to the others, reflecting the
difficulty in assigning proportional blame.
The NTSB produces factual and probable cause reports (usually available online in pdf
format) for each accident, and also provides a coded summary in a searchable database
format. The probable cause report provides a brief synopsis of the accident and the probable
cause statement. The factual report generally provides more detail such as pilot experience
and aircraft airframe hours accompanied (usually) by a prose account of the accident.
3.1.1

Old System (1982–2008)

Until 2008, NTSB investigators could choose from 54 occurrence codes, 1597 subject
codes, and 470 modifier codes to provide summaries of accidents (Figure 11). The NTSB
used five-digit subject codes accompanied by four-digit modifiers to represent the key
findings in accidents. The NTSB classified these subject codes into four sections to
describe the nature of the findings (Table 3). NTSB-Sections IA and IB are used to list the
primary events/findings that led to the accident. NTSB-Sections II and III are used to
further define or explain the primary events or findings.
Table 3: NTSB Accident Classification 1982–2008 (NTSB, 1998)
Category
IA—Primary non-person related findings
Aircraft Structure
Aircraft System
Power plant
Miscellaneous aircraft/equipment
ATC/weather/airport facility/equipment

Examples
Control surfaces, rudder, fuselage, landing gear
Autopilot, hydraulic systems
Bleed air system, compressor assembly, fuel
system
Lights, coolant, fuel, lavatory
Approach aids, radar, meteorological services
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Category
Miscellaneous publication
IB—Primary person-related findings
Aircraft/equipment performance
Operations/ATC/Maintenance
II—Direct underlying events
III—Indirect underlying events

Examples
Aircraft manuals, charts and other manuals
Autopilot, communication equipment, navigation
instruments
Missed approach, aircraft control, compensation
for wind
Inadequate design, inadequate training,
physiological conditions
Inadequate surveillance of operation, insufficient
standards

To illustrate the NTSB accident coding system, consider a maintenance-related accident
from March 2007, when a Bell 206L-1 on an air-taxi mission lost engine power during
cruise. The investigation findings blamed the accident on incorrect installation of the
engine fuel line fitting by maintenance personnel (NTSB ID: DFW06FA083). Table 4
provides a breakdown of the corresponding subject codes and modifiers used to explain
this accident in the database.
Table 4: Illustration of NTSB Accident Coding in 1982–2008
Numeric Code
24111
3109
4108

NTSB Classification
Subject Code
Modifier
Personnel Modifier

Description
Maintenance, Installation
Improper
Other maintenance personnel

NTSB investigators place occurrences in a sequence leading up to the accident. They use
three digit codes ranging from “100: Abrupt Maneuver” to “430: Miscellaneous/Other”.
3.1.2

Current System (2008–Present)

In 2008, the NTSB began recording accidents using a new coding system. In place of the
subject codes, the NTSB introduced ten digit findings codes, which ranges from
“01000000XX: Aircraft handling/service” to “05000000 XX: Not determined”. The last
two digits “XX” represent the modifier codes.
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For example, consider an accident involving a Robinson R-44 II in June 2012. During a
cherry-drying operation near Wenatchee, WA, the pilot maneuvered close to power lines
(NTSB ID: WPR12LA259). The main rotor impacted the power lines, and the helicopter
crashed into the trees. The pilot was seriously injured and the helicopter sustained
substantial damage. The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from the power lines was one
of the causes for the accident; given by the findings code 0106201220. Table 5 shows the
breakdown of the findings code. To facilitate clarity, we will refer to findings codes as
subject codes in the remainder of this document.
Table 5: Illustration of NTSB Breakdown of Findings Code in 2008–Present
Findings Code
0106201220
0106201220
0106201220
0106201220
0106201220

NTSB Classification
Category
Subcategory
Section
Subsection
Modifier

Description
Aircraft
Operation/performance/capability
Performance/control parameters
Altitude
Not attained/maintained

In the post-2008 system, the NTSB replaced the three-digit occurrence codes with six-digit
codes. The first three digits correspond to the phase of flight, and the last three digits
represent an “event”. Consider for example the code 500240, where the first three digits
(500240) indicate approach phase of flight, while the last three digits (500240) represent
loss of control inflight. To facilitate ease of understanding and continuity with the old
system, I will refer to the last three digits as occurrences for the remainder of this thesis.
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3.2

Issues with Accident Data

Multiple data issues should be borne in mind while analyzing NTSB accident data, and
arriving at conclusions about accident causation. I highlight here some of the key issues
associated with the data. These issues include incomplete or inconsistent data entries in the
database, lack of information about the current coding system, subjectivity in probable
cause determination, and inconsistency in published accident narratives. I highlight
relevant data issues while presenting analysis results.
3.2.1

Lack of Consistency in Data Entries

Inconsistent entry of data fields is one of the major issues in the accident database. The
absence of information in many cases impedes accident trend analysis. Consider for
example aircraft “airframe hours”. Airframe hours help estimate the amount of time an
aircraft has been in service16. Consistent reporting of airframe hours could potentially help
correlate airframe-related failures and flying time17. Unfortunately, the NTSB does not
report airframe hours in each accident. Potential reasons including inaccessible
maintenance records and/or pilot logs.
3.2.2

Changes in Accident Recording System

The NTSB changed its accident recording system twice: first in 1982, followed by the
transition to the current system in 2008. While the transition to the current coding system
provides additional capabilities to the analyst (e.g., creation of a CFIT occurrence), it also

16

Some of the common methods of estimating airframe hours include: (1) using pilot log books to calculate
the amount of flying time accrued by the aircraft; (2) referring to maintenance logs, which base their
information on tachometer readings and pilot logs; and in some cases, (3) using an “air hobbes” that activates
only when the aircraft is off the ground.
17
Note that since the NTSB does not record the year of manufacture of an aircraft, it is generally difficult to
determine the age of the aircraft at the time of the accident.
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presents some challenges. One of the issues involves the deletion of fields from the
previous version of the database. For example, in the old system the NTSB represented
US-registered aircraft by the USUS code. This code is no longer used in the current
system—making it challenging to identify aircraft that are registered in the US.
Another challenge with the current system involves the information lost during the
transition away from five-digit subject codes to 10-digit findings codes. The absence of a
“map” (correspondence between codes in the old and new system) creates a “gap” or
discontinuity while reporting results. During my review of multiple historical accident
studies, I noticed that many studies restricted their analysis to either pre-2008 accidents or
considered only accidents post-2008. This problem (absence of a map) is further
exacerbated by the absence of a coding manual for the new system18.
3.2.3

Subjectivity in Recording Accident Details

It is worthwhile to take a moment here to consider the levels of information available to
investigators and analysts, as shown in Figure 12. First, the accident itself has all the
requisite detail, by the very fact that it occurred. Second, a smaller subset of information is
available to investigators, because we cannot possibly know every single detail of the
accident. Third, it is possible that the investigators do not obtain all the theoretically
available information about the accident. For example, a witness may know something
about the accident, but that witness might not be found and questioned. At the same time,
the witness is putting their own interpretation on what they experienced, further

18

Unlike the pre-2008 system, the NTSB does not provide a detailed manual of how accidents are recorded
in the current system. Information for the post-2008 system can be found in the dictionary table in
downloadable NTSB database. This table provides brief descriptions of the different findings and occurrence
codes.
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obfuscating the true nature of the accident. Fourth, the investigators may not record every
piece of information in their narrative, while simultaneously putting their interpretation on
the findings. And finally, the investigators might not code all the information into the
database.

Figure 12: Levels of information available to accident investigators and safety analysts.
3.2.4

Inconsistency in Accident Narratives

Generally, each accident is accompanied by a detailed factual report and a synopsis or brief
report. The brief reports contain information on the occurrences, subject codes and
modifiers, and the causes and contributing factors to accidents. They also include a
probable cause statement that summarizes the NTSB’s accident findings in a couple of
lines. In contrast, the factual reports include a history of flight narrative that gives the reader
some background on the events leading up to the accident. The factual reports also include
information on personnel (e.g., age, experience, medical certificate, and ratings held by
pilots); aircraft (e.g., owners, serial numbers, powerplant models, and airframe hours);
meteorological information (e.g., wind, ceiling); airport or landing site; and wreckage and
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impact information. In addition to the narratives, they include details on the nature of
operations (e.g., personal use, aerial application), levels of damage (e.g., destroyed,
substantial), and names of investigation personnel. These accident reports could potentially
yield valuable insight into accidents; however, not all accidents have factual reports, and
for those that do, the level of details varies significantly19.
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Factual and Brief Accident Reports
Type of Report
Factual
Brief

Pre-2008
(Accident Count = 5198)20
Count
Mean
SD
2769
730
5198
128

904
90

Post-2008
(Accident Count = 982)
Count
Mean
SD
982
806
964
200

1071
157

Table 6 summarizes the availability of factual reports in the database. The count indicates
the number of accidents that had factual reports with a “non-zero” word count. Only about
half (53.3%) of pre-2008 accidents had factual reports with information in them. The large
standard deviation (904.3) suggests varying levels of detail in the reports. It is encouraging
to note that every accident in 1982–2008 had a brief report; providing potential learning
opportunities. In contrast to 1982–2008, all 982 helicopter accidents post-2008 had factual
reports. These reports also had large variation in their level of detail. Comparing the
average factual report lengths for pre and post-2008 accident (t-test at significance level
5%) reveals a statistically significant difference. However, further investigation of the

19

The interested reader is directed to Leveson (2001, pp. 13–18) for a comprehensive discussion regarding
the use of accident reports and potential limitations.
20
Note that there were 43 midair collision that involved 63 helicopters. Therefore, the total number of
(helicopters in) accidents is 5218 for 1982–2008.
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effect size21 reveals that difference between the mean report lengths is marginal. In other
words, the average lengths of the reports did not change over the two time periods.

3.3

Features of Accident Dataset

The accident dataset analyzed in this thesis consist of all civil helicopter accidents that
occurred in the US in 1982–2015. The dataset contains 6200 helicopter accidents—5218
accidents were recorded (by the NTSB) under the old system (1982–2008), while the
remaining 982 were recorded under the current system (2008–present). Fatal accidents
accounted for 16.2% (1005 out of 6200) accidents.

Figure 13: Helicopter accident trends between 1982 and 2015. The grey markers
represent the years that still have ongoing accident investigations.
Figure 13 shows a decreasing trend for the number of helicopter accidents each year. The
drop in the number of accidents after 2013 is primarily due to the number of ongoing
accident investigations. As expected, the number of accidents under investigation is higher
for more recent years (Table 7).

21

Comparing the means using a t-test at a 5% significance level suggests a statistically significant difference.
The Cohen’s d value is ~0.08—indicating that the difference between the means is trivial.
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Table 7: Accident Year and Number under Investigation
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015

3.4

Accidents still under investigation
(% of total accidents that year)
1 (0.6%)
3 (2.0%)
36 (25.3%)
69 (53.1%)

Occurrence Chains: Do They Tell the Full Story?

This section presents a method to identify high-risk occurrence chains (or sequence of
occurrences) using historical accident data. This method uses a frequentist approach to
calculate the presence of various occurrence chains in helicopter accidents that occurred in
the US between 1982 and 2008. The chains are ranked for different injury severity levels
and mission types.
3.4.1

Approach to Identifying High Risk Occurrence Chains

Risk is essentially a combination of the probability and consequences of a given set of
events. We usually refer to risk by one or a combination of these dimensions. For example,
we refer to the chance of winning a lottery (probability), the potential areas impacted by a
hurricane (consequences), or the expected number of motor vehicle accident fatalities in a
year (probability times consequence).
In the case of accidents, the consequences are always negative; that is, there is no “upside”
risk, as there may be in, for example, financial transactions. For accidents, we usually
interpret consequences in terms of loss of life, injury, and loss of property. We may, for
example, refer to the number of fatalities associated with rotorcraft firefighting efforts in a
given year. When considering populations, or accidents during a particular time period or
in a particular area, we also interpret consequences using simple or normalized counts. For
example, we may track trends in the number of accidents per year in a particular region,
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and we might normalize this number by flight hours. It is important to consider these
different dimensions of risk when developing accident reduction measures. For example,
consideration of fatalities resulted in commercial aircraft designers creating aircraft with
measures to increase survivability in a crash (e.g., fireproof and fire resistant cabin
materials). Conversely, reducing the raw number of accidents is also important—the public
would likely stop using commercial aviation if there were frequent small accidents, even
if they did not result in injuries. Accidents that seem less significant from an injury or loss
perspective may also provide insights into potentially more serious accidents. This
perspective is particularly relevant to general aviation, where fatal accidents often involve
so much damage that little physical evidence can be found (these aircraft rarely have “black
boxes”).
Here, I show how occurrence chains corresponding to different perspectives on risk can be
identified. In particular, I identify the occurrence chains that most often result in accidents,
and the occurrence chains that most often result in accidents of a particular severity (e.g.,
which chains are most likely to result in fatal accidents).
The analysis approach consists of three steps, as described next.

Figure 14: Directed network between occurrence chain and accidents.
First, I identify the occurrence chains corresponding to the accidents. My example from
Table 4 illustrates the process, as shown in Figure 14. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the
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NTSB accident reports place each occurrence in a sequence leading up to the accident. In
this thesis, I designate the final node as the accident. In this case, I therefore have a twonode occurrence chain (Loss of engine power—non- mechanical, Forced landing) followed
by a hard landing accident.

Figure 15: The non-permissible accident code is introduced into the occurrence chain and
a “new” accident node is introduced.
In some accidents, the NTSB reports “non-intuitive” final occurrences (e.g., loss of control,
loss of engine power). For example, when accident reports suggest that LOC was the final
occurrence, I know that the accident ultimately must have involved the helicopter crashing
into the ground, water, or other object following the loss of control. Thus the NTSB coding
must be missing the final occurrence node. I term these occurrence codes that must have
an ensuing node, though it is not documented, as “non-permissible accident codes”. Tables
284 and 285 in Appendix F show the full list of occurrences that I consider non-permissible
and permissible accident codes. After identifying the accidents with non-permissible
terminating codes, I place the non-permissible occurrence in the chain and introduce a
“New” accident node, as shown in Figure 15. So, for example, if an accident had “250:
Loss of control” as the terminating occurrence, then the chain is re-coded as:
“250: Loss of control” + “New Accident Node”
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In some accidents, only a single occurrence is recorded by the NTSB. One such accident
occurred

in

April 1994

during

an

air-medical

mission

near

Bluefield

VA

(NTSB ID: BFO94FA071). The pilot of a Bell 214 did not execute the correct instrument
approach in IMC conditions (rain, fog, and low ceiling). The subsequent collision with
terrain (230) resulted in four fatalities. The investigators added that better instructions from
the ATC personnel could have prevented the accident. Here, since “230: Inflight collision
with terrain/water” is a permissible terminating occurrence as well as the only occurrence
recorded in the database, I record this occurrence chain as “230S: Inflight collision with
terrain/water”. The suffix S indicates that chain had a single occurrence and was the
terminating occurrence (or accident node).
After

identifying

the

occurrence

chains,

I

calculate

the

presence

(cf. Sorenson and Marais, 2015) of 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗 as number of times each chain j
appears in different types of accidents (e.g., fatal, non-fatal), normalized by the total
number of (fatal, non-fatal) accidents:
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗 |𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑛

=

𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗 AND 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )

#𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

(1)

𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗 |𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑛

=

𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗 AND 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )

#𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

For example, the single node “250: Loss of Control inflight” chain appears in 121 out of
the 845 fatal accidents, thus its presence in fatal helicopter accidents is 14.3%. Note that
midair collision accidents involve more than one aircraft that can have the same or different
sequences of occurrences leading up to the collision (and after).
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3.4.2

Occurrence Chain Statistics

This section provides key occurrence chain statistics. First, I identify the top occurrence
chains in accidents overall. Then, I determine the top chains in fatal accidents, and compare
their presence in accidents that were non-fatal. Finally, I compare the presence of the top
chains overall across different mission types.
3.4.2.1 Old System (1982–2008)

Figure 16: Distribution of occurrence chains in 1982–2008. “250: Loss of control” was
the most frequent chain; associated with 13.5% of helicopter accidents.
Figure 16 shows the frequency distribution of occurrence chains for helicopter accidents
in 1982–2008. These accidents were associated with 422 different occurrence chains,
where the top 10 chains accounted for over half the accidents (54.6% of accidents). 54.6%
of the accidents had only one occurrence, 36.4% of the accidents had two occurrences, and
7.2% of the accidents had three or more occurrences. Accidents had an average chain length
of 1.55 (with SD = 0.67).
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Table 8: Presence of the Top-Five Occurrence Chains in All Accidents
First Occurrence
Loss of control-inflight (250)

Second Occurrence
-

Presence in Accidents
13.5%

Loss of engine power (350)

Forced landing (180)

5.7%

Loss of engine power-nonmechanical (353)

Forced landing (180)

5.4%

Inflight collision with terrain/water
(230S)

-

5.2%

Inflight collision with object (220)

-

5.1%

Table 8 compares the presence of the top five occurrence chains in all US helicopter
accidents in 1982–2008. The presence of each occurrence chain is calculated using Eq. 1.
“250: Loss of control inflight” (LOC) was the top occurrence chain, accounting for 13.5%
of all helicopter accidents. The high frequency of the LOC chain may reflect a lack of detail
in many investigations, since we would expect that LOC would be induced by some prior
event (which may not be known).
Note the occurrence chain “230S: Inflight collision with terrain/water”, where the ‘S’
signifies that this chain was the sole recorded occurrence in the accident. 5.2% of accidents
result from this chain, but unfortunately, the NTSB reports do not indicate what happened
before the collision. Again, as with LOC, I assume that in each accident there must have
been some instigating factor that was not captured by the investigation.
3.4.2.2 Injury-Specific Occurrence Chain Ranking
Next, I identify the top occurrence chains in fatal accidents and compare their presence in
non-fatal outcomes. An accident is fatal if any injury sustained results in death within 30
days of the accident (NTSB, 1998). I group accidents that had serious, minor, or no injuries
as “non-fatal” accidents.
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Table 9: Comparison of the Presence of Top Occurrence Chains in Fatal and Non-Fatal
Accidents
Occurrence Chain

Presence in Accidents

First Occurrence

Second Occurrence

Fatal

Non-fatal

Loss of control inflight (250)

-

14.3%

13.4%

Inflight collision with object (220)

-

10.0%

4.2%

Inflight collision with terrain/water
(230S)

-

9.0%

4.4%

Airframe/system/component failure
(130)

Loss of control inflight (250)

6.4%

1.8%

Inflight encounter with weather
(240)

-

6.4%

1.2%

Table 9 compares the presence of the top five fatal occurrence chains in fatal and non-fatal
accidents. Three of the top five chains overall (Table 6) are among the top five for fatal
accidents; i.e., LOC, collision with terrain/water, and inflight collision with object. “240:
Inflight encounter with weather” enters the top five chains for fatal accidents, highlighting
the tendency of flights into poor weather to result in fatal outcomes.
The loss of control chain appeared most frequently in both fatal and non-fatal accidents.
Unfortunately, the high presence of the single node LOC chain suggests that investigators
had limited information about the occurrences that preceded LOC. In some cases, the
investigators were able to establish the precursor to loss of control. One such example is
the chain “130-250: Airframe/system/component failure followed by LOC”, which
appeared in 6.4% of fatal accidents. System failures, particularly flight control cables and
control surfaces, made it difficult (if not impossible) for the pilot to control the aircraft.
Often, helicopter mission require operation in proximity to objects/terrain. Unsurprisingly,
“220: Inflight collision with object” and “230S: Inflight collision with terrain/water” were
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among the top occurrence chains for fatal accidents. Similar to the LOC chain, the single
node collision with object/terrain chains do not provide any insight into the events that
preceded them.
3.4.2.3 Operation-Specific Occurrence Chain Statistics
The NTSB defines 34 types of operation, of which 20 are reported in the context of
helicopter accidents. When the type of activity being carried out at the time of the accident
is unclear, the NTSB assigns the UNK code22. Table 10 shows the five types of operation
that most frequently resulted in accidents between 1982 and 2008.
Table 10: Top-Five Operation Categories Involved in Accidents
Type of Operation

Description

Accidents

PERS

Personal use

1048 (20.2%)

INST

Instructional flight

868 (16.7%)

AAPL

Aerial application

631 (12.1%)

UNK

Unknown

627 (12.0%)

OWRK

Other work use

386 (7.4%)

Personal use missions accounted for the largest proportion of accidents in 1982–2008.
Accidents involving instructional flights were the second most frequent, accounting for
16.7% of all accidents. These accidents generally involved solo-flights by students, in some
cases accompanied by a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). Flight training also involved
simulated emergency scenarios to better prepare pilots in the event of an emergency during
a non-training flight. However, the pilot’s (or CFI’s) inability to recover from a simulated
emergency often resulted in accidents. DeVoogt (2007) points out the paradoxical nature

In certain accidents, the NTSB coded the mission type as “unknown” or “other work” while also indicating
that the accident was either an “air medical” or “site seeing” mission. Using this information, I identified 157
site seeing accidents and 199 air medical accidents.
22
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of helicopter training—that is, the frequency of accidents during simulated emergencies is
higher than the frequency of these emergencies occurring during non-instructional flights.
He also suggests that student pilots are exposed to high levels of risk during training by
practicing for emergencies that have rarely resulted in accidents during non-instructional
missions.
Aerial application missions generally involve agricultural operations such as application of
pesticides or plant fertilizers. 12.1% of the accidents occurred during this mission.
Collision with objects (e.g., wire strikes) and loss of engine power due fuel
starvation/contamination were among the top causes for aerial application accidents. The
NTSB classified 12% of the accidents under the “unknown” mission category23. The “other
work” mission category, which accounted for 7.9% of the accidents, involved various
flights including cattle herding, blow-drying of plants, and transportation of workers to
worksites.
Table 11: Comparison of the Presence of Occurrence Chains for different Mission Types
Occurrence Chain
First Occurrence

Second
Occurrence

Loss of control-inflight
(250)

-

Loss of engine power
(350)

Percentage of Accidents
PERS

INST

AAPL

UNK

OWRK

15.9%

16.1%

10.3%

11.5%

11.4%

Forced landing
(180)

7.0%

3.5%

6.5%

5.7%

4.7%

Loss of engine powernon-mechanical (353)

Forced landing
(180)

5.6%

2.0%

10.5%

4.6%

8.0%

Inflight collision with
terrain/water (230S)

-

5.4%

6.3%

-

5..9%

2.1%

Inflight collision with
object (220)

-

4.5%

1.8%

11.4%

2.7%

7.0%

In the NTSB database, 1.7% of the accidents had “blank” fields for mission type. For purposes of clarity,
I do not combine these “blank” mission type accidents with those that the NTSB designated as unknown.
23
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The LOC chain has the highest presence in accidents that involved personal flights and
instructional activities (Table 11). As stated earlier in this section, the frequent citing of the
single node chain provides little insight into understanding the causes for loss of control.
Likely reasons for the frequent use of the single node chain are: (1) Lack of information
available to the investigator from the accident site and witness interviews (ref. Figure 12);
and (2) Lack of depth in accident investigation.
The “200S: Hard landing” chain does not appear in the top five most frequent chains.
However, it has the second highest presence in instructional flying accidents; appearing in
15.7% of instructional accidents. The presence of the LOC chain is almost the
same (16.1%), but it tends to result in more fatalities and serious injuries. Many hard
landing accidents involving student pilots happened during the landing or hover-to-landing
phases. Student pilots are usually relatively inexperienced in judging distances and
monitoring RPM.
Inflight collision with an object (220) is the top occurrence chain for accidents during aerial
application missions. Wire strikes, agricultural operations, and main and tail rotor strikes
were the dominant characteristics of collision with object accidents. Also, the probability
of “353-180: Loss of engine power-non-mechanical followed by a forced landing” is the
highest for these operations, suggesting negligence during preflight checks for common
non-mechanical triggers such as fuel and oil levels.
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3.4.2.4 Comparison of Pre and Post-2008 Occurrence Chains

Figure 17: Distribution of occurrence chains in 2008–2015. “240: Loss of control” was
the most frequent chain; associated with 7.6% of helicopter accidents.
The frequency distribution of occurrence chains in 2008–2015 (Figure 17) is similar to that
of 1982–2008 (see Figure 16). Accidents in 2008–2015 were associated with 378 different
occurrence chains. 51.7% of the accidents had only one occurrence, 31.7% of the accidents
had two occurrences, and 16.6% of the accidents had three or more occurrences. In contrast
to the old system (where the top 10 chains accounted for over half the accidents), the top
10 chains in the current system accounted for only 31.9% of the accidents. The reduced
proportion of accidents could be attributed to multiple reasons including: (1) Investigators
leveraged the greater variety of occurrence codes in the current system (98 compared to 54
in the old system) to better represent accidents; (2) Greater variety of accidents; or (3) just
that the sample size is smaller (fewer accidents) and hence the proportion estimate has not
converged to the true proportion24.

24

Owing to the lower accident count, there might be fewer accidents associated with a particular occurrence
chain j. As more accidents occur (and are recorded by the NTSB in current system), the frequency of this
chain j might increase—thus increasing the proportion of accidents associated with the chain.
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Table 12: Comparison of Occurrence Chains Pre and Post-2008
Information

Old System

Current System

(1982–2008)

(2008–2015)

Number of accidents

5218

982

Number of Occurrences

54

98

Number of occurrence chains

422

378

Top occurrence chain
(% presence)

250: Loss of control inflight
(13.5%)

240: Loss of control inflight
(7.6%)

Average chain length (and SD)

1.55 (0.67)

1.73 (0.95)

Number of single node chains

51

89

Accidents per occurrence chain

12.3

2.6

Table 12 compares key information for occurrence chains that were recorded under the old
and current systems. Investigators frequently attributed accidents to Inflight loss of
control—the top occurrence chain in accidents recorded under the old and current systems.
Unfortunately, the continued use of the single node LOC chain does not help us (safety
analysts) better understand LOC accident causation. In fact, the proportion of single node
chains increased in the current system (23.5% compared to 12.1% in the old system). A
comparison of the chain lengths reveals a statistically significant (confidence level of 5%)
higher average for chains in the current system. The Cohnen’s d value is 0.24, indicating
that the size of the difference between the means is moderate.
The current system also introduced over 40 new occurrences to better represent accidents.
One such example is the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and non-CFIT occurrences.
The old system did not explicitly mention CFIT in the coding system, making it difficult
for the analyst to identify such accidents. In the subsequent chapter, I will present an
approach to identifying CFIT accidents using the old system.
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The last row of Table 10 presents the accidents per occurrence chain metric. This metric
captures the average “usage” of an occurrence chain to capture accidents. In 2008–2015,
each occurrence chain captures only 2.6 accidents—almost five times less than in 1982–
2008. The lower number of accidents per occurrence chain in the current system suggests
that a greater variety of chains is used by investigators. Tracking this metric, as more
accidents are recorded, could potentially provide a better insight into: (1) the variety of
occurrence chains used by investigators to capture accidents; and (2) the different accident
trajectories.
3.4.3

Lesson Learned from Occurrence Chain Analysis

I began this chapter by asking the following question:
Can we learn more about GA accident causation by counting and comparing these
occurrence chains?
The answer is yes, we can learn a little more than just a root cause analysis. In Section 3.4,
I demonstrated the occurrence chain approach to identifying accident “stories”. My
analysis showed that accident stories tended to be short; that is, over 82% of the accidents
in 1982–2015 had a maximum of two nodes. I ranked occurrence chains based on their
presence in accidents. The high presence of the single node loss of control (LOC) chain,
while highlighting the well-known tendency for pilots to lose control, also suggests a lack
of information available to investigators to reconstruct the accident story.
The occurrence chain approach also helps with comparing accident stories across different
injury severity levels. Take for instance the single node hard landing chain (200S)—it has
the highest presence in instructional flight accidents and generally resulted in minor or no
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injuries to the occupants. Occurrence chains also help highlight mission-specific safety
issues. For example, in 2008–2015, “220: Low altitude operations” chain (not present in
the pre-2008 system) had the highest presence in aerial application accidents. This chain
highlights the tendency for pilots during aerial application missions to fly in proximity to
the ground.
While this approach helps us think beyond a single root cause by identifying the most risky
event sequences, it does not provide a complete picture of an accident. I discuss some of
the key issues with the occurrence chain technique in the remainder of this section.
Like with any chain of events model, this approach also suffers from backward chain
propagation, where the assignment of an initiating event can be arbitrary as it is dependent
on the stopping point when going backward in the event chain. To illustrate this point,
recall the earlier example involving a fatal crash that occurred in poor weather condition
(NTSB ID: BFO94FA071). Inflight collision with terrain/water (230) was the only
occurrence used in this accident. However, one could ask why this accident was not coded
as “240–230: Inflight encounter with weather followed by an inflight collision with
terrain/water”. The occurrence chain technique is dependent on an investigator’s
interpretation of the sequence of events that led to an accident.
While the low average chain length might suggest lack of information available in the
accident, the occurrence chain technique does not leverage all the information available in
the subject codes and modifiers. Often, subject codes provide vital information to
understanding the reasons behind an occurrence. For example, many LOC accidents are
associated with the subject-modifier combination “poor inflight planning/decision making”.
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Here, I can say that the pilot’s poor decision was one of the causes for LOC. In addition to
not using subject codes, the large variety of occurrence chains (422 in the old system and
378 in the current system) makes it difficult to propose any intervention strategies.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several researchers have analyzed NTSB accident data to
identify the causes for GA accidents. Some research looked exclusively at occurrences (or
occurrence chains) to explain accident causation. Other GA accident literature focuses on
the subject codes that are designated as “causes” or “factors” by the NTSB. In an effort to
potentially better understand GA accident causation, in the next chapter, I propose a statebased accident model.
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CHAPTER 4.

A STATE-BASED AVIATION ACCIDENT MODEL

One of the key objectives of accident investigations is to learn how to prevent future
accidents. In Chapter 3, I presented the NTSB’s accident recording system and analyzed
the top occurrence chains in helicopter accidents. The NTSB accident coding system lends
itself to a chain of events model of accidents. Such models have several limitations
(Leveson, 2001), in particular, not all aspects of an accident can be viewed as “events”
(e.g., poor training is a continuing condition, or state, rather than an event). In this chapter,
I propose a state-based accident modeling approach to potentially better understand GA
accident causation.
Section 4.1 reviews the fundamental elements of a state-based approach. In Section 4.2, I
provide the definitions for a system, nominal state, and hazardous state using illustrative
helicopter accident examples. Section 4.3 describes the dictionary of hazardous states and
trigger events from the NTSB accident database. Section 4.4 details how I use the accident
data to build the “grammar” that links hazardous states to trigger events.

4.1

Basic Elements of State-based Approach

Before discussing the details of how I use NTSB data to build the accident model, it is
important to understand the basic elements of the model. Figure 18 shows a state-based
representation of a notional system.
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Figure 18: State-based representation of a simple notional system. The nodes represent
the different states of the system, the links with arrows represent the transitions. Triggers
cause the system to transition from one state to another (or remain in the same state).
The basic elements of the state-based model are: (1) states; and (2) triggers.
State: Segments of time wherein a system exhibits a particular behavior. The nodes in
Figure 1 represent the two possible states of the notional system. The link with the black
node points to the “default” or “start” state of the system. A system must be in one and
only one state at any given point of time.
Triggers: Occur at precise instants of time and cause a system to transition between states
or remain in the same state. Triggers may be deterministic or stochastic. In some cases, the
amount of time spent in a state can cause the system to move to a new state (e.g., the time
spent flying through instrument meteorological or IMC conditions can trigger a spatial
disorientation state). If the system remains in a state beyond a specified time bound, it
triggers a time-out, which transitions the system to a new state.

4.2

Definitions of System and States in the Accident Model

For the state-based aircraft accident model, the helicopter and the pilot(s) operating the
helicopter constitute the system. I graphically represent the two constituents of the system
as two halves of a circle—the top half representing the state of the pilot(s) operating the
aircraft, and the bottom half representing the state of the aircraft (Figure 19).
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Figure 19: Building the system from its constituent parts. The top half of the circle
represents the state of the pilots operating the aircraft, while the bottom half represents
the states of aircraft.
The state25 of a system at any instant of time is given by:
Pilot
𝑥(𝑡) = [
]
Aircraft

(2)

where, 𝒙(𝒕) represents the state of the system at any given instant of time 𝒕.
A nominal state for the system is defined as a state of system operation that is accepted as
safe by society. The system is said to be in a nominal state if both constituents of the system
(pilot and aircraft) are in a nominal state, as shown by the green circle in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Illustration of the nominal state for the system.
Operating the system in a nominal state does not imply that the system is absolutely (100%)
safe26. It just means that the system is in a less unsafe state compared to a hazardous state.
A hazardous state for the system can be defined as “A state of system operation that is
less safe compared to the nominal state (i.e., off-nominal operation)”. The state
immediately preceding an accident or incident must be a hazardous state—the system

25

The state-based approach used in this thesis does not attempt to model the dynamics of the entire system.
Here, I leverage historical accident data to model the different states of a system (pilot and aircraft) during
operation, and to identify triggers that cause the system to transition between states.
26
While in reality there is no system that can be 100% safe, for completeness, I state that, a system that is
100% safe cannot transition to a hazardous state; i.e., it always transitions back to the 100% safe state.
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cannot transition directly from a nominal to an accident/incident state. The system is said
to be in a hazardous state if it is in one of the following scenarios:
a) Pilot is in a hazardous state.
b) Aircraft is in a hazardous state.
c) Both pilot and aircraft are in a hazardous state.
Figure 21 illustrates the three scenarios (a, b, and c) in which the system is in a hazardous
state.

Figure 21: Illustration of the three possible scenarios in which a system is said to be in a
hazardous state. Scenario (a) happens when the pilot is in a hazardous state (e.g., physical
impairment due to prescription medication), scenario (b) occurrs when the aircraft is in a
hazardous state (e.g,, poorly maintained aircraft or loss of control state), and scenario (c)
happens when both (a) and (b) occur.
The mathematical representation of a system’s hazardous state (based on the source of the
hazard) are given by:
Pilot haz
𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑧 (𝑡) = [
]
Aircraft

(3)

𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑧 (𝑡) = [

Pilot
]
Aircraft haz

(4)

𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑧 (𝑡) = [

Pilot haz
]
Aircraft haz

(5)

where, xhaz (t) indicates that the system is in a hazardous state, Pilot haz indicates that the
pilot is the source of the hazard, and Aircraft haz indicates that the aircraft is the source of
the hazard.
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The system can start a mission in either the nominal flight state or a hazardous state,
transition through a set of hazardous states during flight, and end in one of three possible
end states: (1) accident; (2) incident; or (3) safe landing.
To facilitate a better understanding of the different states and triggers, I consider examples
of accidents under the following categories:
1. A flight that began with the system in a hazardous state due to poor aircraft
maintenance.
2. A flight that began with the system in a hazardous state due to pilot impairment.
3. A flight that began with the system in a nominal state.
Preflight Mechanical Issue due to Improper Maintenance (NTSB ID: DEN84FA207)
In a July 1984 accident near Englewood, CO, a Bell 206B experienced an on-board system
failure and subsequent loss of control before colliding with terrain. The resulting accident
killed both the pilot and the passenger. The NTSB cited incorrect maintenance installation
as one of the causes for this accident.

Figure 22: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began with the
system in a preflight mechanical issue state. Improper maintenance was one of the causes
for this accident.
Figure 22 shows a state-based representation of the same accident. The preflight
mechanical issue state was triggered by improper maintenance installation, insufficient
information/checklist provided by the manufacturer, and the pilot’s failure to detect the
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mechanical issue during a preflight check27. In this accident, all trigger information was
available in the accident codes (see Section 4.3.2 for a discussion of cases where the trigger
information is not available).
The system began operation with an existing mechanical issue. Subsequently, the cyclic
control disconnected, triggering a transition to a system failure state. The failure of a
critical helicopter control component (i.e., cyclic) rendered the aircraft uncontrollable (as
shown by the “control not possible” trigger), triggering a transition to an inflight loss of
control (LOC) state. The helicopter crashed into the surrounding terrain, fatally injuring all
occupants.
Flight that began with an impaired pilot (NTSB ID: CHI03FA181)
In June 2003, a Robinson R44 II experienced an inflight loss of control and crashed near
Coleta, IL. The accident investigation revealed that the pilot was impaired because he had
taken anti-depressant drugs before the flight. During the flight, he did not maintain rotor
RPM, resulting in a loss of control. He did not recover from the uncontrolled descent and
crashed into the terrain.

Figure 23: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began with the
system in a hazardous state owing to pilot impairment. I add the impaired pilot state to
the improper RPM and loss of control states to indicate the role played by pilot
27

Note that the preflight mechanical issue state has three triggers. I term these this succession of triggers as
a “rapid sequence of triggers”, which I discuss later in this Chapter.
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impairment in the accident. The triggers in red were inferred as they were not recorded in
the database.
Figure 23 shows a state-based representation of this accident. I inferred the trigger events
labeled in red from the accident data as they were not coded in the database. In this accident,
the system began in a hazardous state owing to drug consumption by the pilot, and failure
to follow procedure, as shown in the first node in Figure 23. In flight, the pilot’s incorrect
throttle or collective input triggered a transition to the improper RPM state. Since the pilot
failed to correct his throttle/collective input, the system transitioned to a loss of control
state. The impaired pilot’s failure to recover from the uncontrolled descent transitioned the
system to a collision with terrain accident (end state).
Flight that began in a Nominal State (NTSB ID: DEN00GA050)
In February 2000, the pilot of a Bell OH-58A+ was executing a practice autorotation to do
a functional check of the free-wheeling unit28. While trying to exit the autorotation, the
pilot failed to follow the procedure for a power recovery (where the pilot should gently roll
the throttle back on, let the engine and rotor RPM needles coincide, and raise the collective).
The failed power recovery resulted in an inflight loss of control and subsequent collision
with terrain. The accident killed both occupants.

28

Helicopters are fitted with a freewheeling unit to prevent the main rotor from driving the engine in the
event of the main rotor RPM exceeding the engine RPM.
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Figure 24: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began in a nominal
state during a practice autorotation, but transitioned to an inflight loss of control accident.
Figure 24 shows the state-based representation of this accident. The system began in a
nominal state while practicing autorotations; however, the pilot’s failure to execute a power
recovery triggered a loss of control. The pilot failed to apply corrective action to recover
from the loss of control state, resulting in a transition to a collision with terrain end state.

4.3

Using Accident Data to Create a Dictionary of Hazardous States, Triggers, and
Information Codes

The state-based accident model requires a set, or vocabulary, of states and triggers that may
appear in accidents. The different states and triggers can be defined using multiple potential
sources (e.g., helicopter flight physics models, expert surveys). Since the focus of this
thesis is to try to better understand the causes for helicopter accidents recorded in the
NTSB’s database, I defined states and triggers by using the codes from the NTSB’s
accident coding manual.
In this section, I present a set of hazardous states and triggers. These definitions are based
on the NTSB accident data coding manual, as well as, where applicable, accident statistics.
The NTSB coding manuals for the pre- and post-2008 systems together contain nearly 3384
different subject codes, modifiers, occurrences, and phase of flight codes. In compiling
these definitions, I create a logical expression that defines how each NTSB code or set of
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codes is translated into states, triggers, or information codes. This set of logical expressions
covers both the old (pre-2008) and current (post-2008) accident coding systems, thereby
facilitating a continuity in the accident analysis. I use these logical expressions to construct
a computer program (in MATLAB®) that automatically identifies the states, triggers, and
information codes corresponding to accidents in the NTSB database.
4.3.1

Hazardous States

Using the NTSB accident codes, I defined 86 hazardous states in total. 51 hazardous states
are one-to-one equivalents of occurrence or subject codes; i.e., these states correspond to
only one code, and vice versa. For example, the subject code “24802: Ground resonance”
translates directly to the ground resonance hazardous state, as shown in Table 13. The table
reads as follows. The first row gives the state name. The second row explains what the state
is. Next, the table shows the expression for the pre-2008 codes. In this case, the expression
is a simple one-to-one correspondence. The remainder of the table gives the expression for
the post-2008 system. The notes field provides information on how I identified the codes
and expressions corresponding to each state.
Table 13: Ground Resonance State Definition
Ground Resonance
Hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is amplified by the stiffness (and
frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration of the helicopter.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this state by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “ground
resonance”.
24802: Ground resonance
In one case in the pre-2008
database, the NTSB did not
specify a modifier while
recording ground resonance.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this state by
232: Ground resonance
searching the coding manual
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Ground Resonance
for the phrase “ground
resonance”.

The NTSB coding manual has multiple codes that convey the same meaning. Further, the
NTSB uses many of these codes interchangeably while recording accidents in the database.
I defined 28 hazardous states by grouping subject codes, occurrences, modifiers, and phase
of flight codes that conveyed the same meaning.
For example, the NTSB uses several codes to indicate inflight loss of control. Table 14
summarizes the corresponding state definition and logic expression. Each row presents a
code or set of codes that translate into the state—i.e., rows are connected into a single
logical expression with OR statements. For example, in this case, the pre-2008 NTSB codes
250, 110, 24566, 24539, 24524, 24525, OR 553, all translate into the “inflight loss of
control” state (in some cases with appropriate modifiers, as indicated in the table). The
remainder of the table gives the expression for the post-2008 system.
Table 14: Inflight Loss of Control State Definition
Inflight Loss of Control
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime
(FAA, 2016b).
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
250: Loss of control inflight
110: Uncontrolled altitude deviation
I identified these codes by
24566: Aircraft control AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible” OR
searching the coding manual
“reduced” OR “uncontrolled”)
for derivatives of the word
24539: Directional control AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible”
“control”.
OR “reduced” OR “uncontrolled”)
I exclude codes that suggest
pilot action or component
24524: Descent AND (“uncontrolled”)
failures.
24525: Descent rate AND (“uncontrolled”)
553: Uncontrolled descent
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
240: Inflight loss of control
01062020XX: Directional control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect operation/use” OR
I identified these codes by
“capability exceeded”)
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
01062022XX: Pitch control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“control”.
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect operation/use” OR
“capability exceeded”)
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Inflight Loss of Control
01062024XX: Yaw control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect operation/use” OR
“capability exceeded”)
02063040XX: Aircraft control
650: Uncontrolled descent

I exclude codes that suggest
pilot action or component
failures.

Using a similar process, I defined the remaining states, as shown in Tables 53 through 83
(Appendix A).
Finally, I defined 4 additional hazardous states that are not available from the NTSB codes:
(1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); (2) improper autorotation; (3) preflight
mechanical issues; and (4) Preflight pilot hazardous state.
Controlled flight into terrain/object (CFIT) is a hazardous state where an airworthy aircraft,
which is under pilot control, is inadvertently flown into terrain, water or an object. The
NTSB’s post-2008 coding system has a code that matches this state, i.e., “120: Controlled
flight into terrain/object”. The pre-2008 system does not have a similar code. Thus, I
defined the CFIT state for the pre-2008 system as shown in Table 15.
Table 15: Controlled Flight into Terrain/Object (CFIT) State Definition
Controlled Flight into Terrain/Object (CFIT)
Hazardous state where which an airworthy aircraft (under pilot control) is inadvertently flow into terrain,
water, or an object.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water AND NOT (Inflight loss of
The definition for CFIT
control state OR loss of engine power state OR system failure state)
indicates that the aircraft
should be airworthy and under
the control of the pilot at the
time of impact. Thus, I defined
this state as any collision with
terrain/object that did not
220: Inflight collision with object AND NOT (Inflight loss of control
involve any issues with the
state OR loss of engine power state OR system failure state)
engine or systems (which
satisfies the definition of
airworthy), and did not involve
loss of control
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The post-2008 coding system
120: Controlled flight into terrain/object
has a code that is a one-to-one
map for the CFIT state.
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Autorotation is a state of helicopter flight where the main rotor blades are driven only by
aerodynamic forces and not by the engine. Helicopter pilots are trained to perform
autorotative landings in the event of losing engine power. To execute a successful
autorotation, pilots are instructed to maintain best gliding airspeed and requisite rotor RPM
(through collective inputs), perform a flare (by aft cyclic motion) to reduce airspeed and
maintain the correct descent angle and rate, and finally perform a safe landing.
While there might be situations where correctly-performed autorotations ended in
accidents due to unfavorable terrain; here, I want to identify those autorotations that were
not correctly executed, i.e., improper autorotations. Table 16 presents the different logical
expressions that define an improper autorotation.
Table 16: Improper Autorotation State Definition
Improper Autorotation
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent,
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24520: Autorotation AND (24518: Altitude AND (“inadequate” OR
“misjudged” OR “low” OR “improper” OR “not maintained” OR
The key elements to a
“delayed” OR “below” OR “unavailable” ))
successful autorotation are:
24520: Autorotation AND (24519: Proper altitude AND (“not
 Maintaining rotor RPM
maintained” OR “not attained” OR “exceeded” OR “below” OR
 Maintaining airspeed
“misjudged”))
 Performing a correct
24520: Autorotation AND (24524: Descent AND (“excessive” OR
descent, with proper descent
“not maintained” OR “exceeded”, “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR
rate
“intentional” OR “uncontrolled”, “misjudged” OR “premature” OR

Performing a correct flare
“not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible” OR “not corrected” OR
(or level-off)
“intentional” OR “premature”)
24520: Autorotation AND (24525: Proper descent rate AND
I combined the 24520:
(“excessive” OR “not maintained” OR “exceeded” OR “improper”
Autorotation code with the
OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional” OR “misjudged” OR
codes corresponding to each of
“uncontrolled” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible” OR
the above elements (along with
“not corrected”))
the logical expressions for each
24520: Autorotation AND (24535: Flare AND (“misjudged” OR “not
of the elements).
possible” OR “not attained”, “delayed” OR “inadequate” OR “low”
OR “high” OR “premature” OR “reduced” OR “abrupt” OR
I included the 24520 code with
“improper” OR “not possible” OR “excessive” OR “not performed”
the modifiers that suggested
OR “abrupt” OR “inaccurate” OR “not successful” ))
improper autorotation.
24520: Autorotation AND (24534: Level-off AND (“improper” OR
“not possible” OR “misjudged” OR “not attained” OR “delayed” OR
“inadequate” OR “premature” OR “high”))
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Improper Autorotation
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent,
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation.
24520: Autorotation AND (24803: Height/velocity curve AND
I included the forced landing
(“exceeded” OR “not complied with” OR “below” OR “not followed” occurrence and the emergency
OR “not attained” OR “disregarded” OR “low” OR “intentional” OR
descent phase of flight code
“not obtained/maintained”))
24520: Autorotation AND (22308: Adequate rotor RPM AND (“not
maintained” OR “not possible” OR “not attained” OR “not available”
OR “misjudged” OR “not followed” OR “delayed”))
24520: Autorotation AND (24558: Rotor RPM AND (“not
maintained” OR “misjudged” OR “low” OR “high” OR “inadequate”
OR “reduced” OR “excessive” OR “exceed” OR “improper” OR
“diminished” OR “ not possible” OR “diminished” OR “not verified”
OR “not identified” OR “not corrected” OR “not
obtained/maintained” OR “not attained”)
24520: Autorotation AND (24506: Airspeed AND (“not maintained”
OR “excessive” OR “inadequate” OR “low” OR “misjudged” OR
“not attained” OR “reduced” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR
“misjudged” OR “below” OR “exceeded” OR “initiated” OR “high”
OR “excessive”))
24520: Autorotation AND (24509: Airspeed-minimum control speed
with the critical engine inoperative AND (“not maintained”))
24520: Autorotation AND (24516: Airspeed-maximum operating
limit speed AND (“exceeded”))
24520: Autorotation AND (“misjudged” OR “poor” OR “improper”
OR “delayed” OR “not maintained” OR “improper use of” OR
“inadequate” OR “uncontrolled” OR “restricted” OR “not obtained”
OR “not successful” OR “not identified” OR “premature”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
601: Autorotation AND (01062037XX: Descent rate OR
01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide path OR 01062041XX:
Landing flare OR 01062010XX: Airspeed OR 01062012XX:
Performance/control parameters-altitude OR 01062052XX:
Performance/control parameters-Prop/rotor parameters
601: Autorotation AND (01062037XX: Descent rate AND (“not
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “capability
exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified” OR
In the post-2008 system, the
“related operating info”))
NTSB records autorotation as a
601: Autorotation AND (01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide AND phase of flight with the code
(“not attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR
601. This code does not have
“capability exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not
any modifiers associated with
specified”))
it. Similar to the pre-2008
601: Autorotation AND (01062041XX: Landing flare AND (“not
system, I build logical
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “not
expressions that include the
specified”))
autorotation code and subject
codes corresponding to the key
601: Autorotation AND (01062010XX: Airspeed AND (“not
elements of an autorotation.
attained/maintained” OR “capability exceeded”))
601: Autorotation AND (01062012XX: Performance/control
parameters-altitude altitude AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect use/operation OR
“related operating info”))
601: Autorotation AND (01062052XX: Performance/control
parameters-Prop/rotor parameters AND (“not attained/maintained”
OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “capability exceeded”))
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The definitions for preflight mechanical issues and preflight pilot hazardous state are
shown in Tables 70 and 71, respectively (see Appendix A).
4.3.2

Triggers

Using the NTSB accident codes, I defined 182 triggers. Similar to one-to-one states, 95
triggers are direct equivalents of a subject or occurrence code. For example, the subject
code “24705: Control interference” translates to the trigger event “Control interference”
(Table 17). The 95 triggers that are direct equivalents are shown in Tables 210 through 308
(Appendix B).
Table 17: Control interference Trigger Definition
Control interference
This trigger, as the name suggests, impedes the pilot from controlling the aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
Note that the NTSB used the
“performed” modifier to
24705: Control interference AND (“inadvertent” OR “encountered”
indicate control interference by
OR “improper” OR “conflicting” OR “not removed” OR “excessive”
a passenger, and “initiated”
OR “performed” OR “initiated”)
when a pilot tried to take over
the controls when another pilot
was flying the helicopter
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Similar to the process I followed for defining “many-to-one” hazardous states, I defined 26
many-to-one triggers by combining NTSB codes that conveyed the same meaning. Table
18 defines the failure to remove aircraft/rotor tie-down trigger. Tables 135 through 159
(Appendix B) present these triggers.
Table 18: Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down Trigger Definition
Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down
This trigger represents failure of ground personnel or pilot(s) to remove a tie-down before flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
23316: Ground tie-down rope/strap AND (“not removed”)
I identified these codes by
17118: Miscellaneous equipment/furnishings—Aircraft tie-down(s)
searching the coding manual
AND (“not removed” OR “separation” OR “entangled”)
for the phrase “tie-down”. I did
not include the code that
24008: Tie down AND (“not removed”)
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Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down
24810: Rotor blade tie-down(s) AND (“not removed”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01011020XX: Aircraft handling/service—Parking/securing-Tiedown/mooring
01011000XX: Aircraft handling/service—Parking/securing (general)
AND (“incorrect use/operation”)

corresponded to securing cargo
under this trigger.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “tie-down”. I did
not include the code that
corresponded to securing cargo
under this trigger.

Table 19 shows the definition for the improper preflight planning trigger. I searched the
coding manual for the word “preflight”, and derivatives of the word “plan” and “prepare”.
Table 19 shows the codes and logical statements for this trigger. The codes in the pre-2008
system (24001, 24002, and 24405) convey the same meaning—that the pilot did not carry
out a proper preflight plan.
Table 19: Improper Preflight Planning Trigger Definition
Improper Preflight Planning
This trigger represents incorrect or insufficient planning by the pilot(s) before flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24001: Preflight planning/preparation AND (“inadequate” OR
First, I searched for the word
“improper” OR “poor” OR “not performed” OR “inaccurate” OR
“preflight” and derivatives of
“intentional”)
the word “plan” and “prepare”
24002: Aircraft preflight AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR
in the NTSB coding manual. I
“poor” OR “not performed” OR “inaccurate” OR “disregarded”)
did not include codes for
24405: Preflight briefing service OR (“not obtained” OR “not used”
inflight planning.
OR “improper use of” OR “incorrect”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
030: Preflight/dispatch event
First, I searched for the word
“preflight” and derivatives of
02061000XX: Planning/preparation (general)
the word “plan” and “prepare”
02061010XX: Planning/preparation—Performance calculations
in the NTSB coding manual.
02061015XX: Planning/preparation—Weight/balance calculations
02061020XX: Planning/preparation—Weather planning
While these codes do not
02061025XX: Planning/preparation—Flight planning/navigation
necessarily convey the same
meaning, they can be placed
02061030XX: Planning/preparation—Fuel planning
under a hierarchy for preflight
planning (see Figure 8).

All the post-2008 codes classified under the improper preflight planning trigger system do
not necessarily convey the same meaning; however, they can be placed in an improper
preflight planning hierarchy (Figure 25). Using this hierarchy facilitates counting not just
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the number of instances improper preflight planning triggered hazardous states, but also
the number of times each of the constituents of the hierarchy appeared in accidents.

Figure 25: A trigger hierarchy for improper preflight planning. Using this hierarchy
facilitates counting not just the number of instances improper preflight planning (toplevel trigger) triggered hazardous states, but also the number of times each of the
constituents (second-level triggers) of the hierarchy appeared in accidents.
Similar to preflight planning, consider the example of the “rotorcraft flight control failure”
trigger, shown in Table 20. Here, each of the rows are individual triggers that can also be
grouped under the “rotorcraft flight control failure” hierarchy, as suggested by the
hierarchies in the NTSB coding manual. I tabulate similar such hierarchies in Tables 160
through 209 (Appendix B), and use the blue shade for convenient identification.
Table 20: Using the existing NTSB hierarchy of subject codes to define the rotorcraft
flight control failure trigger. These codes indicate structural failure/malfunction of
rotorcraft flight control components
Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
10900: Rotorcraft flight control (general) AND
(“disconnected” OR “separation” OR “cut/severed”
OR “jammed” OR “fatigue” OR “inadequate” OR
“undetermined” OR “disabled” OR “vibration” OR
These codes are those given the NTSB
“failure-total” OR “failure”)
hierarchy. Each row is an individual (secondlevel) trigger.
10901: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control AND
(“disconnected” OR “separation” OR “cut/severed”
OR “jammed” OR “fatigue” OR “inadequate” OR
“undetermined” OR “inoperative” OR “lock” OR “not
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Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component.
safetied” OR “seized” OR “fractured” OR
“oscillation”)
10902: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control rod
AND (“fractured” OR “separated” OR “corroded” OR
“disconnected” OR “movement restricted” OR
“overload” OR “failure-partial” OR “failure-total” OR
“not safetied” OR “not installed” OR “fatigue”)
10903: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic bellcrank AND
(“failure-total” OR “disconnected” OR “inadequate”
OR “fatigue”)
10904: Rotorcraft flight control-collective control
AND (“unlocked” OR “worn” OR “inoperative” OR
“failure-total” OR incorrect” OR “undetermined” OR
“locked” OR “failure” OR “failure-partial” OR
“blocked-partial” OR “disabled” OR “movement
restricted” OR “not secured”)
10905: Rotorcraft flight control-collective control rod
AND (“fatigue” OR “failure-total” OR “disengaged”
OR “overload” OR “disconnected”)
10906: Rotorcraft flight control-collective bellcrank
AND (“jammed” OR “improper”)
10908: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor pedal AND
(“vibration” OR “jammed” OR “blocked-total” OR
“cut/severed”)
10909: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor control AND
(“loss-total” OR “undetermined” OR “failure” OR
“disconnected” OR “fatigue” OR “incorrect” OR
“failure-total” OR “loss-partial” OR “movement
restricted” OR “worn” OR “disabled” OR “lack of“
OR “inoperative”)
10910: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor bellcrank
AND (“fatigue”)
10911: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor cable AND
(“failure-total” OR “chafed” OR “fractured” OR
“failure” OR “loose part” OR “separation” OR
“undetermined” OR “corroded” OR “movement
restricted” OR “disengaged” OR “worn” OR
“overload”)
10912: Rotorcraft flight control-mixing unit AND
(“fatigue” OR “disconnected” OR “failure-total” OR
“separation”)
10914: Rotorcraft flight control-rotating scissors AND
(“disconnected”)
10915: Rotorcraft flight control-swashplate assembly
AND (“disconnected” OR “disengaged” OR “overtemperature” OR “seized” OR “failure-total” OR
“failure-partial” OR “jammed” OR “fatigue”)
10916: Rotorcraft flight control-pitch change rod/link
AND (“overload” OR “loose part” OR “failure-total”
OR “fracture” OR “fatigue”)
10917: Rotorcraft flight control-pitch change horn
AND (“separation” OR “loose part” OR “failuretotal”)
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Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component.
10918: Rotorcraft flight control-synchronized elevator
control AND (“separation”)
10920: Rotorcraft flight control-control rod bearing
AND (“worn” OR “failure-total” OR “separation”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01046700XX: Rotorcraft flight control (general) AND
(“failure” OR “malfunction”)
01046710XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Main rotor
I identified these codes by searching for the
control AND (“failure” OR “damaged/degraded”)
“rotorcraft flight control” hierarchy in the
NTSB coding manual.
01046720XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Tail rotor
Each row is an individual (second-level)
control AND (“failure”)
trigger.
01046730XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Rotorcraft
servo system AND (“failure” OR
“fatigue/wear/corrosion”)

4.3.2.1 Trigger Definitions Based on Position in Accident Sequence
I defined four triggers as a combination of codes and their position in the state transition
sequence. I discuss the approach to identifying these triggers in more detail in Section 4.4.2
(after presenting the rules for sequencing states). Tables 21 through 24 present the
definitions of these triggers.
Table 21: Clipping of Object/Terrain Trigger Definition
Clipping of Object/Terrain
This trigger represents clipping of an object or terrain during flight. I defined this trigger after
sequencing states.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
220: Inflight collision with object AND NOT (an end state) AND
I identified these codes by
NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state)
searching the coding manual for
the phrases “collision with
object” and “collision with
terrain”. I used the state
sequence to ensure that these
codes were not end states.
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water AND NOT (an end state)
In some cases, a post-impact
AND NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state)
fire can result from a collision.
In such scenarios, I treat the
collision as the end state (and
the fire/explosion results from
the end state).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
470: Collision with terrain/object AND NOT (an end state) AND
I identified these codes by
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion postsearching the coding manual for
impact” as end state)
the phrases “collision with
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Clipping of Object/Terrain

120: Controlled flight into terrain AND NOT (an end state) AND
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion postimpact” as end state)

object” and “collision with
terrain”. I used the state
sequence to ensure that these
codes were not end states. I also
include cases where the NTSB
reports CFIT; however, CFIT
was not the end state.
In some cases, a post-impact
fire can result from a collision.
In such scenarios, I treat the
collision as the end state (and
the fire/explosion results from
the end state).

Table 22: Clipping of Wing/Rotor Trigger Definition
Clipping of Wing/Rotor
This trigger represents clipping of wing/rotor during flight. I defined this trigger after sequencing states.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “dragged wing”.
I used the state sequence to
ensure that these codes were
not end states.
160: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other AND NOT (an end state) AND
NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state)
In some cases, a post-impact
fire can result from a collision.
In such scenarios, I treat the
collision as the end state (and
the fire/explosion results from
the end state).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “dragged wing”.
I used the state sequence to
ensure that these codes were
093: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other AND NOT (an end state) AND
not end states.
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion postimpact” as end state)
In some cases, a post-impact
fire can result from a collision.
In such scenarios, I treat the
collision as the end state (and
the fire/explosion results from
the end state).
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Table 23: Clipping in Midair Trigger Definition
Clipping in Midair
This trigger represents clipping of another aircraft during flight. I defined this trigger after sequencing
states.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the word “midair”. I used
270: Midair collision AND NOT (an end state)
the state sequence to ensure
that the midair collision was
not the end state.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the word “midair”. I used
250: Midair collision AND NOT (an end state)
the state sequence to ensure
that the midair collision was
not the end state.

Table 24: Inflight fire/explosion Trigger Definition
Inflight Fire/Explosion
This trigger represents fire/explosion that occurred during flight (before impact). I defined this trigger
after sequencing states.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
170: Fire/explosion AND NOT (an end state)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual for
the words “fire” and
“explosion”. I also used the
171: Fire AND NOT (an end state)
state sequence to ensure these
codes were not end states
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual for
the words “fire” and
“explosion”. In the post-2008
150: Fire/smoke (non-impact)
system, the NTSB clearly
distinguishes between postimpact and non-impact
fires/explosion

Finally, I defined the “time spent in poor weather” trigger as the time spent in poor weather
trigger that causes the system to move from a poor weather hazardous state to the
disoriented/lack of awareness state (Table 25). A (non-instrument rated) pilot relies on
visual cues to correctly orient the aircraft relative to the environment (ATSB, 2011). The
obscuration of these visual cues during flight in poor weather (IMC conditions) and light
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conditions can result spatial disorientation. The NTSB coding manual does not contain a
trigger for the disoriented/lacking awareness state.
Table 25: Time Spent in Poor Weather Trigger Definition
Time Spent in Poor Weather
This trigger causes the system to move from a poor weather state to a disoriented/lack of awareness
state.
User-defined Code
Notes
This trigger is inferred when the
NTSB accident report does not
I defined the time spent in poor weather trigger that causes the system indicate how the system
to move from a poor weather hazardous state to the disoriented/lack
transitioned from the poor
of awareness state.
weather state to the
disoriented/lack of awareness
state.

4.3.3

Information Codes

In some cases, the NTSB codes are neither triggers nor hazardous states—they provide
additional information about hazardous states. I term these codes as information codes. For
example, “19200: Terrain” and “20200: Object” codes provide additional information
about the terrain or object, but do not describe a hazardous state of the system, nor a trigger
that could cause a transition. An aircraft’s phase of flight can also be considered as an
information code (with the exception of “553: uncontrolled descent”, which describes
inflight loss of control and “601: Autorotation”, which indicates that the pilot performed
an autorotation).
4.3.3.1 Information about Object
In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB used “20200: Object” frequently in accidents that
involved “220: Collision with object” hazardous state (or clipping trigger event). The
modifiers associated with the subject code provide additional information about the type
of object the aircraft encountered (e.g., transmission wire, pole, or trees).
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Table 26: Information about the Objects that Aircraft Collided with During Accidents
(post-2008)
Information about Object
This code contains detailed information about the specific objects that aircraft collided with during
flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
Tree(s)
Wire, transmission
Wire, static
Vehicle
Fence
Other
Building (non-residential)
Utility pole
Pole
Residence
Bird(s)
Aircraft parked/standing
Other person
Airport facility
These codes are modifiers
Guy wire
associated with the subject code
Hangar/airport building
20200: Object in the pre-2008
Tower
coding system.
Animal(s)
Fence post
The NTSB used the object code
Aircraft moving on ground
(along with modifiers) to
Not specified in NTSB manual
provide additional information
Undetermined
regarding the object that the
Wall/barricade
aircraft clipped/collided with
Electrical tower
during flight.
Wire, transmission (marked)
Sign
Antenna
Wind sock/indicator
Airport sign/marker
Tower (marked)
Runway light
Electrical tower (marked)
Wire, static (marked)
Other
Ditch
High obstruction(s)
Downhill
Approach light/navigation aid
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
Pole
These codes are modifiers
Runway/taxi/approach light
associated with the subject code
Sign/marker
030220XXXX:
Tower/antenna (including guy wires)
Object/animal/substance in the
post-2008 coding system.
Tree(s)
Residence/building
The NTSB uses the object code
Ground vehicle
(along with modifiers) to
Wall/barricade
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Information about Object
This code contains detailed information about the specific objects that aircraft collided with during
flight.
Wind sock
provide additional information
regarding the object that the
Wire
aircraft clipped/collided with
Person
during flight.
Bridge/overpass
Aircraft
Airport structure
Animal(s)/bird(s)
Fence/fence post
Ground equipment
Hidden/submerged object
Debris/dirt/foreign object
Water/moisture
Snow/ice

For accidents recorded in the post-2008 system, the NTSB provided information about the
nature of the object under the “03022000XX–03022055XX: Object/animal/substance”
hierarchy. The codes in this hierarchy were associated with modifiers such as “contributed
to outcome” and “effect on equipment”, which provide some insight into the role of the
object in the accident.
Tables 410 through 412 (Appendix E) provides the description for different types of terrain,
airport conditions/facilities, and flight phases.

4.4

Creating the Grammar for the State-based Accident Model

In the previous section, I presented the vocabulary to define states and triggers, and
compiled the dictionary (of states and triggers) for the state-based accident model. Now, I
proceed to create the “grammar” that contains the rules for: (1) sequencing the different
states in accidents; and, (2) linking triggers to states.
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4.4.1

Sequencing (Ordering) of Hazardous States

In this section, I present the rules for arranging the different hazardous states in accidents.
Figure 26 shows a simple representation of the working of the computer program that
sequences the states.

Figure 26: Demonstrating the working of the algorithm on a notional accident sequence.
The top half of the figure (a) shows the unordered set of states in the accident, and (b)
shows the states arranged in order after applying the sequencing rules.
The top half of Figure 26 shows the unordered states from the accident report. The
algorithm begins by identifying the preflight hazardous states and end/terminating state,
and placing them at the beginning and end of the accident sequence, respectively. Then,
the algorithm applies the sequencing rules (that I present in this chapter) to order the
remaining states, providing the final ordered set of hazardous states in the accident.
Before presenting the rules for sequencing (ordering) the different hazardous states, I sort
the hazardous states (from the dictionary) into: (1) preflight hazardous states; (2) end or
terminating states; and, (3) remaining states.
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Preflight Hazardous State: as the name suggests, is a hazardous state that appears before
flight; i.e., hazardous system states before being airborne. As stated earlier, the system can
be in a hazardous state if either of the system’s constituents (i.e., pilot or aircraft) is in a
hazardous state. Preflight pilot hazardous states include physically impaired pilot, poor
psychological/mental state, and the pilot’s lack of experience or qualification. Preflight
hazardous state for the aircraft is due to mechanical issues that generally result from
improper maintenance and poor design. Table 27 shows all of the possible preflight
hazardous states. If more than one of these codes appeared, then the algorithm puts them
in the order specified in the table.
Table 27: Possible Preflight Hazardous States in Accidents
Preflight Hazardous States
Hazardous states that appear in the beginning of an accident sequence.
Can appear at the beginning of an accident sequence
Preflight mechanical issue
Physically impaired/incapacitated state
Poor Psychological state
Improper supervision state
Insufficient qualification/training state
Overconfidence/Lack of confidence
Fatigued/overworked state
Anxiety/under pressure state
Preflight pilot issue (nonimpairment/psychological/confidence/fatigue)
Unattended aircraft state
Low fuel state
Low oil state
Low grease state

Notes
If more than one of these codes
appeared, then the algorithm
puts them in the order specified
in the table.
I
classified
supervision as a
hazardous state as it
the instructor’s
attitude.

improper
preflight
represents
hazardous

The low fuel, oil, and grease
states are preflight states only if
they are triggered by improper
preflight planning by the pilot,
improper maintenance by
ground
personnel
(not
filling/applying the correct
amount of fluid).

Prevailing/existing weather and light
The NTSB used the codes
corresponding to anxiety or
pressure to indicate hazardous
pilot mental state prior to flight.
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End State: or terminating state, is a state that appears at the end of an incident or accident
sequence. Hard landing, rollover, and collision with terrain/water are some examples for
end states. Table 28 provides the 13 possible end states for accident sequences.
Table 28: Possible End/Terminating States in Accidents
End/Terminating States
Hazardous states that appear in the end of an accident sequence.
Can appear at the end of an accident sequence
Midair collision
Forced/emergency landing
Collision during takeoff/landing
Inflight collision with terrain/water/object
Hard landing
Dragged wing/rotor/float
On-ground collision with terrain/object
Rollover
Nose down/nose over
Controlled flight into terrain/object
Ditching
Abnormal runway contact
Fire/explosion

Notes
I identified 13 end possible end
states.
The NTSB combined the
collision with object and terrain
codes in the post-2008 system
In the pre-2008 system, the
NTSB sometimes used the
180: Forced landing occurrence
to indicate: (1) an end state; and
in some cases (2) an emergency
descent.

Intermediary States: are those hazardous states that are neither preflight nor end states.
Examples for remaining states include inflight loss of control, loss of engine power, and
low rotor RPM states.
Now, I present the rules for sequencing the intermediary hazardous states. Consider the
vortex ring state (also referred to as VRS or the settling with power state), which occurs
when a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex. The circulation of air at the rotating blade tips is pushed downwards by
aerodynamic forces resulting in a vortex, which reduces the lift and increases the drag on
the blades. A rapidly descending helicopter experiences increased upward flow of air at the
blade root and eventual blade root stall.
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Table 29 shows the hazardous states that can appear immediately after a vortex ring state.
Each row contains a hazardous state that can potentially appear immediately after VRS. If
more than one of the states is recorded in an accident that involved VRS, the states are
arranged in the same order specified in Table 29.
Table 29: Sequencing Rules for Vortex Ring State
Vortex Ring State
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
A high rate of descent, low
airspeed, and applying more
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE)
than 20% of available engine
Loss of control
power to the rotor RPM can
lead to vortex ring state.
After entering the vortex ring
state, generally, the helicopter
experiences a loss of altitude.
In some cases, the tail rotor
Improper go-around
enters a vortex ring state,
resulting in a loss of tail rotor
effectiveness (LTE).
Failure to recover from LTE can
result in an inflight loss of
control.

Maintaining airspeed is critical to helicopter safety during forward flight. Failing to
maintain airspeed can result in hazardous states such as improper translational lift, loss of
tail rotor effectiveness, and aircraft/blade stall. Table 30 presents the different hazardous
states that can appear immediately after the improper airspeed hazardous state.
Table 30: Sequencing Rules for Improper Airspeed State
Improper Airspeed State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct airspeed during flight.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper descent
Maintaining airspeed is critical
Improper altitude/clearance
to helicopter safety during
Improper RPM
forward flight.
Improper translational lift
Pilot can control the airspeed
Vortex ring state
using the throttle (when the
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
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Improper Airspeed State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct airspeed during flight.
Inflight loss of control
engine is operational) or by
manipulating cyclic and
collective controls.
Improper flare

Ground resonance is a hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is
amplified by the stiffness (and frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration
of the helicopter. This phenomenon occurs when an improper landing causes helicopter
airframe to jolt or bounce. Table 31 shows the different hazardous states that can appear
immediately after the ground resonance state.
Table 31: Sequencing Rules for Ground Resonance State
Ground Resonance State
Hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is amplified by the stiffness (and
frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration of the helicopter.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Inflight loss of control
Ground resonance occurs when
the helicopter touches down
On-ground loss of control
incorrectly.

System failure

This phenomenon occurs in
fully articulated rotor systems
where each blade is attached to
the rotor hub through a hinge,
and can move independently of
the other blades.
Owing to the violent vibration
during ground resonance, parts
of the helicopter can break-off,
transitioning to a system failure
state.

In certain cases, the positions of some states in the sequence are interchangeable. Improper
rotor RPM and improper airspeed are examples of hazardous states whose positions can be
interchanged in the accident sequence. Consider for example an accident involving a Hiller
UH-12B that occurred in 1986, near Fall River, KS (NTSB ID: MKC86FA082). The
accident report mentioned that the pilot failed to maintain airspeed and RPM during the
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descent. Here, the system (aircraft and pilot) first entered an improper airspeed state
followed by an improper RPM state. Consider another accident where the order of the
improper RPM and airspeed hazardous states is flipped. The fatal accident occurred near
Niles, OH, when a kit-built Rotorway Scorpion collided with terrain, killing the pilot
(NTSB ID: CHI82FA260). Here, the pilot failed to correct a low RPM state before
transitioning to an improper airspeed hazardous state. I handle such interchangeable
situations by placing them in the order in which they are mentioned in the accident reports.
Table 32 shows the different hazardous states that can appear immediately after an
improper RPM state.
Table 32: Sequencing Rules for Improper RPM State
Improper RPM State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct rotor RPM during flight.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper climb
Set of hazardous states that can
appear immediately after the
Improper altitude/clearance
improper RPM state.
Improper airspeed
Improper translational lift
The helicopter flying handbook
Improper descent
emphasizes the importance of
Vortex ring state
maintain rotor RPM by
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
comparing it to “life” (FAA,
Inflight loss of control
2016c). The appearance of
several key hazardous states
after the improper RPM state
Improper flare
justifies equating this state to
life.

Similarly, I present the rules for the remaining hazardous states in Tables 309 through 358
(see Appendix C).
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4.4.2

Linking States and Triggers

After sequencing the hazardous states, I specify the rules that link the different triggers and
hazardous states. Figure 27 shows a simple representation of the working of the computer
program that links the triggers into (and out of) each hazardous state.

Figure 27: Demonstrating the working of the algorithm on a notional accident sequence.
The top half of the figure (a) shows sequenced and unlinked hazardous states, and (b)
shows the triggers linked to each hazardous state.
The computer program takes in the sequenced set of hazardous states for each accident and
uses the rules I specified to link hazardous states and triggers.
There is a clear relationship between some triggers and hazardous states (e.g., loss of
engine power, system failure state). Table 33 shows the different triggers for the loss of
engine power state. If more than one of these triggers appears in an accident report, I group
the triggers and refer to the group as a “rapid sequence of triggers”.
Table 33: Triggers into the Loss of Engine Power State
Loss of Engine Power State
Hazardous state where the aircraft has lost engine power.
Triggers into this state are
Engine assembly failure
Compressor assembly failure
Combustion assembly failure

Notes
There is a clear relationship
between these triggers (e.g.,
combustion assembly failure)
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Loss of Engine Power State
Hazardous state where the aircraft has lost engine power.
Turbine assembly failure
Exhaust system failure
Propeller accessory drive failure
Ignition system failure
Bleed air system failure
Fuel system failure
Improper use of the fuel system
Lubrication system failure
Engine installation failure
Reduction gear assembly failure
Cooling system failure
Turboshaft engine component failure
Throttle/power control failure
Fuel injection system contamination/failure
Induction air system contamination/failure
Inlet assembly failure
Improper fuel grade
Fuel contamination/exhaustion
Carburetor heat control failure
Improper reading from/failure of engine instruments
Engine compartment failure
Engine compressor stall/surge
Engine pre-ignition/detonation
Uncontained engine failure
Engine accessories failure
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of carburetor heat
Improper use of deicing system
Improper engine shutdown
Deicing system failure
Improper use of deicing system
Unknown reasons

and the loss of engine power
hazardous state.
If more than one of these
triggers appears in an accident, I
group the triggers and refer to
the group as a “rapid sequence
of triggers”.

Similar to the loss of engine power state, there exists a clear relationship between the
system failure state and the triggers associated with it. Table 34 shows the triggers for the
system failure state.
Table 34 Triggers into the System Failure State
System Failure State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Fuselage/wing failure
I identified these codes by
Flight control surfaces/attachments failure
searching the dictionary of
Door/window failure/contamination
triggers that indicated failure of
a system or component.
Flight control system failure
Stabilizer system failure
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System Failure State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned.
Rotor drive system failure
Some triggers are common to
the loss of engine power and
Rotor system failure
system failure states. For
Rotorcraft flight control system failure
example, improper use of the
Airframe component failure
deicing system can potentially
Electrical system failure
trigger pitot static tube
Hydraulic system failure
malfunction (system failure), or
Improper use of electrical system
a loss of engine power.
Improper use of hydraulic system
Navigation instrument failure
Snagging or entanglement of
Rotorcraft flight control failure
external load equipment can
Deicing system failure
trigger a system failure or an
Improper use of deicing system
inflight loss of control. In some
Pneumatic system failure
accidents, the NTSB does not
Improper use of aerial application/external load equipment
report a system failure, but
Aerial application/external load equipment failure/entanglement
indicates an inflight loss of
Entanglement of helmet
control (with the
Improper use/failure of shoulder harness
snagging/entanglement code).
Improper use/failure of seat belt
Entanglement of cargo restraints
If more than one of these
Failure of rafts
triggers appears in an accident, I
Failure of furnishing equipment
group the triggers and refer to
Improper reading from/failure of engine instruments
the group as a “rapid sequence
Lubricating system failure/contamination
of triggers”.
Propeller accessory drive failure
Exhaust system failure
Landing gear failure
Unknown reasons

Certain codes in the NTSB coding manual translate to triggers that have broad definitions,
and can therefore trigger multiple hazardous states in a single accident. Improper inflight
planning/decision-making is an example of a trigger that can be linked to multiple
hazardous states in the same accident. Consider for example a sightseeing accident that
occurred near Humuula, HI, in February 1994. The pilot encountered hazardous weather
conditions, failed to maintain airspeed, and subsequently lost control of the aircraft and
collided with terrain (NTSB ID: LAX94LA134). Improper inflight planning/decisionmaking is the only the trigger available from the accident report and can potentially trigger
three hazardous states: intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather, improper
airspeed, and inflight loss of control. In this scenario, I assign improper inflight
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planning/decision-making as a trigger to all three hazardous states. Table 359 through 409
(in Appendix D) shows similar triggers that could be applied to multiple states in an
accident.
Many rotorcraft accidents involved collision with terrain/objects. In some cases, these
collisions were end states, while in other situations, colliding with (or clipping, hitting)
objects/terrain caused the accident. To be able to differentiate between collisions that are
end states and triggers in accidents, I defined four “clipping” triggers—clipping of
object/terrain, clipping in midair, clipping of wing/rotor, and inflight fire/explosion (see
Tables 21–24 for trigger definitions). Some accident reports indicate that the aircraft
collided with an object/terrain before losing control. For example, in May 1994, the pilot
of a Schweizer 269C lost control of the aircraft and collided with terrain near Hiram, GA
(NTSB ID: ATL94LA100). The VFR-rated pilot inadvertently flew into IMC conditions,
collided with trees, lost control of the aircraft, and impacted the terrain. When I apply the
trigger definition to this accident sequence, the collision with trees translates to “clipping
of object/terrain” trigger.
If the computer program cannot identify a trigger for each hazardous state in a particular
accident, that accident is flagged for manual review.
Table 35 provides all the triggers that can cause the system to move to an inflight loss of
control state.
Table 35: Triggers into the Inflight Loss of Control State
Inflight Loss of Control
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime
(FAA, 2016).
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
I searched for codes that were
Improper use of collective
associated with controlling the
aircraft.
Improper compensation for winds
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
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Inflight Loss of Control
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime
(FAA, 2016).
Improper maneuvering
I excluded codes relating to
system failure (with the
Improper aircraft handling
exception of the entanglement
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
triggers) and loss of engine
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque control
power.
Not possible
Improper load jettison
If no triggers were available
Aerial application/external load equipment entanglement
from the accident report, I
Control interference
inferred triggers based on:
Relinquishing control
 Whether a system
Failure to remove aircraft/rotor tie-down
failure state preceded
Improper use of control friction
LOC If yes, I inferred
Improper trim setting
the
Disturbance by passenger
“impossible/reduced
Improper remedial action
control authority”
Improper use of flight controls
trigger.
Incorrect action selected
 Whether an improper
Incorrect action performed
autorotation/low RPM
Incorrect sequence of actions
(engine not
Delayed action
operational) /VRS state
Lack of action
preceded LOC. If yes, I
Forgotten/omitted action
inferred the “incorrect
Incomplete action
use of
Unnecessary action
collective/cyclic”
Not possible
trigger.
Improper use of procedures/directives
 If the engine was
Clipping of object/terrain
operational, I inferred
Clipping in midair
the “incorrect use of
Incorrect use of throttle and/or collective input
throttle/collective
input”. Also, I used
Incorrect use of collective and/or cyclic
this trigger to indicate
Incorrect use of anti-torque pedal and cyclic
failed power recovery
Impossible/reduced control authority after system failure
after a simulated
autorotation.
 If the helicopter
experienced LTE, then
I inferred “incorrect
use of anti-torque pedal
and cyclic”
 If the pilot was in a
disoriented state before
LOC, I inferred the
No/failed recovery after disoriented state
“no/failed recovery
action after disoriented
state” trigger. I used
this trigger (and not
improper remedial
action) to be able to
differentiate between
codes that appeared in
accident reports and
those that I inferred.
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Inflight Loss of Control
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime
(FAA, 2016).
If more than one of these
triggers appears in an accident, I
group the triggers and refer to
the group as a “rapid sequence
of triggers”.

Similarly, Tables 359 through 409 present the rules linking the different triggers and
hazardous states.
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CHAPTER 5.

ANALYZING HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS USING
STATE-BASED ACCIDENT MODEL

In this chapter, I use three example questions to demonstrate the application and investigate
the potential usefulness of the state-based model. I do one high-level analysis of the 6200
accidents in the database to identify the most frequent states and triggers—i.e., the states
and triggers that are most likely to be associated with, or lead to, accidents. Next, I
investigate the causal patterns associated with two of the most hazardous states—loss of
control and improper autorotation.

5.1

Presence of Hazardous States and Triggers in Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents

Most efforts to reduce GA accidents focus on reducing fatal accidents. The argument made
for focusing on reducing fatal accidents is that, since these accidents have the most severe
consequences, we should first eliminate them. While this goal is worthy, it usually results
in a narrow focus on investigating only fatal accidents, suggesting an underlying
assumption that non-fatal accidents cannot provide insight into fatal accidents.
Unfortunately, fatal GA accidents are often difficult to investigate. In many cases, it is hard
to discern the reasons for an accident if the aircraft is extensively damaged or destroyed in
a post-crash fire. Many fatal accidents have no survivors, making it impossible for
investigators to gather information from interviews with pilots or occupants. Many
rotorcraft do not have on-board flight data recorders (FDR) or “black boxes”, making it
challenging for investigators to reconstruct the reasons for fatal accidents. In contrast, nonfatal accidents, which account for the majority of accidents, offer the potential for deeper
understanding because the aircraft is often not destroyed, and investigators can supplement

106
their accident findings with pilot testimonies. Unfortunately, many investigations do not
take advantage of this potential—in part because these accidents are not fatal and therefore
do not warrant significant investigation resources.
In this section, I argue that data from non-fatal accidents can help us to better understand
the causes of fatal accidents. To make my argument, I apply the state-based accident
modeling approach to 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. I
identify the most frequent states (preflight, remaining, and end states) and triggers in
accidents overall, and compare their presence in fatal and non-fatal outcomes29. I show that
fatal and non-fatal accidents share many causes, thus deeper investigations of non-fatal
accidents may help identify ways to reduce all types of accidents.
I begin by developing a measure of frequency that takes into account that states and triggers
may repeat in a particular accident. Repeated occurrence of a state in an accident does not
necessarily reflect greater importance. For example, the prevailing/existing weather
hazardous state may be mentioned multiple times in an accident to describe various weather
characteristics (e.g., tailwind, high density-altitude). Another example of repeated mention
of a state in an accident involves improper rotor RPM—where the first instance refers to
the rotor RPM being too high while the second instance is to indicate the RPM was too
low. Therefore, we calculate the presence [cf. Sorenson and Marais, 2015] for each 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗
as the number of times that hazardous state was reported at least once in an accident,
normalized by the total number of accidents:

29

The work presented in this section is an extension of previous research (Rao and Marais, 2016).
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𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗 |𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑛𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗 ≥ 1 AND 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )
=
#𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

(6)
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗 |𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑛

𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗 ≥ 1 AND 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )
=
#𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

For example, the LOC hazardous state appears at least once in 2516 out of the 6200
accidents, thus its presence in rotorcraft accidents is 40.6%. The total presence of all the
hazardous states generally does not sum to 100% because a given accident can involve
multiple hazardous states. For example, an accident might involve both loss of control and
inadequate rotor RPM hazardous states.
Between 1982 and 2015, there were 6200 helicopter accidents—16.2% were fatal and the
remaining 83.8% were non-fatal30.
Table 36: Comparison of the Ranking and Presence of End States in Fatal, Non-fatal, and
Accidents Overall.
Presence in Accidents
Description of End States
Overall

Fatal

Non-fatal

Inflight collision with terrain/water/object

45.2%

79.0%

38.6%

Hard landing

19.2%

2.5%

22.4%

Roll over

16.9%

3.2%

20.5%

On-ground collision with terrain/water/object

2.7%

1.1%

3.0%

Forced/emergency landing

1.9%

0.2%

2.2%

30

Similar to the classification in Chapter 3, I group all accidents that did not involve any fatalities as nonfatal accidents. The non-fatal category includes accidents that involved serious, minor, or no injuries.
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Table 36 shows the top five end states in helicopters accidents overall in 1982–2015. The
top five states are ranked based on their presence in accidents overall. The first column
provides a description of the state, the second column shows the presence of the end state
in accidents overall, and the third and fourth columns show the presence of end states in
fatal and non-fatal accidents, respectively. The top five end states appeared in 84% of
accidents. The other eight end states (see Table 27 in Chapter 4) accounted for the
remaining accidents31.
Not surprisingly, 45.2% of the accidents had inflight collision with terrain/water/object as
the end state (flights must end on the ground/water). The deadly nature of this end state is
highlighted by its high presence (79%) in fatal accidents.
The hard landing end state has the second highest presence (19.2%) in accidents overall,
as shown in the second row of Table 36. Accidents that ended in hard landings were
generally survivable, as indicated by the high presence of this end state in non-fatal
accidents. Many accidents that involved improper autorotation ended in hard landings.
Rollovers occur when the helicopter exceeds a critical roll/bank angle while one of the
skids (landing gear wheels) is in contact with the ground. Rollovers appeared third most
frequently in accidents overall. Similar to hard landings, accidents that ended in rollovers
usually did not result in death.
Table 37: Comparison of the Presence of Preflight states in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and
Accidents Overall.
Presence in Accidents
Description of Preflight States
Overall
Prevailing/existing weather and light state
31

17.7%

Fatal
19.4%

Non-fatal
17.4%

6% of the accident did not have a permissible end state. See discussion regarding non-permissible end
states in Chapter 3.
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Presence in Accidents
Description of Preflight States
Overall

Fatal

Non-fatal

Preflight mechanical issues

13.9%

17.1%

13.2%

Qualification/lack of experience

6.4%

11.1%

5.5%

Improper supervision

4.0%

1.6%

4.4%

Overconfidence/lack of confidence

1.1%

3.0%

0.8%

Table 37 shows the top five preflight hazardous states in helicopter accidents between 1982
and 2015. Not all poor weather accidents need necessarily involve intentional/inadvertent
flight through poor weather. While flight in the prevailing weather (or light) state (e.g.,
high density altitude, tailwind, or glare) can be considered less hazardous (than, say, VFR
flight into IMC), the prevailing weather and light conditions could still play a role in the
accident. This state has the highest presence (17.7%) in accidents overall.
Preflight mechanical issues appeared in 13.9% of accidents overall. Flights that began with
preflight mechanical issues had a higher presence in fatal accidents (17.1%) compared to
non-fatal cases (13.2%), highlighting the importance of proper maintenance and preflight
checks.
6.4% of accidents began with pilots who lacked relevant experience with regard to the
aircraft or operating environment. The presence of lack of experience is almost twice as
high in fatal accidents as in non-fatal accidents, suggesting that inexperienced pilots are
more likely to get into situations that result in fatalities.
Table 38: Comparison of the Presence of Intermediary states in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and
Accidents Overall.
Presence in Accidents
Description of Intermediary States
Overall
Inflight loss of control

40.6%

Fatal
60.3%

Non-fatal
36.7%
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Presence in Accidents
Description of Intermediary States
Overall

Fatal

Non-fatal

Loss of engine power

26.0%

14.7%

28.2%

Improper altitude/clearance

15.8%

23.8%

14.0%

System failure

13.1%

17.7%

12.2%

Improper autorotation

9.8%

7.6%

10.3%

Table 38 shows the top five intermediary states (i.e., states that are neither end states, nor
preflight hazardous states). Inflight loss of control (LOC) was the top-ranked hazardous
state, appearing in 40.6% of helicopter accidents in 1982–2015. Accidents involving loss
of control often had severe consequences, as indicated by a high presence of 60.3% in fatal
accidents, versus 36.7% in non-fatal accidents. The presence of LOC in over a third of the
non-fatal accidents (36.7%) provides potential opportunities to learn more about the causes
for LOC by interviewing pilots/passengers who survived the LOC accidents.
Loss of engine power is the second-ranked hazardous state in helicopter accidents, with a
presence of 26.0% in accidents overall. Pilots are trained to perform autorotative landings
if they experience a loss of engine power during flight. Many pilots are able to recover
successfully, as indicated by the higher presence of 28.2% in non-fatal accidents.
The improper altitude/clearance hazardous state appeared third most frequently in
helicopter accidents overall. Failure to maintain proper altitude/clearance from
terrain/objects often results in inflight collisions with terrain/object (end state) or clipping
terrain/object, which can potentially trigger an LOC state. Maintaining altitude is one of
the key elements to a successful autorotative landing. Misjudged or inadequate altitude
during autorotations can potentially result in accidents.
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System failure appeared in 13.1% of accidents overall. Failure of critical aircraft control
systems (e.g., cyclic control) can often render the helicopter uncontrollable. The high
presence in fatal accidents (17.7%) compared to non-fatal outcomes (12.2%) suggests that
flights with inflight system failures were more likely to end in fatalities.
Similar to the previous calculations (see Eq. 6), the presence of a 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 is given by the
number of times that trigger event was cited at least once in an accident (fatal, and nonfatal), normalized by the total number of (fatal, and non-fatal) accidents:
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 | 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑛𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 ≥ 1| 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )
=
#𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

(7)
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 |𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑛

𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑𝑖=1
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 ≥ 1|𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 )
=
#𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

For example, the inflight planning/decision trigger appears at least once in 100 out of the
1005 fatal accidents, thus its presence in fatal accidents is 14.3%. Similarly, it appears at
least once in 422 out of 5195 non-fatal accidents, thus its presence in non-fatal accidents
is 7.8%.
Note that the NTSB assigned the “25000: Reason for occurrence undetermined” subject
code when the reason for an occurrence was unknown—in 11.4% of fatal accidents and
9.4% of non-fatal accidents. Although this code is one of the most frequently cited, I do
not include it in the ranking of top triggers because it does not provide any information on
the actual cause in an accident.
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Table 39: Comparison of the presence of triggers in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and Accidents
Overall.
Presence in Accidents
Description of Preflight States
Overall

Fatal

Non-fatal

Improper maintenance

10.8%

11.0%

10.2%

Improper inflight planning/decision-making

8.9%

14.3%

7.8%

Improper use of procedures/directives

7.5%

10.0%

7.0%

Improper preflight planning

7.0%

7.7%

6.8%

Rotor drive system failure

6.5%

6.6%

6.5%

Table 39 shows the top five triggers associated with helicopter accidents in 1982–2015.
The improper maintenance trigger has the highest presence overall. Improper maintenance
actions include errors (slips, lapses, or mistakes) or violations (disregarding
directives/procedures). Improper maintenance can trigger a preflight mechanical issue
(which is the second-ranked preflight hazardous state). Improper maintenance often affects
key helicopter systems such as the rotor system and rotor drive system (Rao et al., 2016).
Improper inflight planning/decision-making is ranked second based on presence in
accidents overall. It has the highest presence in fatal accidents (14.3%). The coding manual
and accident reports provide little information on the exact nature of poor decisions made
by pilots. A possible reason for the high presence of improper inflight planning/decisionmaking could be that investigators did not have enough information to make a more
accurate determination of what went wrong in accidents (and chose improper inflight
planning/decision-making instead).
Improper use of procedures or directives was more likely to appear in fatal than non-fatal
accidents. This trigger represents situations where the pilots/maintenance personnel had
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access to sufficient information/procedures, and chose to disregard or failed to use them
correctly.
As part of their training, pilots are instructed to complete a thorough preflight plan prior to
departure. The preflight plan includes an airworthiness check, weather briefing, and
consulting navigation charts to plot a flight path and make note of terrain or obstacles.
Failure to carry out or complete a preflight plan can put the flight in a hazardous state
before departure. For example, on a snowy evening in January 1991, an MBB BK-117B1
crashed into terrain while returning from a medevac mission near Sonestown, PA (NTSB
ID: NYC91FA067). The resulting crash killed the pilot and three other occupants. The
NTSB used radar data and flight data recovered from the helicopter to reconstruct the flight
path and altitude. Their investigation revealed that impact with a mountain ridge occurred
at 2440 ft. MSL, while the ridge was 2520 ft. MSL with 40 ft. high trees. The NTSB
concluded that the pilot’s preflight planning did not consider the ridge. In this accident, it
is likely that the pilot took no evasive action because he had limited knowledge of the
impending collision with terrain.
The rotor drive system, as the name indicates, is responsible for driving the main rotor and
tail rotor in a helicopter. Failure of any component in this system triggers a system failure
hazardous state. Recovering directional control of the helicopter, and performing a safe
autorotative landing becomes difficult after a rotor drive system failure. The almost equal
presence in fatal and non-fatal suggests that this trigger is equally likely to appear in both
fatal and non-fatal outcomes.
I began this section by arguing that we can use non-fatal helicopter accident data to
potentially better understand the causes for fatal accidents (and accidents overall). To see
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if there is potential to learn from non-fatal accidents, I used the state-based approach to
identify the top hazardous states and triggers in accidents overall. Then, I compared the
presence of these states and triggers in fatal and non-fatal accidents. The results from the
analysis suggest that we can learn from non-fatal accidents to improve rotorcraft safety.
Poor aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is a feature of both fatal and non-fatal GA
accidents. Poor inflight planning/decision-making was the top trigger in fatal accidents.
While this trigger suggests that an incorrect action or improper setting chosen by the pilot
led to the hazardous state, it provides little information about the actual action taken during
flight. Since this trigger is important in fatal accidents, and occurs frequently in non-fatal
accidents, we have an opportunity to learn much more about it, and potentially prevent
both fatal and non-fatal accidents. One way we could learn from these accidents is by
interviewing pilots or survivors about the incorrect actions that resulted from bad decisions,
and also the circumstances that might have resulted in poor decisions. The interviews might
also lend insight into pilots’ risk perception, confidence in their abilities, and assessment
of situations. Another avenue that could potentially improve our understanding of bad
decisions includes analyzing flight data recorder (FDR) data in fata (and non-fatal)
accidents. While the number of GA aircraft with FDRs is limited, recent efforts to improve
GA safety using flight data records could help understand pilot decision-making.
Improper maintenance was the second-ranked trigger in fatal helicopter accidents, and had
a similar presence in non-fatal accidents. This trigger puts that system in a preflight
mechanical issue state (which happens to be the second most frequent preflight hazardous
state). In many cases, system failures that often follow preflight mechanical issues can
render aircraft difficult (if not impossible) to control. Paying closer attention to the kinds
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of mistakes or violations by maintenance personnel, and the affected systems, can help
potentially prevent future preflight mechanical issues.
Improper preflight planning puts the flight at risk (of an accident) before departure. The
act of not doing/completing a preflight plan not only puts the rotorcraft in a preflight
hazardous state, but also indicates pilots’ hazardous attitudes prior to flight. Not consulting
weather briefings, not noting terrain/objects in flight path, and disregard for preflight
procedures were present in both fatal and non-fatal accidents. Similar presence in non-fatal
accidents could help learn lessons that include: (1) reasons for not completing a preflight
plan; (2) key preflight parameters that were missed (e.g., aircraft weight and balance, fuel
level); and (3) actions (or inactions) due to lack of information (that pilots might have
acquired by following preflight procedure).

5.2

Analysis of Inflight Loss of Control Accidents

Analyses of GA accident data by several researchers and safety teams generally arrive at a
common conclusion—Inflight loss of control (LOC) is the top cause for GA accidents.
Harris et al. (2000) analyzed over 8000 helicopter accidents that occurred during 1963–
1997. They found that LOC was the cause for 625 out of 5371 (approximately 12%)
accidents involving civilian helicopters. In 2010, the US Joint Helicopter Safety and
Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001,
and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons for selecting the aforementioned years for their
analysis). In their analysis, they found that inflight loss of control was the top cause—
accounting for over 41% of the accidents in their dataset (US JHSAT, 2011). In a related
study, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation Measurement Data Analysis Team (US

116
JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US
JHIMDAT, 2014). Their analysis showed that inflight loss of control was not only the top
cause, but accounted for a greater proportion of accidents when compared to the US JHSAT
study (47.5% compared to 41%). A 2012 study by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to improve GA safety termed LOC as the most frequent “defining event” in GA
accidents. In fact, recently, we (Rao and Marais, 2015) analyzed 5051 helicopter accidents
that occurred in 1982–2008, and identified LOC as the most frequent single-node
occurrence chain.
While all of these studies indicated that LOC was the top reason for GA (fixed wing and
helicopter) accidents, they did not provide any information on “why” the accident-aircraft
(and pilot) experienced loss of control. One of the potential reasons for the limited
understanding of LOC causation could be due to the setup of the NTSB accident coding
system. In this section, I use the state-based approach to: (1) check if we are correctly
counting accidents that involved LOC; and (2) potentially identify the gaps in our
understanding of the causes (or the “why”) for helicopter accidents that involved LOC.
Then, I compare the results from this analysis with those of a conventional analysis using
only the NTSB codes.
5.2.1

Conventional Analysis of LOC Accidents from NTSB Database

In this section, I carry out a conventional analysis of the NTSB accident database. I identify
LOC accidents using the NTSB occurrence codes, and determine the top causes and
contributing factors for LOC using the subject codes. Since the accident dataset spans a
32-year period that uses multiple NTSB accident coding systems (pre- and post-2008
coding systems), I present the results from each of these coding systems separately.
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5.2.1.1 LOC Accidents in 1982–2008
I begin by identifying the accidents that involved LOC. In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB
specifies the occurrence “250: Loss of control inflight” for LOC accidents. I identified
1403 (26.8%) accidents that involved LOC, with 22.5% of them being fatal.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the NTSB uses subject codes and modifiers to describe the
various events in an accident. In each accident, they classify some of the subject codes as
causes or contributing factors, and the remaining codes as findings (that are neither causes
nor factors). Table 40 shows the top five subject codes in a causal role.
Table 40: Top Causes for LOC Accidents (pre-2008)
Subject Codes that were causes for LOC

Presence in
Accidents

24566: Aircraft control

16.6%

24558: Rotor RPM

9.3%

24539: Directional control

8.6%

24010: Inflight planning/decision-making

7.0%

25000: Reason for occurrence undetermined

6.3%

Unsurprisingly, the 24566: Aircraft control subject code was cited most often, appearing
at least once in 16.6% of fatal LOC accidents. In 86% of cases, this subject code was
modified with “not maintained”; in other words, (one of) the recorded causes for inflight
loss of control was “not maintaining aircraft control”!
The 24539: Directional control subject code appeared at least once in a causal role in 8.6%
of LOC accidents. Accidents that blamed Directional control point to the pilot’s inability
to maintain lateral directional authority over the rotorcraft. Pilots in these accidents often
encountered situations such as loss of tail rotor effectiveness during hover, yaw and roll
exceedances while compensating for strong crosswinds, or loss of directional control due
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to tail rotor system failure. The directional control code, similar to aircraft control, was
frequently modified by “not maintained”. This code (like 24566: Aircraft control) provides
little information about the cause for LOC.
Maintaining rotor RPM is critical to safe rotorcraft flight. The FAA helicopter flying
handbook emphasize this point by stating that “RPM is life”. In LOC accidents that
occurred in 1982–2008, 24558: Rotor RPM appeared as the second most frequent cause
(9.3% of LOC accidents). Failure to maintain rotor RPM can result in the onset of blade
stall and subsequent LOC. If all the blades stall, the outcome is usually fatal (FAA, 2016c).
The pilot can correct rotor RPM by altering the throttle setting, or appropriate collective
and cyclic control inputs.
24010: Inflight planning/decision-making was a cause in 7.0% of LOC accidents.
Generally, the coding system and accident reports provide little information on the exact
nature of poor decisions made by pilots. In many LOC accidents, the NTSB does not record
the specific actions following a poor decision by the pilot.
Table 41: Top Contributing Factors for LOC Accidents (pre-2008)
Subject Codes that were contributing factors for LOC

Presence in
Accidents

20000: Weather condition

33.1%

19200: Terrain condition

13.5%

20200: Object

7.8%

20100: Light condition

4.6%

34333: Lack of total experience in type of aircraft

2.4%

Table 41 shows the top five contributing factors for LOC accidents. Four out of the top
five contributing factors (weather condition, terrain condition, object, and light condition)
provide additional information about the environment in which the accident occurred.
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Over a third of the LOC accident reports (33.1%) cited 2000: Weather conditions as a
contributing factor to the accident. Accompanying modifiers for this code include “rain”,
“fog”, “tailwind”, and “gust”. The modifiers provide additional information about the
nature of weather in LOC accidents.
The NTSB used 19200: Terrain condition to provide additional information about the
topography of the area. The nature of terrain played a key role in the outcome (e.g., fatal
vs. non-fatal) of many LOC accidents. For example, an LOC accident over grassy
vegetation might be more survivable than an accident that occurs near mountainous terrain.
Similar to the subject code that describes the weather condition, 20100: light condition
indicates the nature of ambient lighting that prevailed at the time of the LOC accident.
Modifiers for this code included “dark night”, “sun glare”, “night”, and “dusk”.
5.2.1.2 LOC Accidents in 2008–2015
I used the occurrence code 240: Loss of control inflight to identify LOC accidents recorded
under the post-2008 accident coding system. I identified 226 LOC accidents, with 20% of
them being fatal.
Table 42: Top Causes for LOC Accidents (post-2008)
Subject Codes that were causes for LOC

Presence in
Accidents

02063040XX: Use of equipment/info—Aircraft control

49.1%

01062000XX: Performance/control parameters (general)

18.6%

01062052XX: Performance/control parameters—Prop/rotor parameters

13.7%

01062020XX: Performance/control parameters—Directional control

11.5%

02041015XX: Action-Incorrect action performance

7.5%
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Table 42 shows the top five causes for LOC accidents in 2008–2015. Similar to the causes
in the pre-2008 accidents, the NTSB frequently attributed not maintaining control
(02063040XX: Use of equipment/info-Aircraft control) and failing to maintain directional
control (01062020XX: Performance/control parameters-Directional control) among the
top causes for LOC. In addition to these two codes, they used a generic code, 01062000XX:
Performance/control parameters (general), to suggest that the pilot lost control of the
aircraft. These codes can be simply thought of as tautologies for LOC, and not necessarily
as causes.
Failing to maintain rotor RPM is ranked third among the top causes for LOC accidents,
appearing at least once in 13.7% of accidents. In some cases, pilots fail to maintain rotor
RPM during autorotative landings. The FAA helicopter flying handbook states the
following while suggesting measures to be taken by the pilot in the event of an engine
failure: “By lowering the collective pitch, which must be done immediately in case of an
engine failure, lift and drag are reduced, and the helicopter begins an immediate descent,
thus producing an upward flow of air through the rotor system. This upward flow of air
through the rotor provides sufficient thrust to maintain rotor rpm throughout the descent”.
Failure to maintain rotor RPM can result in a failed autorotation, loss of control, and
subsequent hard landing.
02041015XX: Action-Incorrect action performance appears at least once in 7.5% of LOC
accidents. This code, as the name suggests, indicates incorrect action by the pilot, which
potentially resulted in LOC.
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Table 43: Top Contributing Factors for LOC Accidents (post-2008)
Subject Codes that were contributing factors for LOC

Presence in
Accidents

02041025XX: Action-Delayed action

3.1%

02041515XX: Info processing/decision—Understanding/comprehension

1.3%

02041520XX: Info processing/decision—Decision making/judgment

1.3%

03021017XX: Terrain-Sloped/uneven

1.3%

01022701XX: Flight control system-control column section

0.9%

Table 43 shows the top contributing factors for LOC accidents. In contrast to the pre-2008
system, the top five contributing factors accounted for only 10.2% of the LOC accidents.
Some of the reasons for the lower presence of the top five contributing factors could be
due to: (1) a larger (and potentially better) set of codes for the NTSB investigators to choose
from; or (2) just that there have been fewer accidents recorded under the post-2008 system.
In the post-2008 system, the NTSB frequently use the newly introduced 02041025XX:
Action-Delayed action code to indicate that delayed action (e.g., control inputs) was a
contributing factor in LOC accidents.
The codes corresponding to decision-making/judgment and comprehension/understanding
appeared in the top-three contributing factors (In 1982–2008, the NTSB listed inflight
planning/decision-making as one of the top causes).
The code 01022701XX: Flight control system-control column section corresponds to the
mechanical failure of the flight control column (also referred to as the yoke). The failure
of the control column generally renders the aircraft uncontrollable.
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5.2.2

State-based Analysis of LOC Accidents

In this section, I present the results from the state-based analysis of LOC accidents. Similar
to the conventional analysis, I begin by identifying LOC accidents from the set of 6200
helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. After applying the definition
for the LOC state (see Table 14 in Chapter 4), I identified 2520 accidents that involved the
LOC state—an increase of 891 accidents compared to 1629 identified using the
conventional database analysis. The larger set of accidents using the state-based approach
can be attributed to the definition for this state, which involves a combination of subject
codes, occurrences, and phase of flight code (compared to the single occurrence that is used
in a conventional analysis of the database). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the NTSB uses
some of these codes interchangeably when referring to LOC in accidents—the definition
for the LOC state in the state-based approach takes into account the different codes used
by the NTSB to represent LOC.
Triggers were available from the accident database for 42.2% of the 2520 accidents. Table
44 shows the top five triggers for the LOC state. Using an expression similar to Eq. 2, I
calculated the presence for each trigger as a proportion of the number of times a trigger
appears at least once in an LOC accident, to the total number of LOC accidents (2520
accidents).
Table 44: Top Triggers from the Database for the LOC State.
Triggers from Database

Presence in
Accidents

Inflight planning/decision-making

10.3%

Not possible

8.9%

Improper remedial action

6.9%

Improper maneuvering

3.5%

Improper compensation for wind

3.2%
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Comparing the top triggers in Table 44 with the top causes and factors for LOC (in Tables
40 through 44) reveals that only inflight planning/decision-making is common across both
the state-based and conventional analyses. As mentioned earlier, the planning/decisionmaking trigger can be linked to multiple hazardous states in an accident.
In some accidents, the pilot was unable to control the aircraft owing to the failure of onboard systems, or was in a flight regime that made it impossible to control the aircraft. The
“not possible” trigger captures these situations and appears in 8.9% of LOC accidents.
Improper remedial action is ranked fourth, appearing at least once in 6.9% of LOC
accidents. This trigger does not provide any insight into the type of remedial action (e.g.,
lowered collective) that was not executed correctly.
Pilots are trained to maintain directional control using the anti-torque pedals that affect the
thrust produced by the tail rotor. Improper compensation for wind can trigger a loss of
directional control. The high presence of this trigger (which provides specific information
regarding pilot action) highlights the tendency for helicopter pilots to misjudge wind
intensity while applying anti-torque pedals.
Next, I discuss the remaining 57.8% (1457 out of 2520) of LOC accidents that did not have
triggers in the accident reports. In these cases where it is not possible to identify the
necessary triggers from the accident report, I infer triggers based on the rules linking the
LOC state and triggers (see Table 14 in Chapter 4 for a description of the rules). Table 45
shows the inferred-triggers for the LOC state.
Table 45: Inferred Triggers for the LOC State
Triggers that are inferred

Presence in
Accidents

Clipping of object/terrain

16.7%

Limited/no control after system failure

7.7%
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Triggers that are inferred

Presence in
Accidents

Improper use of throttle and/or collective

3.1%

Improper use of collective and cyclic

3.1%

Improper use of anti-torque control

2.8%

1874 out of 2520 (74.3%) LOC accidents involved collision with terrain/water or object.
From a conventional analysis of the database, it is not possible to determine if these
collisions caused the accident or were end states. Using the grammar linking states and
triggers (see Table 21 in Chapter 4), I inferred the “clipping” trigger in 16.7% of LOC
accidents. LOC accidents involving this trigger occurred when pilots failed to maintain
clearance from an object/terrain, resulting in “clipping” the object/terrain. Consider for
example the fatal LOC accident that occurred near Umpqua, OR, during an external load
operation (NTSB ID: SEA95LA10). During the mission, the pilot failed to maintain
clearance from an object (in this case, a tree). He “clipped” the object and subsequently
lost control of the aircraft, and collided with the terrain.32
Limited or no control after system failure is the top inferred trigger, with a presence of 7.7%
in LOC accidents. I inferred this trigger when the LOC accident involved the system failure
state. Consider a 1996 accident that occurred near Gretna, VA (NTSB ID: IAD96LA094).
During flight, the main rotor drive shaft failed, jammed the flight controls, and triggered a
system failure state. The pilot had limited control authority over the aircraft and
subsequently entered the LOC state. He attempted an autorotation, but collided with the
terrain. Similarly, I inferred this trigger in LOC accidents that did not have trigger
information in the accident reports.

32

To ensure the correct working of the clipping object/terrain rule, I read multiple accident reports that were
identified by this rule. The NTSB IDs for a sample of these accident reports are: SEA96LA070,
FTW96LA274, FTW96TA383, and CEN09CA339.
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Improper use of throttle and/or collective is the second most frequent inferred trigger,
appearing in 3.1% of LOC accidents. I inferred this trigger only when the accident: (1) did
not involve loss of engine power; and (2) the low RPM state preceded LOC. Describing
how to recover from a low RPM state, the FAA’s helicopter flying handbook states that
“While in flight, RPM may be regained by lowering the collective slightly and increasing
the RPM” (of the engine) (FAA, 2016c).
Improper use of collective and cyclic triggered the LOC state in 3.1% of accidents, as
shown in Table 10. I inferred this trigger when an improper autorotation (not maintaining
RPM after loss of engine power) appeared before LOC in the accident sequence. A recent
addendum to the helicopter flying handbook states that during an autorotation, the pilot
must apply simultaneous aft cyclic (along with collective pitch) to prevent lowering of the
nose and associated loss of RPM (FAA, 2016d).
The improper use of anti-torque control trigger appears in 2.8% of LOC accidents. As
mentioned earlier, failure to compensate for winds using the anti-torque pedal can trigger
a loss of directional control. I inferred this trigger when the aircraft experience a loss of tail
rotor effectiveness (LTE) before LOC. The pilot’s failure to effect anti-torque/tail rotor
control after LTE can result in a loss of directional control.
In some accidents, the NTSB mentioned that pilots in a spatially disoriented state lost
control of the aircraft. In such cases, I inferred the “no action after being disoriented”
trigger. This trigger appears at least once in 1.7% of LOC accidents.
Inferring triggers for LOC accounted for 17.4% or 440 LOC accidents, leaving us with a
deficit of 600 accidents (23.8% of all LOC accidents) which did not have any triggers—
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neither from the database, nor inferred. The computer program stores these accidents for
future review.
5.2.3

Summary

In sections 5.2, I conducted a conventional analysis of NTSB database and identified the
top causes and contributing factors for LOC. Then, I applied the state-based approach to
identify the top triggers for the LOC state. Table 46 compares and summarizes the results
from both analyses.
Table 46: Top Triggers that are inferred for the LOC State
Conventional
Analysis

Number of accidents
identified

1629

State-based
Analysis

The larger set of accidents
using the state-based
approach can be attributed
to the definition for this
state, which involves a
combination of subject
codes, occurrences, and
phase of flight code
(compared to the single
occurrence that is used in a
conventional analysis of the
database).

2520

-

The subject codes for
aircraft control appeared as
the top causes for LOC
accidents recorded in the
pre- and post-2008 coding
systems. The presence of
this subject code provides
no insight into why LOC
happened.

-

The weather condition code
appeared as the top
contributing factor for LOC
accidents in 1982–2008. It
indicates that weather
played a role in the
accident. The use of the new
coding system by the NTSB
revealed that delayed action

Aircraft control
(16.6%) (pre2008)
Top cause
Aircraft control
(49.1%) (post2008)

Top factor

Weather condition
(33.1%) (pre2008)

Remarks
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Conventional
Analysis

State-based
Analysis

by the pilot was the top
contributing factor. While
this code provides some
information about the nature
of the action, it does not
provide specifics (e.g.,
lowering collective).

Delayed action
(3.1%) (post2008)

Top trigger from database

Top inferred trigger

-

-

Remarks

Inflight
planning/decisionmaking (10.3%)

This trigger is not
informative and provides
little insight into the
mistakes/decisions taken by
pilots.

Clipping of
object/terrain
(16.7%)

LOC accidents involving
this trigger occurred when
pilots failed to maintain
clearance from an
object/terrain, resulting in
“clipping” the object/terrain

A comparison of the results from the conventional database analysis and state-based
approach revealed some key differences. Results from the conventional analysis provide
little insight into the causal mechanism for LOC. For instance, listing “aircraft
control/directional control not maintained” as the top cause does not help further our
understanding of LOC accidents.
Results from the state-based analysis showed that pilots’ tendency to clip objects frequently
triggered LOC. The high presence of this trigger is not surprising, considering the nature
of helicopter operations (often in proximity to terrain/objects). However, this information
was not available from a conventional analysis of the database because it does not take into
the account the sequence of states in an accident; i.e., the state-based approach helps
differentiate between a collision with terrain/object that is an end state, or a trigger in the
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accident. Further, the frequent occurrence of LOC after system failure highlights the
importance of aircraft maintenance and preflight checks.
The frequent citing of inflight planning/decision-making (in both approaches) could be due
to a lack of information available to investigators about the actual reason for LOC. I argue
that the use of this code is not helpful; on the contrary, it potentially takes away analysts’
and operators’ focus from specific triggers/causes such as not maintaining tail rotor control.

5.3

State-based Analysis of Improper Autorotation

An autorotation is a state of helicopter flight where the helicopter’s main rotor blades are
driven by aerodynamic forces, and not by the engine. Pilots are instructed to perform an
autorotative descent as part of numerous emergency procedures (FAA, 2016c).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the NTSB’s use of the autorotation code in accidents does not
always distinguish between a successful and improper autorotation. Also, the accident
codes often do not indicate the reasons for improper autorotations. In this section, I provide
background on accidents in the database that involved autorotations. Then, I apply the
state-based approach to potentially better identify improper autorotations, and understand
the reasons behind improper autorotations.
5.3.1

Background on Accidents that Involved Autorotations

Analyzing 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015 reveals that
24.2% of accidents involved autorotations. I begin my discussion of autorotation accidents
recorded under the pre-2008 system. Later in this section, I briefly discuss autorotation
accidents recorded in the post-2008 system.
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In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB used the subject code 24520: Autorotation
(accompanied by 25 different modifiers) to identify 1277 accidents that involved
autorotative descent. Table 47 shows the top five modifiers associated with the autorotation
code.
Table 47: Top Modifiers for the NTSB Autorotation Code (pre-2008)
Description of Modifiers

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

3135: Performed

48.2%

3118: Initiated

17.5%

3100: Attempted

10.8%

3109: Improper

4.9%

3001: “Blank” modifier

4.3%

Three of the top five modifiers only suggest that pilots “performed”, “initiated”, or
“attempted” to Autorotate. The frequent use of these modifiers with the autorotation code
may lead one to incorrectly conclude that a majority of autorotations did not involve any
problems. The “improper” code appeared only in 4.9% of accidents that involved
autorotations. Table 48 provides a distribution of the top modifiers that suggested improper
autorotation.
Table 48: Top Modifiers that suggested Improper Autorotation (pre-2008)
Description of Modifiers

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

3109: Improper

4.9%

3131: Not possible

3.1%

3120: Misjudged

1.7%

3128: Not performed

1.0%
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Description of Modifiers

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

3104: Delayed33

0.9%

The top modifiers that suggest improper autorotation accounted for only 11.7% of the 1277
autorotation accidents (in fact, including the all the modifier that suggested improper
autorotation accounted for only 13.5% of accidents). Further, the autorotation code does
not provide any additional insight into the cause for improper autorotations (e.g., did the
pilot not maintain RPM during the autorotative descent?).
The post-2008 coding system further obscures the role of autorotations in accidents. The
NTSB uses a phase of flight code “601: Autorotation” to indicate that the accident involved
an autorotation. This code is not accompanied by any modifiers, making it impossible to
determine if accidents involved improper autorotations. There were 227 autorotation
accidents in the post-2008 system.
5.3.2

State-based Analysis of Autorotation Accidents

In this section, I present the results from the state-based analysis of autorotation accidents.
Specifically, I want to identify accidents that involved “improper” autorotations. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, the key elements to a successful autorotation are: maintaining (1)
rotor RPM, (2) airspeed, (3) altitude, (4) descent profile/rate, (5) distance from the landing
site, and (6) executing a correct flare/level-off. Thus, I classify an autorotation as “improper”

The other modifiers that suggested improper/incorrect autorotations are: “3115: inadequate”, “3122: not
attained”, “3140: uncontrolled”, “3136: poor”, “3145: restricted”, “3011: not obtained”, “3030: not
successful”, “3110: improper use of”, “3125: not identified”, “3127: not maintained”, “3137: premature”,
and “3144: discontinued”.
33
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if one or more of these key elements are not maintained. Table 16 (Chapter 4) provides the
definition for the improper autorotation state.
I begin by identifying improper autorotation accidents from the set of 6200 helicopter
accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. After applying the definition for an
improper autorotation, I identified 632 accidents that involved the improper autorotation
state—an increase of 458 accidents when compared to the 174 obtained using NTSB
modifiers. Table 49 shows the presence of the key elements in improper autorotations.
Table 49: Distribution of Key Elements in Improper Autorotations
Description of Key Elements

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

Improper RPM

37.5%

Improper flare

28.6%

Improper altitude

11.7%

Improper descent

11.6%

Improper airspeed

5.4%

Improper distance from landing site

1.7%

Operating in the hazardous region of the height-velocity curve

1.7%

Improper level-off

1.6%

Failure to maintain RPM appeared at least once in 37.5% of accidents that involved
improper autorotations. Consider an instructional accident that occurred near Englewood,
CO, in March 1999 (NTSB ID: DEN99LA058). The student and flight instructor were
practicing autorotations when the flight instructor failed to maintain rotor RPM. He was
not able to perform a power recovery (during which the pilot roll-up the throttle and lowers
the collective to gain RPM), and landed hard. While the subject and modifier codes in the
accident report indicate that the “autorotation was performed”, the state-based approach
provides a more complete picture of the accident. Reading the narrative for the accident
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reveals that “the flight instructor allowed the RPM to decay during the autorotation”—
confirming the findings from the state-based approach.
In preparation for landing, the pilot decelerates the helicopter with the use of appropriate
aft cyclic control. During this “flare” state, the pilot needs to avoid a nose-high and taillow attitude, which can result in a tail strike. Table 49 shows that failure to perform a proper
flare appeared in 28.6% of improper autorotation accidents.
Not maintaining the proper descent angle or descent rate can result in an improper
autorotation. 11.7% of improper autorotation accidents involved improper descent. During
descent, pilots should carefully adjust cyclic control to maintain the correct glide attitude,
and adjust the collective pitch to maintain RPM—any sudden collective movements can
trigger an improper autorotation.
In some cases, the NTSB mentions the height-velocity curve (also known as the Deadman’s
curve) in the context of autorotation accidents. This curve shows the heights and airspeeds
above the ground which, in the case of a loss of engine power or system failure, a pilot
should be able to perform a safe autorotative landing. A 1995 accident involving a Bell
206L illustrates this situation (NTSB ID: CHI95LA093). Shortly after takeoff from
Maryland Heights, MO, the helicopter lost engine power. The pilot was unable to perform
a proper autorotation as the helicopter was operating in the hazardous region of the heightvelocity curve. The helicopter sustained substantial damage after colliding with terrain.
Fortunately, all five occupants walked away from this accident, uninjured.
Next, I discuss the different triggers for the improper autorotation state. The rules linking
the improper autorotation state and different triggers are shown in Table 262 (Appendix
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C). Triggers were available from accident reports for 56.6% of improper autorotation
accidents. Table 50 shows the top five triggers from the accident reports.
Table 50: Top Triggers from the Database for Improper Autorotation (pre-2008)
Top Triggers for Improper Autorotation

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

Not possible

11.6%

Improper remedial action

9.2%

Delayed action

5.9%

Incorrect action

3.5%

Improper inflight planning/decision-making

3.5%

In many accidents, circumstance prevent the pilot from performing a correct autorotation.
The circumstances can include failure of vital components (e.g. collective pitch control
lever) or phase of operation (e.g., hovering in the hazardous region of the Deadman’s
curve). The presence of the “not possible” trigger in 11.6% of autorotation accidents
suggests that it was impossible to make an autorotative landing. For example, in April 1990,
a Bell 47 was involved in a serious accident near Oakdale, MN (NTSB ID: MKC90LA088).
In this accident, the rotor drive system failed (specifically, the clutch assembly), forcing
the pilot to attempt an autorotation. During the attempted autorotation, it was impossible
for the pilot to maintain rotor RPM, resulting in a collision with terrain.
Three of the top five trigger for improper autorotation point to some form of improper
action by the pilot. Improper remedial action appears in 9.2% of improper autorotation
accidents. Despite having a high presence in accidents, it provides little insight into the
specific nature of the remedial action. The other two action-related triggers (i.e., delayed
action and incorrect action) also have the same lack of specificity problem.
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Improper use of collective appears sixth for improper autorotation. Correct use of collective
pitch control is crucial to maintain rotor RPM during an autorotation (considering that
engines are generally not operational during autorotations). As I noted earlier (in Table 49),
many autorotations failed because the pilots did not maintain rotor RPM.
Next, I discuss the remaining 43.4% of improper autorotation accidents that did not have
triggers in the accident reports. In these cases where it is not possible to identify the
necessary triggers from the accident report, I infer triggers based on the rules linking the
improper autorotation state and triggers.
Table 51: Inferred Triggers for Improper Autorotation (pre-2008)
Inferred Triggers for Improper Autorotation

Presence in
Autorotation
Accidents

Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation)

10.3%

Improper use of collective and/or cyclic

7.1%

Table 51 shows the presence of the two inferred triggers in improper autorotation accidents.
I inferred the Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation) when the pilot
failed to maintain rotor RPM after initiating a practice autorotation. Consider the example
of a test-flight, where the company pilot was simulating an autorotation on a newly
manufacture Bell L4 helicopter (NTSB ID: FTW91LA154). During the simulated
autorotation, he failed to maintain rotor RPM (now in an improper autorotation state), and
subsequently landed hard. In this accident, I infer that the pilot’s improper use of the
collective led to the RPM decay.
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The improper use of collective and/or cyclic trigger appears in 7.1% of accidents. As
mentioned in Table 251 (Appendix B), I inferred this trigger only when the pilot failed to
maintain rotor RPM or descent profile/rate after experiencing a loss of engine power.
5.3.3

Summary

In sections 5.3, I identified accidents that involved incorrect autorotations by using the
modifiers in the NTSB accident database. Then, I applied the state-based approach to
identify accidents with improper autorotations, and analyzed these accidents to identify the
top reasons for poor autorotations. Table 52 summarizes the results from both analyses.
Table 52: Top Triggers that are inferred for the LOC State
Conventional
Analysis

Number of accidents identified

174

State-based
Analysis

Remarks
The larger set of accidents
using the state-based
approach can be attributed to
the definition for this state,
which involves a
combination of subject
codes, occurrences, and
phase of flight code.

632

In the conventional analysis,
improper autorotations can
be found only using the
modifiers.
The NTSB used the
“performed” modifier
frequently (48.2% of
accidents that involved
autorotations).

Improper (4.9%)
(pre-2008)

Top modifier

-

Among the modifiers that
describe poor autorotations,
the NTSB used “improper”
most frequently.
After 2008, the NTSB
represented autorotation as a
phase of flight (and not a
subject code). This code did
not have any modifiers
associated with it.
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Conventional
Analysis

Top trigger from database

Top inferred trigger

State-based
Analysis

Remarks

-

Not possible
(11.6%)

In 11.6% of improper
autorotation accidents,
circumstances (e.g.,
component failures,
hazardous height-velocity
regime) made it impossible
for the pilot to execute a
correct autorotation.

-

Improper use of
collective
(during
simulated
autorotation)
(10.3%)

I inferred two triggers for the
improper autorotation state.
Improper use of collective
during practice autorotations
can trigger improper
autorotations.

Applying the state-based model helps us identify a larger set of accidents that involved
improper autorotation accidents. As I mentioned earlier in this section, the NTSB used the
“performed” modifier in almost half the accidents that involved autorotations. This
modifier lends little information beyond the fact that pilots carried out autorotations. Using
the NTSB modifiers for poor autorotations suggests that only a small proportion (13.6%)
of accidents involved improper autorotations. Further, the change in the NTSB coding
system (with the use of autorotation as a phase of flight) made it difficult to identify
improper autorotations from a conventional analysis.
Results from the state-based analysis showed that not maintaining rotor RPM and improper
flare were among the top reasons for improper autorotations. This information is not easily
discerned using the conventional analysis because it (conventional analysis) does not take
into account the key flight parameters (elements) that are part of the definition of an
improper autorotation in the state-based model.
In 11.6% of improper autorotation accidents, circumstances (e.g., component failures,
hazardous height-velocity regime) made it impossible for the pilot to execute a correct
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autorotation. Four of the top five triggers from the database involve some form of incorrect
action or decision by the pilot. These triggers, while suggesting that the pilot “made a
mistake”, do not provide additional information about the nature of the mistake.

5.4
5.4.1

Limitations of Data Source
NTSB Coding Manual

I developed the state-based accident model by using the codes provided in the NTSB
coding manual. The state-based approach, while highlighting key differences compared to
a conventional analysis, inherits some of the problems associated with the coding system.
The NTSB coding manual contains several non-informative/non-specific codes that
translate to triggers such as improper inflight planning/decision-making or incorrect action.
The broad nature of these triggers makes it difficult to link them to specific states—in other
words, these triggers can potentially trigger multiple states in the same accident.
5.4.2

NTSB Dataset Analyzed

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I applied the state-based accident model to 6200
helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. The frequent appearance of
certain non-informative/non-specific triggers limits our ability fully understand the causes
for accidents. For example, the presence of triggers such as inflight planning/decisionmaking or delayed action in many fatal and non-fatal accidents do not provide any specific
information that could be used to reduce/mitigate future accident risk.
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CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FUTURE WORK

US General Aviation (GA) has a diverse fleet composition and various mission types. GA
aircraft account for almost 97% of all civil aviation aircraft in the US. GA operations
involve more accidents (and fatalities) compared to commercial aviation (Part 121)
operations. Recognizing the relatively high risk in GA operations, safety agencies (e.g.,
NTSB) and regulators (e.g., FAA) have called for improved safety levels.
One way to improve GA safety is to better understand accidents that have occurred. Several
studies have used the NTSB’s accident database to carry out retrospective accident
analyses. These studies, generally, analyzed the accidents in the database using the NTSB
accident coding manual—a guidebook that lends itself to event-based analyses of accidents.
However, these studies, while providing some useful insights into accident causation, limit
themselves by adhering to this event-based system.
This thesis has a developed an alternative approach to modeling aviation accidents by using
a state-based approach. The method moves beyond an event-based approach by viewing
aviation accidents as a set of hazardous states of a system (pilot and aircraft), and triggers
that cause the system to move between hazardous states. As part of this approach, I used
the NTSB’s accident coding manual (that contains nearly 4000 different codes) to develop
a “dictionary” of hazardous states, triggers, and information codes. Then, I created the
“grammar”, or a set of rules, that: (1) arranges hazardous states in accidents; and, (2) links
triggers to different hazardous states. This approach helps: (1) provide a more correct count
of the causes for accidents in the NTSB database; and, (2) checks for gaps or omissions in
NTSB accident data, and fills-in some of these gaps using logic-based rules. These rules
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also help identify and count causes for accidents that were not discernable from previous
analyses of historical accident data.

6.1

Summary

Chapter 1 introduced GA accidents and motivated the need to better understand GA
accident causation.
Chapter 2 reviewed literature on aviation accident causation, with particular emphasis on
studies that have looked at historical GA accidents. The second half of Chapter two
reviewed the different accident modeling techniques—many of which have been used to
understand the causes for aviation accidents.
The first part of Chapter 3 served as a “beginners guide to the NTSB database”. The second
part of Chapter 3 analyzed over 6000 historical helicopter accidents to determine “common
themes” or chains of occurrences. While this occurrence chain approach moved beyond a
root cause analysis, it showed that helicopter accidents recorded in the database had short
stories (i.e., occurrence chains with short chain lengths). This approach highlighted one of
the shortcomings of the event-based approach to analyzing historical aviation accidents.
To move beyond an event-based analysis, Chapter 4 presented a state-based accident
modeling approach. Chapter 4 developed a dictionary of hazardous states, triggers, and
information codes. The latter part of Chapter 4 developed the grammar (or rules) that
arranged hazardous states, and linked triggers to hazardous states.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the state-based accident model when applied to 6200 historical
helicopter accidents. The first part of this chapter identified and compared the top
hazardous states and triggers in fatal and non-fatal accidents. The second part of this
chapter demonstrated that we can learn more about the causes for inflight loss of control
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accidents by using the state-based accident modeling approach. The third (and final) part
of Chapter 5 applied the state-based approach and presented insights into the reasons for
improper autorotation accidents.

6.2

Contributions

Despite many years of retrospective accident analysis, helicopter (and fixed wing GA)
accidents continue to occur frequently, often resulting in fatalities and damage to property.
The pursuit of trying to better understand the reasons behind these accidents raised the
following fundamental question:
The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete
and omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and
potentially removes the omissions?
To address this question, I broke it down into two research questions:
1. The current accident coding system limits our understanding of accident
causation—can a different approach help?
2. Can we provide a more correct count and hence a more accurate ranking of the
causes for accidents in the NTSB database?
To address the first question, I developed a state-based accident model. To build this model,
I translated the codes in the NTSB coding manual, and created a dictionary of hazardous
states, triggers, and information codes. After creating the vocabulary of states and triggers,
I developed the grammar that: (1) sequences hazardous states in accidents; and (2) links
triggers to hazardous states. This state-based accident model (complete with its dictionary
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and grammar) facilitates the analysis of historical accident data without needing to rely
on/being restricted by the NTSB coding manual.
To address the second question, I applied the state-based accident modeling technique to
better understand if we are correctly identifying and counting the causes for two of the top
hazardous states in helicopter accidents: (1) infight loss of control (LOC); and (2) Improper
autorotations. Results from the state-based analyses highlighted causes such as “clipping
of object/terrain” that were not available from a conventional analysis of the database.
Further, the state-based approach also inferred triggers for particular states, in accidents,
when all the information was not in the coded accident reports. The state-based approach,
while highlighting key differences compared to a conventional analysis, also points out
issues that need to be addressed in future research. Examples of such issues include the
frequent use of codes relating to poor decision-making or incorrect actions.

6.3

Recommendations for Future Work

The work in this research has unearthed several interesting research questions to consider
in future work. Building on the work completed in this thesis, I present some of the ideas
for future research in this chapter. It is my intent for each of these ideas to serve as steppingstones for future research proposals.
6.3.1

Suggested Refinements of the State-based Approach

In the current version of the model, I used the grammar to infer triggers (that I defined) for
specific states in an accident that did not have any triggers in the accident report. In future
work, I propose creating more sophisticated rules that will allow us to infer triggers (for
specific states) from the list of triggers that were translated from the NTSB coding manual.
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For example, if an accident involves an improper descent state after the disoriented/lack of
awareness state (and there is no code in the accident report that corresponds to a trigger for
this state), then I could potentially infer the lack of action trigger that is coded in the coding
manual.
Another suggested improvement is to develop a set of rules that could potentially help infer
missing states in accident reports. For example, if an accident involves a loss of engine
power followed by a hard landing, then, we can infer that accident might have involved an
improper autorotation state.
6.3.2

Extending the Application of the State-based Approach

In this thesis, I showed that the state-based approach can help identify triggers for
hazardous states that cannot be obtained from a conventional analysis of the accident
database. I propose the following ideas as some of the logical next-steps for this research:
1. Applying the state-based approach to fixed-wing GA accident data. Fixed-wing
aircraft account for nearly 80% of the GA fleet (and over 82% of the accidents
recorded in the NTSB database in 1982–2015). I recommend using the state-based
model to identify trigger events for high-risk hazardous states such as inflight loss
of control (LOC) and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). The nature of fixed-wing
and helicopter operations is different; however, it might be worthwhile to explore
similarities (if any) in the triggers for the top hazardous states.
2. The state-based approach can also be used to model accidents that occurred during
towered/un-towered airport operations. I recommend using this approach to
potentially capturing issues with communication between pilots and air traffic
controllers (ATC) or between pilots, and estimating the frequency of trigger events
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such as misinterpreted information, incorrect phraseology, or poor crew resource
management (CRM) techniques.
3. Many accidents involve runway incursions, excursions, undershoot, and overruns.
The state-based model can also capture hazardous states of the system when
operating in different surface conditions.
4. The state-based model could also be used to model incidents. In this extension of
the model, I would use incident data from the NTSB, FAA Accident and Incident
Data System (AIDS), and NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). I
would begin by mapping the different incident coding systems to the states and
triggers that I defined in this thesis. Then, I would use these incident data to track
different hazardous states (and trigger events) that ended in near misses, and
compare them with accident data.
6.3.3

Bridging the Divide: Mapping the FDM World to Accident Data

Traditionally, researchers associate the terms Flight Operations Quality Analysis (FOQA)
and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) with the commercial aviation sector. Generally, aircraft
used in commercial operations have on-board Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) that record
several flight parameters at predefined frequencies. In the interest of safety and
performance improvements, many commercial operators (in the US) voluntarily contribute
their data to an Aviation Safety Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) repository. Researchers
have used these data to identify key parameters to be monitored during flight, and have
also defined several FDM events—combinations of flight parameters that help capture
unsafe situations during flight (e.g., High airspeed at low altitude).
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More recently, there has been a concerted effort from regulators and members of the safety
community to incorporate FDM analysis in the General Aviation (GA) sector. As I
mentioned during my review of safety literature (Section 2.2), few GA aircraft are equipped
with FDRs—making it challenging to collect flight data (and hence draw meaningful
conclusion from analyses). However, I believe that careful analysis of historical GA
accident data can provide us meaningful information about flight parameters that should
be monitored. Here, I recommend the following:
1. A map between the codes used by the NTSB to record accident information and a
predefined list of helicopter FDM events. This map could be used to potentially
point us to high risk FDM events that have occurred frequently in past accidents.
2. Using Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion to establish a link between these FDM
events and hazardous states that frequently resulted in accidents (e.g., loss of
control).
6.3.4

Basic Accident Plots: Using Historical Data to Build Aviation Accident Archetypes

Most accident analysis techniques tend to focus on a single root cause or count the causes
that appear most frequently in accidents. Through this thesis, I have demonstrated that the
use of a state-based approach to model accidents potentially provides a richer
understanding of accident causation. Building on the hazardous states and trigger events
identified, I propose developing a set of GA accident archetypes that model the common
stories (states and triggers) that often end in accidents.
These accident archetypes can also help capture organizational factors that contribute to
accidents. While the term “Organizational influence” is more commonly used in accidents
that involve the process industry (e.g., chemical plants, oil refineries), I believe that we can
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extend the use of the term to the realm of GA and helicopter operations. I intend to use the
term organizational influence to better understand the safety culture of pilots, aircraft
maintenance technicians (AMTs), and operators (e.g., law enforcement, search and rescue).
In our attempts to reduce fatal accident rates, we (safety community) often focus on the
causes at the sharp end of accidents, often relegating the underlying role of the
pilot/organizational attitudes towards safety.
These archetypes, once developed, could be used to describe accidents. An example of a
potential accident archetype is “Accidents that involved controlled flight into terrain or
objects due to poor preflight planning”. In this example, I can explore the reasons for the
poor preflight planning (e.g., management-induced time pressures, pure negligence). In
addition, a time history of these archetypes might provide additional insight—if the number
of accidents described by an archetype has increased, decreased, or remained the same,
then we can track specific reasons for the change (or lack of it). Consider for example the
above mentioned accident archetype; if the number of accidents per year has remained
relatively unchanged, then I can explore reasons for the lack of change in the particular
archetype (e.g., specific trigger events continue to occur despite changes in pilot training
procedure).
6.3.5

Improving General Aviation Safety by Building an Accident Ontology

Greek philosophy defines “ontology” as the study of being or in existence. The domain of
artificial intelligence defines it as a “specification of a conceptualization” (Gruber, 1993).
Generally, ontologies are used to not just share data, but also establish semantics for using
the data. Some researchers have developed ontologies that help with the aircraft design
process, which involves mapping of data between various design tools. Using aircraft
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design ontology, Ast (2012) created a central data model that contained all the mapped
information from the different tools. In addition, this central data model also helped check
the plausibility of the maps between the different tools.
Some research has looked into the use of ontologies in the safety domain, particularly in
the road traffic safety domain. Barrachina et al. (2012) developed a vehicular accident
ontology network that combined automobile specifications, operator information,
operating environment, historical accident data, and on-board sensor data to alert nearby
vehicles and emergency personnel. Unfortunately, I have not come across any similar
approaches in the aviation safety domain. Therefore, I suggest building an accident
ontology by leveraging information from historical accident data, flight recorder data, pilot
information, operating environment, and air.

Figure 28: Framework for notional accident ontology. The central data model contains
mapped information from the different data sources depicted in the framework.
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Figure 28 presents an initial outline for this ontology. The central data model helps map
(and exchange) data between the different data sources. Analysis of flight data could
potentially reveal FDM events that were “flagged” during operation of the aircraft. Using
this ontology structure, I can combine the flagged FDM events, flight crew information,
and operating environment, compare it with historical accident data and potentially
determine the risk of an accident associated with a flight. Furthermore, this ontology also
allows for the analysis of flights using an aircraft dynamics model to recreate the flight and
estimate the “hazard level” for the entire time interval of the flight.
6.3.6

The Pursuit of Completeness: Data Mining Applied to Accident Reports

As I mentioned earlier in this document, in addition to recording accidents in a coded
system, the NTSB also provides brief summaries and detailed factual reports regarding
accidents. These reports generally contain detailed witness and survivor accounts (in nonfatal accidents). To supplement the map between trigger events and hazardous states, I
recommend using data mining approaches to identifying key information from accident
reports.
Consider for example a 2012 accident involving a Schweizer 269C near Asheville, NC
(NTSB ID: ERA12LA362). The accident coding system indicates that the skid shoe came
loose due to improper maintenance resulting in a roll-over end state. However, closer
examination of the accident report provides additional insight into the causes for this
accident:
“The pilot conducted the approach for landing at about 40 knots and touched down left of
the runway centerline on both skids. As he lowered the collective, the helicopter's right
center skid shoe contacted a runway centerline light, shearing off the right skid and its

148
support arms. The pilot raised the collective, picked the helicopter up to a hover, and
turned towards the taxiway in order to land. Shortly after, the engine and rotor RPM began
to drop, and the pilot opened the throttle and lowered the collective, setting the helicopter
onto the left skid. The helicopter rolled over and came to rest on its right side, resulting in
substantial damage to the main rotor blades. A post-accident examination by the pilot
revealed that, during the right skid's impact with the centerline light, the front landing gear
crossbeam was pushed aft, crimping the fuel supply line”.
While the coding system captures the fact that right skid sheared off, it does not indicate
that the helicopter experienced low engine RPM due to crimping of the fuel line. The
additional insight from the report helps complete the accident story by supplementing the
information from the state-based model.
While there has been extensive work in the field of text mining and natural language
processing (Wallace et al., 2003; Kloptchenko et al., 2004; Tseng et al., 2005), only a
limited amount of work apply these techniques to accident/incident report analysis. Melby
(2011) outlines how he (and the MITRE Company) developed the Aviation Information
Retrieval and Extraction System (AIRES) to identify keywords and phrase from NTSB
reports. Jeske and Liu (2007) used a naïve Bayes classifier to mine text data from FAA
aviation safety report project. Bazargan et al. (2013) applied the AIRES software and
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to identify some of the key causes associated with
fatal GA accidents in 1983–2009. The authors also suggest implementing machine learning
techniques such as Self Organizing Maps (SOM) to improve the quality of text mining
results. I recommend building on this body of text mining research to identify key words
and phrases that can supplement the information obtained from the state-based approach.
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APPENDIX A. DEFINTIONS OF HAZARDOUS STATES

Table 53: Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE) State Definition
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE)
Hazardous state where the helicopter tail rotor does not provide the requisite thrust to maintain
directional control.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24805: Loss of tail rotor effectiveness
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “effectiveness”
24813: Tail rotor effectiveness AND (“not maintained”)
and “LTE”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
242: Loss of tail rotor effectiveness
for the words “effectiveness”
and “LTE”.

Table 54: Vortex Ring State (VRS) Definition
Vortex Ring State (VRS)
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24817: Vortex ring state
The circulation of air at the
rotating blade tips is pushed
downwards by aerodynamic
forces resulting in a vortex,
which reduces the lift and
increases the drag on the
blades. A rapidly descending
helicopter experiences
increased upward flow of air at
the blade root and eventual
blade root stall. Other
contributing factors for VRS
24811: Settling with power
include increased collective
pitch, high aircraft weight, low
forward speed, and operating
downwind.

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
244: Settling with power/vortex ring state
500: Loss of lift

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “vortex ring”,
“loss of lift”, “settling with”,
and the word “VRS”.
Notes
Literature uses the terms loss
of lift, vortex ring state, and
settling with power
interchangeably while
describing this state.
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Vortex Ring State (VRS)
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift.
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “vortex ring”,
“loss of lift”, “settling with”,
and the word “VRS”.

Table 55: Improper RPM State Definition
Improper RPM State
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high).
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
22308: Proper rotor RPM AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible”
I identified these codes by
OR “not attained” OR “not available” OR “misjudged” OR “not
searching the coding manual
followed” OR “delayed”)
for the phrase “rotor RPM”
and the word “RPM”.
24558: Rotor RPM AND (“not maintained” OR “misjudged” OR
“low” OR “high” OR “inadequate” OR “reduced” OR “excessive” OR
In one case, the NTSB did not
“exceed” OR “improper” OR “diminished” OR “ not possible” OR
use any modifier while
“diminished” OR “not verified” OR “not identified” OR “not
describing the improper RPM
corrected” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR “not attained”)
state.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
Careful studying of several
01062052XX: Performance/control parameters—Prop/rotor
accident reports suggests that
parameters AND (“not attained/maintained” OR “attain/maintain not
the NTSB use this code to
possible” OR “capability exceeded”)
indicate an improper rotor
RPM situation.

Table 56: Improper Altitude/Clearance State Definition
Improper Altitude/Clearance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating too close to the ground, terrain, water, or object.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24518: Altitude AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR “low” OR
I identified these codes by
“improper” OR “not maintained” OR “delayed” OR “below” OR
searching the coding manual
“unavailable” )
for derivatives of the words
24519: Proper altitude AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR “altitude” and “clearance”.
“exceeded” OR “below” OR “misjudged”)
I also included “buzzing” and
24526: Clearance AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR
“exceeded” OR “inadequate” OR “not possible” OR “not obtained/not “low pass”, which suggest that
flights occurred at low
maintained” OR “improper” OR “misjudged”)
altitudes.
24577: Altitude/clearance AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR
“low” OR “improper” OR “not maintained” OR “not obtained/not
In two cases, the NTSB used
maintained” OR “not verified”)
the modifier “inattentive” with
24521: Buzzing AND (“intentional” OR “performed” OR
this subject code. These cases
“continued”)
suggest that the pilot was in a
distracted state prior to the
24541: Low pass AND (“performed” OR “intentional” OR
improper altitude/clearance
“misjudged”)
state
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes

151
Improper Altitude/Clearance State
01062012XX: Performance/control parameters-altitude AND (“not
attained/maintained” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect
use/operation OR “related operating info”)
290: Altitude deviation
220: Low altitude operations

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the words
“altitude” and “clearance”.

Table 57: Rollover End State Definition
Rollover State
Hazardous state where when the helicopter skid/landing gear pivots about an object and exceeds the
critical roll angle.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
380: Rollover
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“rollover” and the phrase
“dynamic rollover”.
24801: Dynamic rollover

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

097: Rollover

In two cases, the NTSB
modified the dynamic rollover
state code with “initiated” and
“performed”, respectively, to
indicate the onset of a dynamic
rollover.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“rollover” and the phrase
“dynamic rollover”.

Table 58: Improper Climb State Definition
Improper Climb State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was
incorrect.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
17303: Aircraft performance-climb capability AND (“exceeded” OR
I identified these codes by
“lack of” OR “deteriorated” OR “inadequate”)
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the words
24527: Climb AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR
“climb”.
“improper” OR “inadequate” OR “not possible” OR “delayed” OR
“excessive” OR “not performed” OR “initiated”)
In one case, the NTSB
modified this subject code with
24528: Proper climb rate AND (“not attained” OR “not maintained”
“other” to indicate an improper
OR “not possible” OR “not obtained”)
climb state
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01061010XX: Climb capability AND (“capability exceeded” OR
I identified these codes by
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “not attained/maintained”)
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the words
01062035XX: Climb rate AND (“capability exceeded” OR “not
“climb”.
attained/maintained”)
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Table 59: Improper Distance State Definition
Improper Distance State
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24523: Distance AND (“misjudged” OR “not obtained/maintained”)
I identified these codes by
24580: Distance/altitude AND (“misjudged” OR “not maintained” OR
searching the coding manual
“low”)
for the word “distance”.
24581: Distance/speed AND (“misjudged”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 60: Improper Heading State Definition
Improper Heading State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01062047XX: Performance/control parameters-heading/course
280: Course deviation

Notes
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “course” and
“heading”.

Table 61: Improper Airspeed State Definition
Improper Airspeed State
Hazardous state where the aircraft airspeed is either too low (or too high).
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24506: Airspeed AND (“not maintained” OR “excessive” OR
I identified these codes by
“inadequate” OR “low” OR “misjudged” OR “not attained” OR
searching the coding manual
“reduced” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR “misjudged” OR
for the word “airspeed”.
“below” OR “exceeded” OR “initiated” OR “high” OR “excessive”)
Maintaining correct airspeed is
24507: Airspeed-lift off speed AND (“not attained”)
critical to safe aircraft
24509: Airspeed-minimum control speed with the critical engine
operations. Not maintaining
inoperative AND (“not maintained”)
airspeed can result in other
hazardous states such as
aerodynamic stall, VRS, or
operating in the unsafe region
24516: Airspeed-maximum operating limit speed AND (“exceeded”)
of the Height-Velocity curve
(also known as the Deadman’s
curve).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
01062010XX: Airspeed AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
searching the coding manual
“capability exceeded”)
for the word “airspeed”.

Table 62: Improper Descent State Definition
Improper Descent State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Improper Descent State
24524: Descent AND (“excessive” OR “not maintained” OR
“exceeded”, “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional” OR
“misjudged” OR “premature” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not
possible” OR “not corrected” OR “intentional” OR “premature”)
24525: Proper descent rate AND (“excessive” OR “not maintained”
OR “exceeded” OR “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional”
OR “misjudged” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible”
OR “not corrected”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01062037XX: Descent rate AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“incorrect use/operation” OR “capability exceeded” OR
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified” OR “related
operating info”)
01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide path AND (“not
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “capability
exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified”)

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “descent”. I did
not include the “uncontrolled
descent” phase of flight as I
grouped it with the inflight loss
of control state.
Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “descent”.

I classified the poor weather state into:
1. Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state: This state appears in
accidents where pilots knowingly or inadvertently flew through poor weather
conditions.
Table 63: Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state Definition
Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
240: Inflight encounter with weather
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
24015: VFR flight into IMC AND (“continued” OR “intentional” OR
for the phrase that contained
“inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated” OR “encountered” OR
the words “VFR” and IMC”. I
“improper” OR “misjudged”)
supplemented this search with
24036: Flight into adverse weather AND (“continued” OR
the careful study of accident
“intentional” OR “inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated” OR
reports to identify the phrase
“performed” OR “selected”)
“adverse weather” that
captures the other two codes.

24023: Flight into known adverse weather AND (“continued” OR
“intentional” OR “inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
401: VFR encounter with IMC
210: Icing encounter

In many instances, these
subject codes are accompanied
by “20000: Weather
condition”, which provides
additional information about
the nature of poor weather
(e.g., clouds, whiteout, icing)
that the pilot
intentionally/inadvertently
flew into.
Notes
I identified this codes by
searching the coding manual
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Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state
for the phrase that contained
the words “VFR” and IMC”. I
also included the occurrence
code that corresponded to icing
(coded as a modifier in the pre2008 system).
The search for “adverse
weather” returned no results.

2. Prevailing/Existing weather and light state: Not all poor weather accidents need
necessarily involve intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather. While flight in
the prevailing weather (or light) state (e.g., high density altitude, tailwind, or glare) can
be considered less hazardous (than, say, VFR flight into IMC), they may still play a
role in the accident.
Table 64: Prevailing/Existing weather state Definition
Prevailing/Existing weather and light state
Hazardous weather state that existed during the flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
20000: Weather condition

20100: Light condition

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

0303YYYYXX: Environmental issues-conditions/weather/phenomena

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase that contained
the words “weather” and
“light”. I excluded the codes
corresponding to
inadvertent/intentional flight
into adverse weather.
I also excluded the codes
relating to aircraft lighting
(e.g., panel lights).
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase that contained
the words “weather” and
“light”. I excluded the codes
corresponding to
inadvertent/intentional flight
into adverse weather.
I also excluded the codes
relating to aircraft lighting
(e.g., panel lights).
Here, YYYY represents that
different weather and light
conditions that are recorded
under the Environmental

155
Prevailing/Existing weather and light state
issuesconditions/weather/phenomena
hierarchy. YYYY ranges from
“0000: general” to “6030:
Light condition-glare”

Table 65: Wake Turbulence state Definition
Wake turbulence State
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24715: Wake turbulence AND (“encountered” OR “inadvertent”)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “wake
410: Vortex turbulence encountered
turbulence” and “vortex
turbulence”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
361: Aircraft wake turbulence
for the phrases “wake
turbulence” and “vortex
turbulence”.

Table 66: Improper Turn/Bank state Definition
Improper Turn/Bank State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
17305: Aircraft performance-turn capability AND (“total loss” OR
I identified these codes by
“exceeded”)
searching the coding manual
17306: Aircraft performance-rolling maneuvers AND (“dynamic
words “turn”, “roll”, and
imbalance” OR “extraneous”)
“bank”.
24804: Hovering turn AND (“low” OR “abrupt” OR “uncontrolled”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 67: Runway Overshoot State Definition
Runway Overshoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “overrun” and
390: Overrun
“excursion”. The terms overrun
and excursion are used
interchangeably.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
370: Landing area overshoot
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “overrun” and
300: Runway excursion
“excursion”. The terms overrun
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Runway Overshoot State
and excursion are used
interchangeably.

Table 68: Loss of Engine Power State Definition
Loss of Engine Power State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s engine is not operational.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
350: Loss of engine power
351: Loss of engine power (total)-mechanical failure/malfunction
352: Loss of engine power (partial)-mechanical failure/malfunction
353: Loss of engine power (total)—non-mechanical
354: Loss of engine power (partial)—non-mechanical

16902: Powerplant AND (“failure, total” OR “seized” OR “fire” OR
“overspeed” OR “output low”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
340: Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure
341: Loss of engine power (total)

342: Loss of engine power (partial)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “loss of
engine” and “powerplant”. I
do not include the codes
relating to powerplant
control, powerplant fire
systems and extinguishers
Note that despite grouping
mechanical and nonmechanical losses of engine
power, I can count the
instances where each of the
codes appeared in accidents.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “loss of
engine” and “powerplant”.
Note that despite grouping
mechanical and nonmechanical losses of engine
power, I can count the
instances where each of the
codes appeared in accidents.

Table 69: System Failure State Definition
System Failure State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
130: Airframe/component/system failure/malfunction
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
131: Propeller failure/malfunction
for the words “malfunction”,
“failure/malfunction”, and
“failure”. I do not include
powerplant failures in this
category.
132 Rotor failure/malfunction
Note that despite grouping
codes that convey the same
meaning (i.e., system failure
state), I can count the
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System Failure State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned.
instances where each of the
codes appeared in accidents.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
330: System/component malfunction/failure (non-powerplant)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
331: Pressure/environmental system malfunction/failure
for the words “malfunction”,
332: Electrical system malfunction/failure
“failure/malfunction”, and
333: Flight control system malfunction/failure
“failure”. I do not include
334: Flight instrument malfunction/failure
powerplant failures in this
335: Navigation system malfunction/failure
category.
336: Communication system malfunction/failure

337: Aircraft structural failure

Note that despite grouping
codes that convey the same
meaning (i.e., system failure
state), I can count the
instances where each of the
codes appeared in accidents.

Table 70: Preflight Mechanical Issue State Definition
Preflight Mechanical Issue State
Hazardous state where the flight begins with a pre-existing mechanical problem with the aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24006: Aircraft weight and balance AND (“exceeded” OR
I identified these codes by
“disregarded” OR “high” OR “improper” OR “misjudged” OR
searching in the coding manual
“excessive” OR “selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR
for NTSB codes that suggested
“inaccurate” OR “not corrected” OR “not calculated”)
mechanical issues before the
flight began (note that I
consider improper weight a
mechanical issue). I also
studied several accident reports
and noticed that the NTSB
used these codes while
referring to preflight
mechanical problems.

24007: Operation with known deficiencies AND (“continued” OR
“attempted” OR “intentional” OR “performed” OR “attempted” OR
“improper use of” OR “poor” OR “selected” OR “disregarded”)

In addition to these two subject
codes, I define the preflight
mechanical issue state using
following triggers: improper
maintenance (24100–24124,
24703), improper design by the
manufacturer/builder (82000–
82200), improper use of
material (84000–84200),
insufficiently defined
procedure for maintenance
personnel (80000–80400),
insufficient/unclear
information provided to
maintenance personnel
(35000–35310), and
insufficient aircraft
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Preflight Mechanical Issue State
Hazardous state where the flight begins with a pre-existing mechanical problem with the aircraft.
certification/standards (91000,
91200, 91400, 92000, and
92400).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01061040XX: CG/weight distribution AND (“capability exceeded”)
I identified these codes by
searching in the coding manual
for NTSB codes that suggested
mechanical issues before the
flight began (note that I
consider improper weight a
01061035XX: Maximum weight AND (“capability exceeded OR “not
mechanical issue). I also
specified” OR “incorrect use/operation”)
studied several accident reports
and noticed that the NTSB
used these codes while
referring to preflight
mechanical problems

Table 71: Preflight Pilot Hazardous State Definition
Preflight Pilot Hazardous State
Hazardous pilot state that does not involved psychological conditions, physical impairment, confidence,
fatigue, or qualification/experience related states.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by using the
triggers:
 35200: Information
 I identified this state using the triggers shown in the
unavailable.
notes column. This state does not correspond to any
of the other pilot-related hazardous states.
 35100: Information insufficient.
 I excluded the non-pilot related
personnel codes.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
 04024010XX: Management—
safety culture
 04024015XX: Management—
standard operating practices
 04031000XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
training
 04031010XX:
 I identified this state using the triggers shown in the
Support/oversight/monitoring—
notes column. This state does not correspond to any
initial training
of the other pilot-related hazardous states.
 04031020XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
upgrade training
 04031030XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
emergency procedure training
 04032000XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
general
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Preflight Pilot Hazardous State







04032015XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
oversight of operation
04035010XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Availability of safety programs
04035015XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Adequacy of safety programs
04035020XX:
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Adherence to safety programs
030: Preflight or dispatch event
I only included modifiers
corresponding to the “operator”

Table 72: Aircraft Stall/Spin State Definition
Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24551: Stall AND (“inadvertent” OR “uncontrolled” OR “not
I identified these codes by
corrected”)
searching the coding manual
for the words “stall”,
24552: Stall/spin AND (“uncontrolled” OR “inadvertent”)
“stall/spin”, “spiral”, and
24550: Spiral AND (“not possible” OR “uncontrolled” OR
“rotation”. I exclude codes
“inadvertent”)
relating to engine/compressor
24548: Rotation AND (“uncontrolled”)
stalls.

24809: Retreating blade stall AND (“encountered”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
241: Aerodynamic stall/spin

243: Retreating blade stall

When the lifting surfaces of an
aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor
blades) exceed a critical angle
of attack they experience a loss
of lift, and enter a stalled state.
Any yawing motion in this
stalled state can induce a spin.
The NTSB uses the
“uncontrolled” modifier to
suggest that loss of control
followed the stall/spin state
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “stall”,
“stall/spin”, “spiral”, and
“rotation”. I exclude codes
relating to engine/compressor
stalls.
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Table 73: Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State Definition
Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State
Hazardous state where the pilot is lost, disoriented, unable to maintain visual reference/perception.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
33400: Spatial disorientation
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
24014: Became lost/disoriented
for derivatives of the word
31210: Visual/aural perception
“disorient” and “aware”, and
31211: Visual illusion
the words “lost”, “perception”,
33500: Visual/aural detection
and “illusion”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
02022000XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—general
I identified these codes by
02022015XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—Visual
searching the coding manual
illusion/disorientation
for derivatives of the word
02022025XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—spatial disorientation
“disorient” and “aware”, and
the words “lost”, “perception”,
02022035XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—Situational awareness
and “illusion”.
02022040XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—Perception

Table 74: Physically Impaired/Incapacitated State Definition
Physically Impaired/Incapacitated State
Hazardous state where the pilot was impaired or incapacitated.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
33200: Incapacitation (general)
33212: Incapacitation (cardiovascular)
33214: Incapacitation (carbon monoxide)
33218: Incapacitation (motion sickness)
33221: Incapacitation (other organic problem)
33100: Physical impairment
33115: Physical impairment (other toxic)
33116: Physical impairment (hypoglycemia/diet)
33119: Physical impairment (stroke)
33120: Physical impairment (visual deficiency)
33121: Physical impairment (other organic problem)
33130: Impairment (alcohol)
33140: Impairment (drugs)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
02012000XX: Impairment/incapacitation (general)
02012010XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Illness/injury
02012020XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Illicit drug
02012025XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Prescription medication
02012030XX: Impairment/incapacitation—OTC medication
02012045XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Neurological
02012050XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Cardiovascular
02011030XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Physical characteristicPhysical limitation
02011510XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Sensory ability/limitation Visual function

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“impair” and “incapacitate”.
Note that I do not include the
code “33141: Use of drugs”—I
term this code a trigger.

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“impair” and “incapacitate”.
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Table 75: Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State Definition
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was
distracted.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24610: Monitoring AND (“inadequate” OR “inattentive” OR “not
maintained”)
31110: Diverted attention
I identified these codes by
31120: Inattentive
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
24021: Visual lookout AND (“inadequate” OR “not maintained” OR
“monitor”, “divert”, and
“not possible” OR “restricted” OR “reduced” OR “diminished” OR
“distract”. I supplemented this
“poor” OR “inaccurate” OR “improper” OR “not attained” OR
search by looking for instances
“restricted” OR “inattentive” OR “not performed” “attempted” OR
where pilot’s failed to maintain
“not received” OR “inadvertent” OR “disregarded” OR “misjudged”
“lookout” or “separation”.
OR “not understood”)
24618: Visual separation AND (“not maintained” OR “inadequate”
OR “inattentive”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
02021500XX: Attention/monitoring (general)
I identified these codes by
02021525XX: Monitoring equipment/instruments
searching the coding manual
02021530XX: Monitoring other person
for derivatives of the word
“monitor”, “divert”, and
02021535XX: Monitoring other aircraft
“distract”.
02021540XX: Monitoring environment

Table 76: Overconfident/Lack of Confidence State Definition
Overconfident/Lack of Confidence State
Hazardous state where the pilot demonstrated lack of/overconfidence in his/her/aircraft’s ability.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
31140: Complacency
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
31150: Under-confidence in personal ability
for derivatives of the word
31170: Overconfidence in aircraft’s ability
“confidence” and
“complacent”. I included
ostentatious display as it
31260: Ostentatious display
suggests a hazardous pilot
attitude.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
02021010XX: Personality/attitude self-confidence
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
02021015XX: Confidence/reliance on equipment
for derivatives of the word
“confidence” and
02021020XX: Complacency
“complacent”.

Table 77: Insufficient Qualification/Training State Definition
Insufficient Qualification/Training State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not meet the qualification/training requirements to perform the flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
34000: Qualification
I identified these codes by
34001: Lack of certification
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
34100: Improper training

162
Insufficient Qualification/Training State
34110: Improper initial training
34200: Inadequate training
34210: Inadequate initial training
34220: Inadequate recurrent training
34230: Inadequate transition/upgrade training
34240: Inadequate training (emergency procedure(s))
34300: Lack of experience
34310: Lack of familiarity with aircraft
34320: Lack of familiarity with geographic area
34330: Lack of total experience
34331: Total (experience)
34332: Lack of total experience in kind of aircraft
34333: Lack of total experience in type of aircraft
34334: Lack of total instrument time
34335: Lack of total experience in type operation
34340: Lack of recent experience
34341: Lack of recent total experience
34342: Lack of recent experience in kind of aircraft
34343: Lack of recent experience in type of aircraft
34344: Lack of recent instrument time
34345: Lack of recent experience in type operation
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
02030000XX: Experience/knowledge (general)
02031000XX: Experience/qualifications (general)
02031010XX: Qualification/certification
02031015XX: Total experience
02031020XX: Total experience in position
02031025XX: Total experience w/ equipment
02031030XX: Total instrument experience
02031035XX: Recent experience
02031045XX: Recent experience w/ equipment
02031515XX: Initial instruct/training
02031530XX: Training with equipment
02032000XX: Knowledge (general)
02032010XX: Knowledge of procedures
02032015XX: Knowledge of equipment
02032025XX: Knowledge of regulatory requirements
02032030XX: Knowledge of geographic area
02032035XX: Aeronautical knowledge

“train”, “knowledge”, and
“experience”.
Note that I do not include
codes relating to the lack of
training procedure provided by
the company, management, or
regulator.

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“train”, “knowledge”, and
“experience”.
Note that I do not include
codes relating to the lack of
training procedure provided by
the company, management, or
regulator.

Table 78: Fatigued/Overworked State Definition
Fatigued/Overworked State
Hazardous state where the pilot was fatigued/overworked.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
33600: Fatigue
33601: Fatigue (conditions conducive to pilot fatigue)
33610: Fatigue (chronic)
33620: Fatigue (lack of sleep)
33630: Fatigue (flight schedule)
33650: Fatigue (flight and ground schedule)
33660: Fatigue (circadian rhythm)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “fatigue”,
“overworked”, and
“workload”.
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Fatigued/Overworked State
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
02013500XX: Alertness/Fatigue (general)
02013510XX: Lack of sleep
02013520XX: Fatigue due to work schedule
02064000XX: Workload management (general)
02064010XX: Task scheduling
02064015XX: Task load shedding
02064020XX: Task allocation
02064025XX: Task overload

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “fatigue”,
“overworked”, and
“workload”.

Table 79: Anxiety/Under Pressure State Definition
Anxiety/Under Pressure State
Hazardous state where the pilot was anxious or under pressure while operating the aircraft
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
31200: Pressure
I identified these codes by
31201: Self-induced pressure
searching the coding manual
31203: Pressure induced by others
for derivatives of the words
31204: Pressure induced by conditions/events
“pressure” and “anxiety”, and
31180: Anxiety/apprehension
the word “panic”.
31190: Panic
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
03042000XX: Pressure/demands (general)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
03042035XX: Personal pressure
for derivatives of the words
03042040XX: Other pressure/demand
“pressure” and “anxiety”, and
02022515XX: Anxiety/panic
the word “panic”.

Table 80: Poor Psychological State Definition
Poor Psychological State
Hazardous state where the pilot was in poor state of mind prior to the flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
31000: Psychological condition
I defined this state to capture
the codes corresponding to
general psychological
31280: Other psychological condition
conditions that did not have
accompanying modifiers.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I defined this state to capture
the codes corresponding to
02020000XX: Psychological (general)
general psychological
conditions that did not have
accompanying modifiers.

Table 81: Exceeding Slope Limitation State Definition
Exceeding Slope Limitation State
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped
terrain.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Exceeding Slope Limitation State
24576: Slope capability AND (“exceeded”)

24812: Slope limitations AND (“exceeded”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “slope”.
These codes describe the
hazardous state where the pilot
operated the aircraft beyond its
capability on sloped terrain.
Not recognizing (and
correcting) this hazardous state
can result in a roll over.
Notes

Table 82: Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State Definition
Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s balance is affected due to improper loading or shifting of the center
of gravity.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24006: Aircraft weight and balance AND (“exceeded” OR
I identified this code by
“disregarded” OR “high” OR “improper” OR “misjudged” OR
searching the coding manual for
“excessive” OR “selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR
the words “weight” and
“inaccurate” OR “not corrected” OR “not calculated”)
“balance”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01061040XX: CG/weight distribution AND (“capability exceeded”)
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
01061035XX: Maximum weight AND (“capability exceeded OR “not
the words “weight” and
specified” OR “incorrect use/operation”)
“balance”.

Table 83: Wheels-up Landing State Definition
Wheels-up Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
232: Wheels-up landing
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual for
24556: Wheels-up landing
the phrase “wheels-up”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
In the post-2008 system, the
NTSB used this code to
095: Landing gear not configured
indicate situations where there
were wheels-down landings in
water and wheels-up landings.

Table 84: Runway Incursion State Definition
Runway Incursion State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
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Runway Incursion State
310: Runway incursion by animal
320: Runway incursion by vehicle/person/aircraft

I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “incursion”.

Table 85: Low Fuel State Definition
Low Fuel State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

17001: Fuel AND (“low level”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01071010XX: Fuel AND (“fluid level”)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “fuel”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “low level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding fuel systems.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “fuel”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “fluid
level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding fuel systems.

Table 86: Low Oil State Definition
Low Oil State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

17002: Oil AND (“low level”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01071020XX: Oil AND (“fluid level”)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “Oil”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “low level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding oil systems.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “Oil”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “fluid
level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding oil systems.

Table 87: Low Hydraulic Fluid State Definition
Low Hydraulic Fluid State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low hydraulic fluid level.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Low Hydraulic Fluid State

17003: Hydraulic AND (“low level”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01071015XX: Hydraulic fluid AND (“fluid level”)

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual for
the words “hydraulic”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “low level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding hydraulic
reservoir capacity and systems.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual for
the words “hydraulic”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “fluid level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding hydraulic
reservoir capacity and systems.

Table 88: Improper Flare State Definition
Improper Flare State
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare prior to landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
In one case, the NTSB used the
24535: Flare AND (“misjudged” OR “not possible” OR “not
modifier “inattentive” with this
attained”, “delayed” OR “inadequate” OR “low” OR “high” OR
subject code. This cases
“premature” OR “reduced” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “not
suggests that the pilot was in a
possible” OR “excessive” OR “not performed” OR “abrupt” OR
distracted state prior to the
“inaccurate” OR “not successful” )
improper flare/level-off state.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01062041XX: Landing flare AND (“not attained/maintained” OR
“incorrect use/operation” OR “not specified”)

Table 89: Improper Supervision State Definition
Improper Supervision State
Hazardous state where the instructor failed to correctly supervise the student pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this state by
searching the coding manual for
24627: Supervision
derivatives of the word
“supervise”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 90: Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State Definition
Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
In some accidents that involved
24803: Height/velocity curve
loss of engine power or
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Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

improper autorotation, the
NTSB used this code to
indicate that at the aircraft was
operating in a hazardous region
of the Deadman’s curve.
Notes

Table 91: On-ground Loss of Control State Definition
On-ground Loss of Control State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain control of the aircraft on the ground.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
260: On-ground loss of control
for the phrase “loss of control”
and “ground”
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
230: Loss of control on ground
for the phrase “loss of control”
and “ground”

Table 92: On-ground Poor Weather Definition
On-ground Poor Weather State
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally/inadvertently flew through poor weather on the ground.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
330: On-ground encounter with weather
for the phrase “weather” and
“ground”
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 93: Improper Run-on Landing State Definition
Improper Run-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
24559: Run-on landing AND (“improper” AND “inadvertent” OR
searching the coding manual for
“misjudged” OR “inadequate” OR “not performed”)
the phrase “run-on”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 94: Improper Vertical Takeoff State Definition
Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Improper Vertical Takeoff State
24559: Vertical takeoff AND (“improper” AND “uncontrolled” OR
“not possible” OR “restricted” )
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “vertical takeoff”.
Notes

Table 95: Improper Go-around State Definition
Improper Go-around State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24536: Go-around AND (“inadvertent” OR “improper” OR “not
possible”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “go-around”.
Notes

Table 96: Exceeding Design Stress Limits State Definition
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “design” and
24538: Design stress limits of aircraft AND (“exceeded”)
“stress”.
I exclude codes relating to
improper aircraft design and
pilot stress/anxiety.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 97: Improper Translational Lift State Definition
Improper Translational Lift State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
24815: Translational lift AND (“not attained/maintained” OR “not
searching the coding manual for
maintained” OR “not attained” OR “not obtained”)
the phrase “translational lift”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 98: Improper Precautionary Landing State Definition
Improper Precautionary Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
The NTSB used this code to
24546: Precautionary landing AND (“not performed” OR
indicate that the pilot had the
“misjudged”)
option of choosing an
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Improper Precautionary Landing State

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

appropriate landing area (unlike
during a forced landing).
Notes

Table 99: Mental Overload State Definition
Mental Overload State
Hazardous state where the pilot’s abilities are limited as he/she is overwhelmed mentally.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
31220: Mental performance overload
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “mental overload”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 100: Unattended Aircraft State Definition
Unattended Aircraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is left unattended with the engines running.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “unattended”.
This state is a preflight
24005: Aircraft unattended/engine(s) running
hazardous state as it involves
leaving the controls of the
aircraft unattended when on the
ground (with engines running),
before flight.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 101: Hazardous Powerplant Operation State Definition
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational
limits.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB introduced this code
in the post-2008 system to
indicate that the powerplant
01062050XX: Performance/control parameters—powerplant
parameters exceeded their
parameters
specified operational limits.
This state was generally
followed by a loss of engine
power or system failure.
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Table 102: Near Midair Collision State Definition
Near Midair Collision State
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft almost collided with each other during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB introduced this code
in the post-2008 system to
260: Near midair collision
highlight situations where
aircraft almost collided with
each other.

Table 103: Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State Definition
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
17310: Helicopter hover performance AND (“exceeded” OR “lack
searching the coding manual for
of” OR “deteriorated”)
the phrase “hover
performance”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 104: Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
17301: Aircraft takeoff capability AND (“exceeded” OR
searching the coding manual for
“inadequate” OR “deteriorated”)
the phrase “takeoff capability”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 105: Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
17302: Aircraft landing capability AND (“exceeded” OR
searching the coding manual for
“inadequate” OR “deteriorated” OR “low”)
the phrase “landing capability”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 106: Improper Lift-off State Definition
Improper Lift-off State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Improper Lift-off State
24533: Lift-off AND (“not attained” OR “not possible” OR “not
corrected”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “lift-off”.
Notes

Table 107: Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “aircraft
performance”.
17300: Aircraft performance (general) AND (“exceeded” OR
“deteriorated” OR “vibration”)
The NTSB used this “general”
code to indicate that the aircraft
was operated beyond its design
performance.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 108: Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State Definition
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “rotorcraft
operations”.
24800: Rotorcraft operations AND (“improper” OR “excessive” OR
“exceeded”)
The NTSB used this “general”
code to indicate that the aircraft
was not operated correctly by
the pilot.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 109: Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
17306: Yawing maneuvers (performance) AND (“exceeded” OR
searching the coding manual for
“deteriorated” OR “erratic”)
derivatives of the word “yaw”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 110: Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of
engine power.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
17304: Aircraft performance—engine out capability AND
searching the coding manual for
(“exceeded”)
the phrase “engine out”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 111: Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
01061015XX: Maximum crosswind capability AND (“capability
searching the coding manual for
exceeded”)
the “crosswind”.

Table 112: Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State Definition
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
01061017XX: Configuration AND (“capability exceeded”)
searching the coding manual for
the word “configuration”.

Table 113: Improper Power-on Landing State Definition
Improper Power-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
24557: Power-on landing AND (“not possible” OR “not maintained”
searching the coding manual for
OR “uncontrolled” OR “improper”)
the phrase “power-on landing”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 114: Poor Interpersonal Relations State Definition
Poor Interpersonal Relations State
Hazardous state where the pilot has poor relations with his co-pilot/crew.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
31240: Interpersonal relations
searching the coding manual for
the word “interpersonal”.
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Poor Interpersonal Relations State
Hazardous state where the pilot has poor relations with his co-pilot/crew.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 115: Runway Undershoot State Definition
Runway Undershoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
390: Undershoot
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
370: Landing area undershoot

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “undershoot”.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “undershoot”.

Table 116: Wheels-down Landing in Water State Definition
Wheels-down Landing in Water State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
231: Wheels-down landing in water
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

095: Landing gear not configured

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “wheels-down”.
Notes
In the post-2008 system, the
NTSB used this code to
indicate situations where there
were wheels-down landings in
water and wheels-up landings.

Table 117: On-ground Loss of Control State Definition
On-ground Loss of Control State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the
ground.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
260: On-ground loss of control
the phrase “loss of control” and
“ground”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
230: Loss of control on ground
the phrase “loss of control” and
“ground”.

Table 118: Improper Level-off State Definition
Improper Level-off State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to bring the helicopter to a level attitude (usually in preparation for
a landing).
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Improper Level-off State
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24534: Level-off AND (“improper” OR “not maintained” OR
“misjudged” OR “not attained” OR “not possible” OR “delayed” OR
“not obtained” OR “premature” OR “high” OR “inadequate”
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “level-off”.
Notes

Table 119: Low Oil State Definition
Low Oil State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01071020XX: Oil AND (“fluid level”)

Notes
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “oil”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “fluid
level”.
I did not include codes
corresponding to the oil
system.

Table 120: Low Coolant State Definition
Low Coolant State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “coolant”. I
01071025XX: Coolant AND (“fluid level”)
also included those instances
that had the modifier “fluid
level”.

Table 121: Low Grease State Definition
Low Grease State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease level.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01071035XX: Fuel AND (“fluid level”)

Notes
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “grease”. I also
included those instances that
had the modifier “fluid
level”.

Table 122: Inflight Collision with Terrain/Water/Object End State Definition
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Inflight Collision with Terrain/Water/Object State
Hazardous state where the aircraft collided with terrain/water/object during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “collision”, “terrain”,
220: Inflight collision with object
and “object”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “collision”, “terrain”,
470: Inflight collision with terrain/object
and “object”. The NTSB
combined the codes for object
and terrain in the post-2008
system.

Table 123: Hard Landing End State Definition
Hard Landing State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landing gear impacted the ground with great force.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
200: Hard landing
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “hard landing”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
092: Hard landing
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “hard landing”.

Table 124: Forced/Emergency Landing End State Definition
Forced/Emergency Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot is unable to choose the landing site and is forced to perform an
emergency landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “forced landing” and
“emergency landing”.
180: Forced landing
This code is used
interchangeably by the NTSB
to indicate an emergency
landing or emergency descent.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
440: Off-field emergency landing
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “forced landing”.

Table 125: On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object End State Definition
On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object State
Hazardous state where the aircraft collided with terrain/water/object while operating on the ground.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object State
310: On ground/water collision with object
320: On-ground/water collision with terrain
271: Collision between aircraft (other than midair)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

200: Ground collision

I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “on-ground” and the
words “collision”, “terrain”,
and “object”.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “ground” and
“collision”. The NTSB used
this code to indicate accidents
that involved collision on the
ground in the post-2008 system.

Table 126: Propeller/Rotor Contact to Person End State Definition
Propeller/Rotor Contact to Person State
Hazardous state where rotating rotor/propeller blades make contact with a person, resulting in injuries.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “contact” and
“person”. The NTSB used this
370: Propeller/rotor contact to person
code as end state to indicate
that rotor/propeller blades made
contact with a person during
operation (generally while
disembarking).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the word “contact” and
“person”. The NTSB used this
081: Aircraft/propeller/rotor contact with person
code as end state to indicate
that rotor/propeller blades made
contact with a person during
operation (generally while
disembarking).

Table 127: Dragged Wing/Rotor/Float End State Definition
Dragged Wing/Rotor/Float State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s wing/rotor/float is dragged along the ground/water.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
160: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “dragged-wing”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
093: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “dragged-wing”.
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Table 128: Nose Down/Over End State Definition
Nose Down/Over State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s nose makes contact with the ground/water/runway surface:
-without inverting the aircraft (nose down)
-and inverts the aircraft (nose over)
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
290: Nose down
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “nose-down” and
300: Nose over
“nose-over”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the phrase “nose-down” and
096: Nose down/over
“nose-over”. The NTSB
combined these codes into a
single code in the post-2008
system.

Table 129: Midair Collision End State Definition
Midair Collision State
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft collide during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

270: Midair collision

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

250: Midair collision

Notes
Note that the midair collision
code should appear in the end
of the accident sequence in
order to be classified as end
state
Notes
Note that the midair collision
code should appear in the end
of the accident sequence in
order to be classified as end
state

Table 130: Ditching End State Definition
Ditching
Hazardous state where the crew makes a planned emergency landing in water.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
150: Ditching
searching the coding manual for
the word “ditching”.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
441: Ditching
searching the coding manual for
the word “ditching”.
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Table 131: Collision during Takeoff/Landing End State Definition
Collision during Takeoff/Landing State
Hazardous state where the aircraft collides with terrain/object during the takeoff or landing phase of
flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
490: Collision during takeoff/landing
the words “collision” and
“takeoff/landing”.

Table 132: Fire/Explosion End State Definition
Fire/Explosion State
Hazardous state where the aircraft explodes or catches fire after impact with terrain/object.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
170: Fire
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “fire” and
“explosion”. These codes are
171: Fire/explosion
classified as end states when
they appear in the end of the
accident sequence.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
170: Fire/smoke (post-impact)
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual for
the words “fire” and
“explosion”. These codes are
180: Explosion (post-impact)
classified as end states when
they appear in the end of the
accident sequence.

Table 133: Abnormal Runway Contact End State Definition
Abnormal Runway Contact State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to execute a correct landing (other than hard landing).
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
Examples for abnormal runway
contact include bouncing, and
090: Abnormal runway contact
then skidding before coming to
rest.

Table 134: Missing Aircraft End State Definition
Missing Aircraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was not recovered after the accident.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
I identified this code by
420: Missing aircraft
searching the coding manual for
the word “missing”.
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Missing Aircraft State
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
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APPENDIX B. DEFINTIONS OF TRIGGERS

Table 135: Improper Maintenance Trigger Definition
Improper Maintenance
This trigger represents maintenance-related errors or violation
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24003: Aircraft service AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR “not
corrected”)
24704: Installation AND (“improper” OR “inadequate”)
24100–24124: Maintenance (hierarchy) AND (“improper” OR
“inadequate” OR “not corrected” OR “not performed” OR “delayed”
OR “not identified” OR “poor” OR “inattentive” OR “not possible”
OR “information insufficient” OR “disregarded” OR “not followed”
OR “not required” OR “not complied with” OR “overdue” OR
“reduced” OR “incorrect” OR “not maintained” OR “excessive” OR
inadvertent use of “ OR “not verified” OR “not approved” OR
“intentional” OR “reversed” OR “low” OR “inaccurate” OR “note
received” OR “not attained”
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

010105YYXX: Maintenance/inspections (hierarchy)

020615YYXX: Inspection (hierarchy)

020620YYXX: Maintenance (hierarchy)

02062415XX: Record keeping-aircraft/maintenance logs
04023025XX: Maintenance scheduling
04032020XX: Oversight of maintenance
04033025XX: Documentation/record keeping-maintenance records
030: Aircraft servicing event
040: Aircraft maintenance event
050: Aircraft inspection event

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“maintain” and “inspect”. I did
not include the codes
corresponding to maintaining
aircraft control and
maintenance computers. I also
included the codes for aircraft
service and installation.
Notes
Here, YY represents that
different maintenance actions
that are recorded under the
Maintenance/inspections
hierarchy. YY ranges from
“00: general” to “20: scheduled
maintenance checks”
Here, YY represents that
different maintenance actions
that are recorded under the
Inspection hierarchy. YY
ranges from “00: general” to
“20: scheduled/routine
inspection”
Here, YY represents that
different maintenance actions
that are recorded under the
Inspection hierarchy. YY
ranges from “00: general” to
“35: installation”
In addition to the subject codes
and occurrences listed in this
table, I used the following
maintenance-related modifiers:
(1) Incorrect
service/maintenance, (2) not
serviced/maintained,
(3) inadequate inspection, and
(4) not inspected
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Table 136: Improper Inflight Planning/Decision-making Trigger Definition
Improper Inflight Planning/Decision-making
This trigger represents incorrect planning or decisions taken by the pilot(s) during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24000: Planning/decision
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
24010: Inflight planning/decision-making
for derivatives of the words
24031: Judgment
“plan” and “decision”. I did
not include the codes that
60000: Improper decision
corresponded to preflight
planning and preparation.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
02041510XX: Information processing/decisionUnlike the pre-2008 system,
identification/recognition
which provided little insight
into the types of actions that
02041515XX: Information processing/decision—
triggered hazardous states, the
Understanding/comprehension
current system has subject
codes such as “02041025XX:
Delayed action”, “02041030:
Lack of action”, and
02041520XX: Information processing/decision-Decision
“02041035XX: Forgotten
making/judgment
action/omission”. I present
these codes as “one-to-one”
codes.

Table 137: Improper Use of Collective Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Collective
This trigger represents the incorrect collective input by the pilot during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
23202: Collective AND (“improper use of” OR “excessive” OR
I identified this code by
“improper” OR “delayed” OR “not used” OR “not possible” OR
searching the coding manual
“premature” OR “uncontrolled” OR “inadvertent activation” OR
for the word “collective”.
“inadequate” OR “inattentive” OR “inadvertent use” OR “abrupt” OR
“attempted”)
Raising or lowering the
collective control in a
helicopter changes the pitch of
the main rotor blades, resulting
in a change in the amount of
23206: Lowering of collective AND (“delayed” OR “restricted” OR
lift force generated by the main
“abrupt” OR “premature”)
rotor. Incorrect use of
collective can potentially result
in a low RPM state for the
system.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 138: Improper Maneuvering Trigger Definition
Improper Maneuvering
This trigger represents sudden or incorrect maneuvering by the pilot during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Improper Maneuvering
100: Abrupt maneuver
24543: Maneuver AND (“excessive” OR “misjudged” OR
“uncontrolled” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “poor” OR “delayed”
OR “premature” OR “inaccurate”)
24582: Evasive maneuver AND (“attempted” OR “performed” OR
“intentional” OR “initiated”)
24501: Aerobatic (maneuver) AND (“performed”)
24537: Ground loop/swerve AND (“inadvertent”)
24583: Low altitude flight/maneuver AND (“not successful” OR
“attempted” OR “required” OR “performed” OR “intentional” OR
“initiated”)
24584: Maneuver to avoid obstructions AND (“misjudged” OR
“intentional” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “not performed”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
270: Abrupt maneuver

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “abrupt” and
“maneuver

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “abrupt” and
“maneuver”.

Table 139: Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls
This trigger represents incorrect use of throttle/powerplant controls by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
22300: Powerplant controls AND (“improper use of“ OR “not
understood” OR “not used” OR “inadvertent deactivation” OR “not
selected”)
I identified these codes by
22301: Throttle/power control AND (“improper use of“ OR
searching the coding manual
“improper” OR “delayed” OR “reduced” OR “inadvertent activation”
for the words “throttle/power”.
OR “inadvertent deactivation” OR “not maintained” OR “not used”
I did not include the codes
OR “removed” OR “excessive” OR “not possible” OR “inadequate”
corresponding to the failure of
OR “uncontrolled” OR “not set” OR “exceeded” OR “incorrect” OR
throttle, engine, or powerplant
“restricted”)
components.
22303: Mixture control OR (“improper” OR “improper use of“ OR
“improper deactivation” OR “inadvertent use”)
22314: Throttle/power control friction lock AND (“excessive”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01057600XX: Aircraft power plant—Engine controls-general AND
I identified these codes by
(“not used/operated” OR “incorrect use/operation”)
searching the coding manual
for the words “throttle/power”.
01057602XX: Mixture control AND (“incorrect use/operation” OR
I did not include the codes
“unintentional use/operation” OR “unnecessary use/operation”)
corresponding to the failure of
throttle, engine, or powerplant
01057603XX: Power lever AND (“incorrect use/operation”)
components.

Table 140: Improper Engine Shutdown Trigger Definition
Improper Engine Shutdown
This trigger represents incorrect shutdown of an engine.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22309: Wrong engine shutdown AND (“performed”)

Notes
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Improper Engine Shutdown
23316: Engine shutdown OR (“inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR
“performed” OR “simulated”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
140: Engine shutdown

I identified this codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “shutdown”.
Notes
I identified this codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “shutdown”.

Table 141: Improper Use of Altimeter Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Altimeter
This trigger represents the incorrect use/setting of the altimeter by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
23103: Altimeter setting AND (“improper” OR “incorrect”)
First, I searched for the words
“altimeter”. Then, I included
those modifiers that suggested
some form of improper pilot
23107: Altimeter AND (“not set”)
action (e.g., improper altimeter
setting).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
First, I searched for the words
“altimeter”. Then, I included
01023416XX: Aircraft systems-Navigation system-Altimeterthose modifiers that suggested
barometric/encoder AND (“not used/operated”)
some form of improper pilot
action (e.g., improper altimeter
setting).

Table 142: Improper Communication Trigger Definition
Improper Communication
This trigger represents incorrect communication by the pilot/crew
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24600: Communication with ATC AND (“inadequate” OR
“improper”)
24601: Interpretation of instructions AND (“not understood” OR
“confusing” OR “improper” OR “incorrect”)
24602: Instructions-written/verbal AND (“not understood” OR (not
followed” OR “inadequate” OR “not obtained” OR “not verified” OR
“inaccurate” OR “attempted” OR “disregarded”)
24608: Communication AND (“inadequate” OR “poor” OR
“incorrect” OR “inaccurate” OR “not understood”)
24609: Communication-information AND (“not issued” OR
“inadequate” OR “not available” OR “not obtained” OR “improper”
OR “incorrect”)
24611: Radio communication AND (“inadequate” OR “delayed” OR
“not used”
24621: Air/ground communication AND (“inadequate” OR “not
available” OR “inaccurate” OR “disregarded” OR “initiated” OR “not
performed” OR “poor”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
02063510XX: Task performance—Communication—Lack of
communication

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the words
“communicate” and
“instruction”.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
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Improper Communication
02063515XX: Task performance—Communication—Accuracy of
communication
02063538XX: Task performance—Communication—Issuing
instructions

for derivatives of the words
“communicate” and
“instruction”.

Table 143: Improper Use of Procedure or Directives Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Procedure or Directives
This trigger represents situation where the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to follow or disregarded
the specified procedure
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24032: Procedures/directives AND (“not followed” OR “not complied
with” OR “improper” OR “disregarded” OR “not performed” OR
“poor” OR “not used” OR “misjudged” OR “improper use of”)
24016: Visual flight rules (VFR) procedures AND (“improper” OR
“not followed” OR “not maintained”)
24018: Flight manuals AND (“not followed” OR “not complied with”
I identified these codes by
OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded”)
searching the coding manual
24024: Instrument flight rules (IFR) procedure AND (“not followed”
for the word “procedure”.
OR “not performed” OR “improper”)
I only included the modifier
24030: Checklist AND (“not followed” OR “not used” OR “not
that suggested that
complied with” OR “not verified”)
procedure/directive was not
24301: Dispatch procedure AND (“not followed”)
followed.
24545: Emergency procedure AND (“improper” OR “not followed”
OR “not complied with” OR “not attained” OR “not selected” OR
“poor” OR “disregarded” OR “inadequate” OR “delayed”)
24549: Starting procedure AND (“improper” OR “initiated” OR
“attempted”
30000: Improper use of procedure
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
02063032XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of
I identified these codes by
policy/procedure
searching the coding manual
02063020XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of manual for the word “procedure”. I did
not include the corresponding
02063030XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of
to availability or adequacy of
checklist
procedures.

Table 144: Insufficient Procedure or Directives Trigger Definition
Insufficient Procedure or Directives
This trigger represents situations where the pilot(s) or maintenance personnel had procedures, directives,
or manuals that did not have requisite information.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24032: Procedures/directives AND (“inadequate” OR “not issued” OR I identified these codes by
“poor”)
searching the coding manual
24017: Documentation AND (“inadequate”)
for the word “procedure”.
24018: Flight manuals AND (“inadequate” OR “improper” OR
I included those modifiers that
“inaccurate” OR “information insufficient”)
suggested a lack of information
in the procedures or directives.
24030: Checklist AND (“inadequate” OR “improper” OR “poor”)
21001: Approach charts AND (“unavailable”)
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Insufficient Procedure or Directives
24609: Information AND (“inadequate” OR “not available” OR “not
obtained” OR “not compiled with” OR “incorrect” OR “poor”)
24300: Dispatch AND (“improper”)
24301: Dispatch procedure AND (“inadequate”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
04021000XX: Organizational issues—ManagementPolicy/procedure—General
04021010XX: Availability of policy/procedure
04021015XX: Adequacy of policy/procedure

I also included the codes for
where the pilot/maintenance
personnel did not have enough
information.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “procedure”.

Table 145: Improper Use of Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Trigger
Definition
Improper Use of Aerial Application/External Load Equipment
This trigger represents the improper use of external load equipment.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17400: Aerial application equipment (general) AND (“not removed”)
17500: Towing/advertising/external load equipment AND (“not
secured” OR “reversed”)
17503: Pickup equipment AND (“deployed inadvertently”)
17505: External load sling/harness AND (“not dumped” OR “not
disconnected”)
17506: External load cable/hook AND (“not removed”)
17507: External load release system AND (“not activated”)
23311: External load equipment AND (“improper use” OR
“improper” OR “not approved” OR “misjudged” OR “not removed”
OR “encountered”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022551XX: Equipment/furnishings—Agricultural/external load
system

480: External load event (rotorcraft)

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “aerial
application”, “external load”
and “pickup equipment”.
I exclude the codes that refer to
snagging/entanglement of the
external load equipment.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “external load”
and “pickup equipment”. I
exclude the codes that refer to
snagging/entanglement of the
external load equipment.

Table 146: Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition
Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion
This trigger represents fuel contamination or exhaustion
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17001: Fluids-Fuel AND (“exhaustion” OR “starvation” OR
“improper” OR “water” OR “contamination” OR “contaminationwater” OR “contamination other than water” OR “leak” OR “flow
restricted” OR “incorrect” OR “obstructed” OR “dumped” OR
“movement restricted” OR “fumes” OR “fire” OR “blocked (partial)”
OR “blocked (total)” OR “excessive flow/output”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071010XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-fuel AND (“fluid
management” OR “fuel condition” OR “inadequate inspection” OR

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the word “fuel”. I exclude
codes that refer to the failure of
the fuel system or low fuel
level.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
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Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion
This trigger represents fuel contamination or exhaustion
“not serviced/maintained” OR “fluid type” OR “incorrect
service/maintenance”)
191: Fuel starvation
192: Fuel exhaustion
193: Fuel contamination

for the word “fuel”. I exclude
codes that refer to the failure of
the fuel system or low fuel
level.

Table 147: Landing Gear Collapse Trigger Definition
Landing Gear Collapse
This trigger represents landing gear collapse
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
191: Main gear collapsed
192: Nose gear collapsed
193: Tail gear collapsed
194: Complete gear collapsed
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
094: Landing gear collapse

Notes
I identified these code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “gear collapse”.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “gear collapse”.

Table 148: Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Trigger
Definition
Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Failure
This trigger represents the failure or snagging of external load equipment
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
17400: External load equipment (general) AND (“snagged” OR
“entangled” OR “improper” OR “failure-total”)
17401: Spray/dusting equipment AND (“blocked (total)” OR “blocked
(partial)” OR “corroded” OR “extraneous” OR “malfunction” OR
I identified these codes by
“overload”)
searching the coding manual
17500: Towing/advertising/external load equipment AND (“snagged”
for the phrases “external load”
OR “entangled”)
and “pickup equipment”.
17503: Pickup equipment AND (“inadequate” OR “failure-total” OR
“incorrect” OR “separation” OR “movement restricted”)
I defined this trigger by
17505: External load sling/harness AND (“entangled” OR “slipped”
grouping these when they
OR “inadequate” OR “separation” OR “improper” OR “shifted” OR
indicated external load system
“oscillation”)
failure/entanglement with the
17506: External load cable/hook AND (“entangled” OR “snagged”
rotor system.
OR “failure” OR “blade strike” OR “binding” OR “separation” OR
“incorrect” OR “fouled”)
17507: External load release system AND (“inoperative” OR
“jammed” OR “malfunction”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01022551XX: Equipment/furnishings—Agricultural/external load
I identified these codes by
system AND (“malfunction” OR “inoperative”)
searching the coding manual
for the phrases “external load”
and “pickup equipment”.
410: External load event (rotorcraft)
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Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Failure
This trigger represents the failure or snagging of external load equipment
I defined this trigger by
grouping these when they
indicated external load system
failure/entanglement with the
rotor system.

Table 149: Improper Loading/Securing of Cargo Trigger Definition
Improper Loading/Securing of Cargo
This trigger represents incorrect loading or securing of cargo by the pilot or ground personnel.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24035: Security of cargo AND (“inadequate” OR “not verified” OR
“inaccurate”)
I identified these codes by
24040: Loading of cargo AND (“excessive” OR “improper”)
searching the coding manual
23317: Load tie-down/security AND (“inadequate” OR “improper”)
for the word “cargo”.
17116: Cargo/baggage AND (“not secured” OR “loose”)
120: Cargo shift
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No codes available

Table 150: Improper Use of Deicing System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Deicing System
This trigger represents improper use of the deicing system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12305: Anti-ice/deice-carburetor heat AND (“not engaged”)
22600: Anti-ice/deice system AND(“not used” OR “improper use of”
OR “not complied with”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01023020XX: Ice/rain protection system-intake anti-ice/deice AND
(“not used/operated”)

Notes
These codes represent the
improper use of the deicing
system
Notes
This code represents the
improper use of the deicing
system.

Table 151: Poor Choice of Landing/Takeoff Area Trigger Definition
Poor Choice of Landing/Takeoff Area
This trigger represents a poor choice of landing/takeoff/taxi area by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24028: Wrong runway AND (“selected”)
This code indicates that the
pilot chose an
24029: Unsuitable terrain or takeoff/landing/taxi area AND
(“selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR “not identified” OR incorrect/inappropriate landing
terrain.
“encountered” OR “not obtained” OR “misjudged”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 152: Improper Use of Protective Covering Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Protective Covering
This trigger represents the improper use of protective covering for the aircraft
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
17124: Miscellaneous-protective covering
These codes represent the
improper use of protective
23313: Aircraft protective covering AND (“not used” OR “not
covering for the aircraft.
available” OR “unavailable” OR “disregarded”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 153: Improper Fuel Grade Trigger Definition
Improper Fuel Grade
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17008: Fluids-Fuel grade
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071010XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-fuel
194: Wrong fuel

Notes
This code represents the use of
improper type of fuel.
Notes
These codes represents the use
of improper type of fuel.

Table 154: Improper Aborted landing/takeoff Trigger Definition
Improper Aborted landing/takeoff
This trigger represents the entanglement of the helmet.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24502: Abort
24504: Aborted landing
24505: Aborted takeoff
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching for derivatives of the
word “abort”.
Notes

Table 155: Improper Touchdown Trigger Definition
Improper Touchdown
This trigger represents an improper touchdown by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24531: Proper touchdown point
24567: Touchdown
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching for the word
“touchdown”.
Notes

Table 156: Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified) Trigger Definition
Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified)
This trigger represents improper use of unspecified equipment.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24700: Miscellaneous
24702: Equipment—other
23300: Miscellaneous equipment
40000: Improper use of equipment/aircraft

Notes
The NTSB used this code
suggest improper use of
aircraft equipment, but did not
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Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified)
This trigger represents improper use of unspecified equipment.

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

specify the nature of
equipment in the codes.
Notes

Table 157: Warning/Safety System Failure Trigger Definition
Warning/Safety System Failure
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13107: Warning system
13108: Safety system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates the
failure of warning systems
Notes

Table 158: Improper Action (Unspecified) Definition
Improper Action (Unspecified)
This trigger represents the failure of the oil system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
02040000XX: Action/decision—general—general
02041000XX: Action/decision—Action—general

02041015XX: Incorrect action performance

Notes
Notes
These codes are part of the
action/decision hierarchy.
However, I define them
separately as they do not
indicate the type of action
(e.g., delayed) unlike other
action-triggers.

Table 159: Improper Gear Position Trigger Definition
Improper Gear Position
This trigger represents failure of the pilot extend/retract the landing gear.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
196: Gear not extended
197: Gear not retracted
198: Gear retracted on ground

22000: Landing gear AND (“misjudged” OR “not selected”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching for derivatives of the
word “retract” and “extend”
along with the phrase “landing
gear”.
I also included the codes
associated with the subject
code “22000: Landing gear”
and modifiers that indicated
improper gear use/position.
Notes
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Table 160: Fuselage/Wing Failure Trigger Definition
Fuselage/Wing Failure
This trigger represents the failure of fuselage/wing components.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10000: Fuselage (general)
10001: Crew compartment
10003: cabin
10006: skin
10007: longeron
10008: attachment
10010: fairing
10111: Winglet
10200: Nacelle/pylon (general)
10203: plate
10207: Fairing
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01035302XX: Fuselage-Rotorcraft tail boom
01035310XX: Fuselage main structure
01035311XX: Frames (main fuselage)
01035340XX: Fuselage attach fittings system
01035343XX: Gear attach fittings on fuselage
01035400XX: Nacelles/pylons structure (general)

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “fuselage” and
“wing” in the NTSB
hierarchies.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “fuselage” and
“wing” in the NTSB
hierarchies.

Table 161: Flight Control Surfaces/Attachments Failure Trigger Definition
Flight Control Surfaces/Attachments Failure
This trigger represents the failure of fuselage/wing components.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10300: Flight control surfaces/attachments

10313: Flight control, rudder

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “flight control”
in the NTSB hierarchies. I
exclude the codes under the
“flight control system”
hierarchy.
Notes

Table 162: Landing Gear Failure Trigger Definition
Landing Gear Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the landing gear.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10400: Landing gear
10401: Main gear
10402: Main gear shock absorbing strut
10403: Main gear strut
10404: Main gear attachment
10405: Nose gear
10406: Nose gear assembly

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “gear” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
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Landing Gear Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the landing gear.
10413: Ski assembly
10414: Float assembly
10417: Skid assembly
10418: Normal brake system
10425: Steering system
10431: Main gear strut scissors
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01023200XX: Landing gear system (general)
01023210XX: Main landing gear
01023211XX: Main landing gear attachment section
01023213XX: Main gear strut/axle/truck
01023270XX: Auxiliary gear

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “gear” in the
NTSB hierarchies.

Table 163: Door/Window Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition
Door/Window Failure/Contamination
This trigger represents the failure of doors/windows, and contamination of windows
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
10500: Door (general)
10502: Exterior crew door
10503: Passenger door
10505: Cargo/baggage door
I identified these codes by
10506: Service door
searching the coding manual
10510: Inspection door
for the word “door” and
“window” in the NTSB
10601: Window-flight compartment window/windshield
hierarchies.
10602: Cabin window
10603: Door-window (window in door)
10604: Inspection/observation window
10605: Canopy window
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01035200XX: Doors (general)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
01035210XX: Passenger/crew doors
for the word “door” and
01035240XX: Service doors
“window” in the NTSB
01035610XX: Windows-flight compartment windows
hierarchies.

Table 164: Flight Control System Failure Trigger Definition
Flight Control System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of flight control system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10700: Flight control system (general)
10708: Stabilator control
10711: Boost system

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “flight control
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
These codes refer to the failure
of flight the control system.
Notes
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Flight Control System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of flight control system components
01022700XX: Flight control system (general)
01022701XX: Control column section

01022770XX: Gust lock or damper

I identified thee codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “flight control
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
These codes refer to the failure
of flight the control system.

Table 165: Improper Use of Flight Control System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Flight Control System
This trigger represents the improper use of the flight control system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022700XX: Flight control system (general) AND (“incorrect
use/operation” OR “unintentional use/operation”)
01022770XX: Gust lock or damper AND (“incorrect use/operation”)

Notes
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “flight control
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.

Table 166: Stabilizer System Trigger Definition
Stabilizer System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10800: Stabilizer (general)
10802: Horizontal stabilizer attachment
10803: Vertical stabilizer surface
10804:: Vertical stabilizer attachment
10805:Horizontal stabilizer
10807: Vertical stabilizer
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01035500XX: Empennage structure (general)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “stabilizer” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes indicated
failure of the stabilizer system.
Notes
I included this code as the
empennage is an analogy for
vertical and horizontal
stabilizer for an aircraft.
This code indicated failure of
the stabilizer system.

Table 167: Rotor Drive System Failure Trigger Definition
Rotor Drive System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
11000: Rotor drive system (general)
11001: engine to transmission drive
11002: Main rotor mast (drive shaft)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
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Rotor Drive System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components
11003: Freewheeling sprag unit
11004: Freewheeling unit (other)
11005: Clutch assembly
11006: Main gearbox/transmission
11007: Combining gearbox
11008: Intermediate gearbox (42 deg.)
11009: Tail rotor gearbox (90 deg.)
11011: Tail rotor drive shaft
11013: Oil cooler drive shaft
11014: Tail rotor drive shaft bearing
11015: Main rotor driven pulley
11016: Main rotor driving pulley
11018: Main rotor drive belt
11019: Isolation link
11021: Tail rotor drive shaft coupling
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01046300XX: Main rotor drive (general)
01046310XX: Engine/transmission coupling
01046330XX: Main rotor trans mount
01046500XX: Tail rotor drive system (general)
01046510XX: Tail rotor drive shaft
01046520XX: Tail rotor gear box

for the phrase “rotor drive” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represents
the failure of a specific part of
the rotor drive system

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “rotor drive” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represents
the failure of a specific part of
the rotor drive system

Table 168: Rotorcraft Flight Control System Failure Trigger Definition
Rotorcraft Flight Control System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
11100: Rotorcraft flight control system
11101: Primary servo
11103: Cyclic trim
11104: Collective trim
11107: Tail rotor servo
11110: NOTAR

NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No codes available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “rotorcraft flight
control system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represents
the failure of a specific part of
the rotorcraft flight control
system
Notes

Table 169: Rotor System Failure Trigger Definition
Rotor System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of rotor system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
11200: Main rotor (general)
11201: Main rotor blade

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
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Rotor System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of rotor system components
11202: Main rotor blade spar
11203: Main rotor blade skin
11206: Main rotor blade abrasion strip
11207: Main rotor blade cuff
11208: tail rotor blade
11209: tail rotor blade spar
11211: tail rotor blade abrasion strip
11212: tail rotor blade cuff
11213: Main rotor hub
11214: Main rotor hub yoke (spindle)
11215: Main rotor hub grip (sleeve)
11217: Main rotor hub lead-lag stop/damper
11218: Main rotor hub stop (static/dynamic)
11219: Main rotor hub flapping hinge/stop(s)
11221: Main rotor hub pillow block
11222: Tail rotor hub
11223: Tail rotor hub counterweight
11224: Tail rotor hub pitch link
11225: Tail rotor hub pitch change mechanism
11226: Tail rotor hub pitch actuating shaft
11227: stabilizer bar
11228: rotor vibration absorber
11229: Main rotor blade balance weights
11230: Tail rotor blade balance weights
11231: Main rotor hub retaining nut
11232: Tail rotor hub retaining nut
11233: Main rotor blade retaining pin/bolt
11234: Main rotor blade drag brace
11235: Main rotor
11236: star flex arm
11237: Tail rotor
11238: Main rotor tension torsion bar
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01046200XX: Main rotor system (general)
01046210XX:Main rotor blade system
01046220XX: Main rotor head system
01045230XX: Main rotor mast/swashplate
01046400XX: Tail rotor (general)
01046410XX: Tail rotor blade
01046420XX: Tail rotor head

for the phrase “rotor system” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represents
the failure of a specific part of
the rotor system.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “rotor system” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represents
the failure of a specific part of
the rotor system.

Table 170: Airframe Component Failure Trigger Definition
Airframe Component Failure
This trigger represents the failure of specific airframe components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
11300: Miscellaneous-airframe
11301: Airframe
11302: Empennage
11303: Bolt/nut/fastener/clamp/spring

Notes
Here, I grouped the different
airframe/hardware-related
codes that the NTSB classified
as “miscellaneous”.
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Airframe Component Failure
This trigger represents the failure of specific airframe components
11304: Dowel/pin
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071430XX: Miscellaneous hardware—fasteners
01071400XX: Miscellaneous hardware (general)
01071410XX: Hoses and tubes

Notes
Here, I grouped the different
airframe/hardware-related
codes that the NTSB classified
as “miscellaneous”.

Table 171: Electrical System Failure Trigger Definition
Electrical System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of electrical system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12000: Electrical system (general)
12001: Battery
12003: Voltmeter
12004: Generator
12005: Alternator
12013: Electric wiring
12015: Electric switch
12017: Circuit breaker
12019: Drive/belt
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022430XX: Electrical power system-DC generation system

01022440XX: External power system

Notes
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the electrical
system.
I excluded the modifiers that
indicated incorrect use of the
electrical system (and used
them in a separate trigger)
Notes
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the electrical
system.
I excluded the modifiers that
indicated incorrect use of the
electrical system (and used
them in a separate trigger)

Table 172: Improper Use of Electrical System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Electrical System
This trigger represents the improper use of the electrical system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22400: Electrical system AND (“inadvertent deactivation”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022430XX: Electrical power system-DC generation system

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the words “electrical” and
“system”.
Note that I used the AND logic
to associate the electrical
system code with the
“inadvertent activation”
modifier.
Notes
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Improper Use of Electrical System
This trigger represents the improper use of the electrical system
01022440XX: External power system

Table 173: Hydraulic System Failure Trigger Definition
Hydraulic System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of hydraulic system components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12100: Hydraulic system (general)
12102: Pump
12104: Reservoir
12105: Hydraulic line
12113: Filter
12114: Actuator

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022900XX: Hydraulic power system (general)
01022910XX: Hydraulic main system

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “hydraulic” and
“system in the NTSB
hierarchies.
These codes correspond to the
failure of the hydraulic system
and not its improper use.
Notes

Table 174: Improper Use of Hydraulic System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Hydraulic System
This trigger represents the improper use of the hydraulic system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12100: Hydraulic system (general) AND (“disabled”)
12102: Pump
12104: Reservoir
12105: Hydraulic line
12113: Filter
12114: Actuator
22500: Hydraulic system AND (“inadvertent deactivation”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022900XX: Hydraulic power system (general) AND (“incorrect
use/operation”)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “hydraulic” and
“system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Note that I used the AND logic
to associate the hydraulic
system codes with modifiers
that suggest incorrect use.
Notes

Table 175: Navigation Instrument Failure Trigger Definition
Navigation Instrument Failure
This trigger represents the failure of navigation instruments
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12201: Flight/navigation instruments—altimeter AND (“inadequate”)
12202: Radio AND (“failure-partial”)
12204: Turn and bank indicator AND (“inoperative”)
12206: Attitude indicator AND (“inoperative”)
12210: Compass AND (“inoperative”)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “navigation” and
“system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
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Navigation Instrument Failure
This trigger represents the failure of navigation instruments
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01023416XX: Navigation system—Altimeter, barometric/encode

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “navigation” and
“system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.

Table 176: Deicing System Failure Trigger Definition
Deicing System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the deicing system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12300: Anti-ice/deice system (general) AND (“leak”)
12303: Anti-ice/deice system-windshield AND (“not installed”)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “deice” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Notes

Table 177: Engine Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Engine Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of engine assembly components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14000: Engine assembly (general)
14001: Bearing
14002: Camshaft
14003: Crankcase
14004: Crankshaft
14006: Connecting rod
14007: Cylinder
14008: Piston
14009: Push rod
14010: Ring
14011: valve-intake
14012: Blower/impeller/integral supercharger
14013: Mount
14014: Engine assembly-other
14015: Connecting rod bolt
14016: Valve-exhaust
14017: Rocker arm/tappet
14019: Valve keeper
14020: Crankshaft counterweights/vibration damper
14022: Connecting rod cap
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01058300XX: Engine (reciprocating) (general)
01058520XX: Reciprocating engine power section
01058530XX: Reciprocating engine cylinder section

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “engine
assembly” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
engine assembly.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “engine
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Engine Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of engine assembly components
assembly” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
engine assembly.

Table 178: Compressor Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Compressor Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the compressor assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14100: Compressor assembly (general)
14101: Casting
14102: Stator vane retainer
14103: Rotor disc
14104: Blade
14105: Blade retention
14107: Impeller
14109: Air seal
14113: Stator vane
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01057230XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Compressor section

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “compressor
assembly” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
compressor assembly.
Notes
In the post-2008 system, I
identified the code
corresponding to compressor
failure by searching for the
word “compressor”.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
compressor assembly.

Table 179: Combustion Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Combustion Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the combustion assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14200: Combustion assembly (general)
14201: Combustion liner

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057240XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Combustion section

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “combustion
assembly” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
combustion assembly.
Notes
In the post-2008 system, I
identified the code
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Combustion Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the combustion assembly
corresponding to compressor
failure by searching for the
word “combustion”.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
combustion assembly.

Table 180: Turbine Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Turbine Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the turbine assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14300: Turbine assembly (general)
14302: Seal
14303: Shroud
14304: Ring
14305: Nozzle
14308: Turbine wheel
14309: Turbine blade
14311: Air seal
14313: Shaft
14314: Shaft bearing
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01057250XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Turbine section

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “combustion
assembly” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
turbine assembly.
Notes
In the post-2008 system, I
identified the code
corresponding to compressor
failure by searching for the
word “turbine”.

Table 181: Exhaust System Failure Trigger Definition
Exhaust System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the exhaust assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14400: Exhaust system (general)
14401: Manifold/pipe
14405: Clamp
14406: Stack
14408: End plate
14411: Probe
14415: External supercharger
14416: Turbocharger
14419: Waste gate
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
011057800XX: Engine exhaust (general)

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “exhaust
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
exhaust system.
Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “exhaust
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Exhaust System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the exhaust assembly
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.

Table 182: Propeller System Failure Trigger Definition
Propeller System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the propeller
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14501: Propeller system/accessories-blade
14513: Planetary gear
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “propeller
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Notes

Table 183: Accessory Drive Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Accessory Drive Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the accessory drive assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14700: Accessory drive assembly (general)
14705: Drive shaft
14706: Drive bearing
14707: Drive gear

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01057260XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Accessory drives

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “accessory
drive” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
accessory drive system.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “accessory
drive” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
accessory drive system.

Table 184: Ignition System Failure Trigger Definition
Ignition System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the ignition system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14800: Ignition system (general)
14801: Magneto

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
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Ignition System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the ignition system
14803: Spark plug
14805: Low tension wiring
14806: High tension wiring
14808: Ignition harness
14809: Ignition switch
14810: Ignition lead
14813: Magneto grounding lead (p-lead)
14814: Auto re-light system
14815: Ignition points
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057414XX: Ignition system—magneto/distributor

for the word “ignition” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
ignition system.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “ignition” in the
NTSB hierarchies.

01057421XX: Spark plugs/igniters
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
ignition system.

Table 185: Engine Accessories Failure Trigger Definition
Engine Accessories Failure
This trigger represents the failure of engine accessories
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
14900: Engine accessories (general)
14906: Engine starter

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “engine
accessories” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific engine
accessories
Notes

Table 186: Bleed Air System Failure Trigger Definition
Bleed Air System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the bleed air system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15000: Bleed air system (general)
15001: Valve
15002: Sensitive valve
15003: Actuator
15004: Governor
15005: Lines
15006: Fittings

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “bleed air” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
bleed air system.
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Bleed Air System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the bleed air system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

01057500XX: Engine bleed air system (general)

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “bleed air” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
failure of a specific part of the
bleed air system.

Table 187: Fuel System Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition
Fuel System Failure/Contamination
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the fuel system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15100: Fuel system (general)
15101: Tank
15102: Line
15103: Line fitting
15104: Selector/valve
15105: Filter
15106: Strainer
15107: Screen
15108: Primer system
15109: Carburetor
15110: Pump
15111: Injector
15112: Vent
15113: Drain
15114: Cap
15115: Dump valve
15116: Ram air/induction air
15118: Nozzle
15119: Fuel control
15121: Fuel shutoff
15124: Electric boost pump
15125: Transfer pump
15127: Fuel flow divider/distributor
15128: Fuel quantity float/sensor
15131: PC line
15134: Low fuel warning light
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022800XX: Fuel system (general)
01022810XX: Fuel storage
01022820XX: Fuel distribution
01022821XX: Fuel-filter strainer
01022822XX: Fuel pumps
01022823XX: Fuel selector/shutoff valve
01022840XX: Fuel indication system
01022841XX: Fuel quantity indicator

Notes

I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “fuel system” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure/contamination of a
specific component in the fuel
system.
Note that this trigger definition
does not include the improper
use of the fuel system.

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “fuel system” in
the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure/contamination of a
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Fuel System Failure/Contamination
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the fuel system
01022841XX: Fuel quantity indicator
01022842XX: Fuel pressure
01022897XX: Fuel system wiring

specific component in the fuel
system.
Note that this trigger definition
does not include the improper
use of the fuel system.

Table 188: Lubricating System Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition
Lubricating System Failure/Contamination
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the lubricating system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
15200: Lubricating system (general)
15202: Oil line
I identified these codes by
15204: Oil pressure pump
searching the coding manual
15205: Oil scavenge pump
for the phrase “lubricating
15206: Oil cooler
system” in the NTSB
15208: Oil seal
hierarchies.
15209: Oil gasket
Each of these codes represent
15210: Oil regulator
the failure/contamination of a
15211: Oil tubing
specific component in the
15212: Oil filler cap
lubrication system.
15213: Oil port/passage, internal
15214: Oil filter/screen
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 189: Engine Installation Failure Trigger Definition
Engine Installation Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the engine installation
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15302: Engine installation—suspension mounts
15303: Fire shield
15304: Mounting bolt

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “engine
installation” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Notes

Table 190: Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments Trigger Definition
Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments
This trigger represents the failure or improper readings from engine instruments
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
15400: Engine instruments (general)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
15402: Tachometer
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Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments
This trigger represents the failure or improper readings from engine instruments
15404: Fuel quantity gage
for the phrase “engine
instrument” in the NTSB
15405: Fuel flow gage
hierarchies.
15410: Exhaust gas temperature
15412: Torquemeter
Each of these codes represent
15413: Carburetor air temperature gage
the failure of an engine
15414: N1 (RPM)
instrument.
15420: Engine RPM gage
15500: Torquemeter system AND (“failure-partial”)
13002: Transmission oil pressure indicator AND (“no pressure”)
13005: Dual tachometer AND (“false indication” OR “erratic” OR
“failure-partial”
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
01057710XX: Engine indicating system—power indicating system

This code represent the failure
of an engine instrument.

Table 191: Reduction Gear Assembly Failure Trigger Definition
Reduction Gear Assembly Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the reduction gear assembly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15603: Reduction gear assembly—reduction gear
15606: accessory drive gear
15607: accessory drive bearing

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057210XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—reduction gear and shaft

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “reduction gear”
in the NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the reduction
gear assembly.
Notes
This code represents the failure
of a specific component in the
reduction gear assembly.

Table 192: Cooling System Failure Trigger Definition
Cooling System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the cooling system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15700: Cooling system (general)
15701: Cowling
15707: Lines

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “cooling
system” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
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Cooling System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the cooling system

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

component in the cooling
system.
Notes

Table 193: Turboshaft engine component Failure Trigger Definition
Turboshaft engine component Failure
This trigger represents the failure of turboshaft engine components
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
15900: Turboshaft engine (general)
15901: Gas generator
15902: Gas generator turbine
15903: Combustion chamber
15904: Gas generator turbine shaft
15905: Free (power) turbine
15906: Fee turbine shaft
15907: Reduction gear box
15908: Power output shaft
15909: Free turbine governor
15910: Gas generator overspeed sensor/governor
15911: Free turbine overspeed sensor
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “turboshaft
engine” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the turboshaft
engine.
Notes

Table 194: Throttle/Power Control Failure Trigger Definition
Throttle/Power Control Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the throttle/power control
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16000: Throttle/power lever (general)
16001: Push/pull rod
16002: Bellcrank
16004: Cable

16005: Linkage

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057600XX: Engine controls (general)
01057602XX: Mixture control
01057603XX: Power lever
01057697XX: Engine control system wiring

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “throttle”,
“power”, and “control” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the
throttle/power system.
Note that this trigger definition
does not include the improper
use of throttle/power control.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “throttle”,
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Throttle/Power Control Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the throttle/power control
“power”, and “control” in the
NTSB hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the
throttle/power system.
Note that this trigger definition
does not include the improper
use of throttle/power control.

Table 195: Carburetor Heat Control Failure Trigger Definition
Carburetor Heat Control Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the carburetor heat control
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16400: Carburetor heat control (general)
16404: Cable/Push-pull rod
16405: Linkage

16407: Air box

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “carburetor” and
“control” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the carburetor
heat control system.
Note that this trigger definition
does not include the improper
use of carburetor heat control
Notes

Table 196: Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure Trigger Definition
Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the fuel injection control system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16600: Fuel injection control/system

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the phrase “fuel injection”
in the NTSB hierarchies.

16602: Bellcrank

Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the fuel injection
system.

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

Notes
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Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the fuel injection control system
01057313XX: Engine and fuel control-fuel injector nozzle

This code represents the failure
of a specific component in the
fuel injection system.

Table 197: Induction Air System Contamination/Failure Trigger Definition
Induction Air System Contamination/Failure
This trigger represents the failure or contamination of the induction air system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
16700: Induction air control/system (general)
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
16709: Intake manifold
for the words “intake” and
16711: Induction air ducting
“induction” in the NTSB
hierarchies.
16712: Engine inlet assembly

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057160XX: Powerplant-air intake
01057220XX: Air inlet section (core engine)

Each of these codes represent
the failure of a specific
component in the induction air
system.
Notes
This code represents the failure
of the air induction/intake
system

Table 198: Aircraft Light Not Available/Failure Trigger Definition
Aircraft Light Not Available/Failure
This trigger represents the unavailability or failure of aircraft lights
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17200: Light(s)
17202: Instrument light(s)
17206: Landing light(s)
17207: Exterior light(s)
17208: Annunciator panel light(s)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
These codes represent the
failure of aircraft lights.
Note that these codes do not
include the ambient light or
airport lighting.
Notes

Table 199: Improper use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls
Improper Use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls
This trigger represents the improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
10901: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control AND (“not safetied”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

Notes
This code represents the
improper use of rotorcraft
flight controls
Notes
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Improper Use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls
This trigger represents the improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
01046700XX: Rotorcraft flight control (general) AND (“incorrect
use/operation”)
01046710XX: Rotorcraft flight control-Main rotor control AND
(“unintentional use/operation”)
01046720XX: Rotorcraft flight control-Tail rotor control AND
(“incorrect use/operation”)

These codes represents the
improper use of rotorcraft
flight controls

Table 200: Pneumatic System Failure Trigger Definition
Pneumatic System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the pneumatic system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13103: Pneumatic system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01023600XX: Pneumatic system (general)
01023610XX: Pneumatic distribution system
01023620XX: Pneumatic indicating system
01023697XX: Pneumatic system wiring

Notes
This code represents the failure
of the pneumatic system.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “pneumatic” in
the NTSB hierarchies.

Table 201: Improper Use of Fuel System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Fuel System
This trigger represents the improper use of the fuel system
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22200: Fuel system (general) AND (“improper use of” OR
“inadvertent deactivation” OR :disregarded”)
22201: Fuel tank selector position AND (“improper” OR “insufficient
information” OR “inadvertent” OR “inadvertent activation”)
22202: Fuel boost pump selector position AND (“improper” OR
“improper use of” OR “not selected”)
22204: Fuel supply AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR
“improper” OR “inattentive” OR “not maintained” OR “not
identified” OR “misread” OR “inadvertent deactivation”)
22205: Fuel management AND (“inaccurate” OR “improper” OR
“inadequate”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01022823XX: Fuel selector/shutoff valve AND (“unintentional
use/operation”)

Notes

These codes represent the
improper use of the fuel
system.

Notes
This code represent the
improper use of the fuel
system.

Table 202: Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization Trigger Definition
Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization
This trigger represents the inadequate facilities provided by the organization
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
70000: Facility inadequate (general)
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Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization
This trigger represents the inadequate facilities provided by the organization
70110: Inadequate design
The lack of facilities generally
prevented the ground
70118: Inadequate external lighting
personnel, maintenance
personnel, or builder from
performing their tasks
70122: Equipment interference
correctly—triggering the
preflight mechanical issue
state.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The lack of facilities generally
prevented the ground
personnel, maintenance
personnel, or builder from
04022025XX: Resources-adequacy of equipment
performing their tasks
correctly—triggering the
preflight mechanical issue
state.

Table 203: Improper Design and Development of Aircraft Trigger Definition
Improper Design and Development of Aircraft
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
82000: Aircraft/equipment inadequate (general)
82100: Inadequate design
82110: Inadequate standards/requirements
82111: Inadequate instrument display
82114: Inadequate control location
82115: Inadequate control shape/size
82122: Equipment interference
82125: Inadequate handling/performance capabilities
82126: Inadequate airframe
82128: Inadequate aircraft component
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
04011010XX: Development-Design-equipment design
01012025XX: Selection/certification/testing-document information
verification
04013000XX: Manufacture/production (general)
04013020XX: Document/information production

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “design” and
“development”
The poor design triggers the
preflight mechanical state.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “design” and
“development”. The poor
design triggers the preflight
mechanical state.

Table 204: Improper Use of Material Trigger Definition
Use of Improper Material
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
84000: Material inadequate (general)
84100: Material defect
84110: Inadequate quality control

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “material”.
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Use of Improper Material
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft
84120: Material defect
84200: Improper
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

The use of improper material
triggers the preflight
mechanical state.
Notes

Table 205: Inadequate Oversight/Surveillance by Management/Regulator Trigger
Definition
Inadequate Oversight/Surveillance by Management/Regulator
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
90000: Inadequate surveillance of operations (general)
90100: Insufficient staff
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
04032000XX: Oversight (general)
04032010XX: Oversight of personnel
04032015XX: Oversight of operation
04032020XX: Oversight of maintenance
04032025XX: Equipment monitoring
04032035XX: Document/revision tracking
04032040XX: Oversight of regulation compliance

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “oversight” and
“surveillance”.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the word “oversight” and
“surveillance”.

Table 206: Inadequate Pilot Training by Management Trigger Definition
Inadequate Pilot Training by Management/Regulator
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
04030000XX: Support/oversight/monitoring (general)
04031000XX: Training (general)
04031010XX: Inadequate initial training
04031020XX: Inadequate upgrade training
04031030XX: Emergency procedure training

Notes
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for derivatives of the word
“train”. I did not include the
codes corresponding to lack of
experience/training

Table 207: Insufficient Standards/Requirement Trigger Definition
Insufficient Standards/Requirement
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
91000: Insufficient standards/requirements
91100: Insufficient standards/requirements-airman

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
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Insufficient Standards/Requirement
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management
91200: Insufficient standards/requirements-aircraft
91300: Insufficient standards/requirements-operation/operator
91400: Insufficient standards/requirements-manufacturer
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

for the phrase
“standards/requirements”.
Notes

Table 208: Inadequate Certification by Regulator Trigger Definition
Inadequate Certification by Regulator
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
92000: Inadequate certification/approval (general)
92100: Inadequate certification/approval -airman
92200: Inadequate certification/approval -aircraft
92300: Inadequate certification/approval –operation/operator
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “certification”
and “approval”.
Notes

Table 209: Inadequate Documentation/Record-Keeping Trigger Definition
Inadequate Documentation/Record-Keeping
This trigger represents the lack of record-keeping by the management
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
93000: Inadequate substantiation process
93100: Inadequate compliance determination record-keeping

Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “compliance”,
“substantiation”, “records, and
“documentation”.

93200: Insufficient review (documentation)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
04033000XX: Documentation/record keeping (general)
02062500XX: Record keeping (general)
04033020XX: Testing records

04033025XX: Maintenance records

These codes represent
inadequate documentation by
the management.
Notes
I identified these codes by
searching the coding manual
for the words “compliance”,
“substantiation”, “records, and
“documentation”.
These codes represent
inadequate documentation by
the management.

Table 210: Oil Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition
Oil Contamination/Exhaustion
This trigger represents oil contamination or exhaustion
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Oil Contamination/Exhaustion
This trigger represents oil contamination or exhaustion
17002: Fluids-oil
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071020XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-oil

This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.
Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.

Table 211: Hydraulic Fluid Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition
Hydraulic Fluid Contamination/Exhaustion
This trigger represents hydraulic fluid contamination or exhaustion
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17003: Fluids-hydraulic
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071015XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-hydraulic fluid

Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.
Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.

Table 212: Contamination by Water Trigger Definition
Contamination by Water
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17005: Fluids-water
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.
Notes

Table 213: Insufficient Grease Trigger Definition
Insufficient Grease
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17012: Fluids-Grease
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01071035XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-grease

Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.
Notes
This code represents fluid
exhaustion/contamination.

Table 214: Improper Use of Carburetor Heat Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Carburetor Heat
This trigger represents the improper use of carburetor heat
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22304: Carburetor heat AND (‘not used” OR “delayed” OR “improper
use of “ OR “not deployed” OR “not selected” OR “unavailable”)

Notes
This code represents the
improper use of carburetor heat
control by the pilot.
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Improper Use of Carburetor Heat
This trigger represents the improper use of carburetor heat
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057231XX: Engine and fuel control—fuel control/carburetor AND
(“not used/operated” OR “incorrect use/operation”)

Notes
This code represents the
improper use of carburetor heat
control by the pilot

Table 215: Improper Weather Forecast Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Weather Forecast
This trigger represents an inaccurate/improper use of weather forecast
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24401: Weather forecast AND (“inaccurate” OR “not obtained” OR
“disregarded”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
I identified this code by
searching the coding manual
for the word “forecast”.
Notes

Table 216: Improper Weather Observation Trigger Definition
Improper Weather Observation
This trigger represents improper observation of the weather
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24402: Weather observation AND (“not possible”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates improper
observation of the weather by
the pilot.
Notes

Table 217: Improper Use of Inflight Briefing Service Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Inflight Briefing Service
This trigger represents the improper use of briefs/information received during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code represents improper
24406: Inflight briefing service AND (“not used”)
use of inflight briefing.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 218: Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories
This trigger represents the improper use of weather advisories received during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code represents the
24407: Inflight weather advisories AND (“not obtained” OR “not
improper use of inflight
followed”)
weather advisories.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
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Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories
This trigger represents the improper use of weather advisories received during flight
No code available

Table 219: Improper Aircraft Handling Trigger Definition
Improper Aircraft Handling
This trigger represents incorrect handling of the aircraft by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24500: Aircraft handling AND (“poor” OR “not successful” OR
“improper” OR “not maintained” OR “not possible” OR “abrupt” OR
“inadequate” OR “not understood” OR “misjudged”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents improper
handling of the aircraft by the
pilot.
Notes

Table 220: Improper Use of Cyclic Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Cyclic
This trigger represents incorrect use of the cyclic control by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23201: Cyclic AND (“improper use of” OR “excessive” OR
“improper” OR “restricted” OR “uncontrolled” OR “excessive” OR
“not possible” OR “abrupt” OR “premature” OR “not understood” OR
“delayed” OR ”inadvertent use” OR “inadvertent activation” OR “not
available”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents improper
use of cyclic control by the
pilot.
This code is not the same as
the one that is inferred in the
absence of a trigger in certain
accidents.
Notes

Table 221: Improper Use of Tail Rotor/Anti-Torque Control Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Tail Rotor/Anti-Torque Control
This trigger represents incorrect use of pedals to control the tail rotor
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23203: Tail rotor/anti-torque control AND (“improper use of” OR
“excessive” OR “improper” OR “restricted” OR “uncontrolled” OR
“excessive” OR “not possible” OR “abrupt” OR “not maintained” OR
“premature” OR “not understood” OR “delayed” OR “inadvertent
activation” OR “not available”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents improper
use of anti-torque control by
the pilot.
This code is not the same as
the one that is inferred in the
absence of a trigger in certain
accidents.
Notes
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Table 222: Improper Use of Control Friction Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Control Friction
This trigger represents incorrect use of control friction for the collective
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code represents the
23205: Control friction AND (“not set” OR “improper use of” OR
improper use of control friction
“inadvertent activation” OR “inadvertent” OR “diminished”)
by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 223: Improper Use of Wind Information Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Wind Information
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not acquire or use the correct wind information
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24011: Wind information AND (“not followed” OR “disregarded” OR This code indicates improper
“misjudged” OR “misread” OR “not understood” OR “inaccurate” OR use of wind information by the
“not obtained”)
pilot.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 224: Improper Fuel Calculation Trigger Definition
Improper Fuel Calculation
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not correctly calculate the rate of fuel consumption
during the mission
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24012: Fuel consumption calculation AND (“inaccurate” OR
This code represents improper
“inadequate” OR “improper” OR “not performed” OR “poor” OR
fuel calculations by the pilot.
“misjudged”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 225: Assistance not Used/not Available Trigger Definition
Assistance not Used/not Available
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not seek proper assistance or did not have access to
assistance
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This codes indicates that
24009: Proper assistance AND (“not used” OR “not obtained” OR
assistance was either
“not performed” OR “not available”)
unavailable or not used by the
pilot.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 226: Improper Understanding of performance Data Trigger Definition
Improper Understanding of performance Data
This trigger represents improper understanding and use of the aircraft’s performance capabilities
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24019: Performance data AND (“not understood” OR “not followed”
This code indicates that the
OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded” OR “exceeded” OR “inaccurate”
pilot failed to
OR “not complied with” OR “not followed” OR “not verified” OR
understand/disregarded the
“not obtained” OR “not identified”)
performance data.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 227: Improper Use of Emergency Light Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Emergency Light
This trigger represents incorrect use of emergency lights by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23310: Emergency lights AND (“improper use of”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates the
improper use of emergency
lights by the pilot.
Notes

Table 228: Improper Refueling Trigger Definition
Improper Refueling
This trigger represents improper refueling of the aircraft prior to flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24020: Refueling AND (“not performed” OR “delayed” OR
“improper” OR “excessive” OR “not verified” OR “inadequate” OR
“inattentive” OR “not performed” OR “not obtained”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This cod represents the
improper refueling before
flight.
Notes

Table 229: Improper Weather Evaluation Trigger Definition
Improper Weather Evaluation
This trigger represents improper evaluation of the weather conditions by the pilot before making a
decision to fly
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24022: Weather evaluation AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR
This code represents improper
“poor” OR “misjudged” OR “inaccurate” OR “not received” OR
weather evaluation by the pilot
“disregarded” OR “not verified”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 230: Improper Use of Exterior/Navigation Lights Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Exterior/Navigation Lights
This trigger represents incorrect use of navigation lights by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23314: Exterior/navigation lights AND (“not used”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents the
improper use of
exterior/navigation lights.
Notes

Table 231: Delayed Flight to Alternate Destination Trigger Definition
Delayed Flight to Alternate Destination
This trigger represents a delayed decision by the pilot to fly to an alternate destination
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code indicates that the
24025: Flight to alternate destination AND (“delayed”)
pilot delayed the decision to go
to an alternate destination
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 232: Improper Ice/Frost Removal Trigger Definition
Improper Ice/Frost Removal
This trigger represents the failure to remove ice/defrost components before flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code indicates that the
24004: Ice/frost removal from aircraft AND (“not removed” OR “not
pilot/ground crew failed to
performed”)
remove ice/frost before flight.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 233: Improper Compensation for Winds Trigger Definition
Improper Compensation for Winds
This trigger represents the pilot’s improper compensation for winds during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24026: Compensation for winds AND (“inadequate” OR “improper”
OR “not performed” OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded” OR “not
This code indicates that the
identified” OR “not maintained” OR “not performed” OR “not
pilot failed to compensate
attained” OR “not obtained” OR “not understood” OR “inaccurate”
correctly for winds.
OR “inattentive”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 234: Improperly Planned Approach Trigger Definition
Improperly Planned Approach
This trigger represents a poorly planned approach by the pilot
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24034: Planned approach AND (“improper” OR “poor” OR
“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR “inaccurate”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates an
improperly planned approach
by the pilot.
Notes

Table 235: Engine Compartment Failure Trigger Definition
Engine Compartment Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the engine compartment
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16903: Engine compartment AND (“fire” OR “not secured”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents the failure
of the engine compartment.
Notes

Table 236: Improper Use of Emergency Equipment Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Emergency Equipment
This trigger represents the improper use of emergency equipment
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23000: Emergency equipment AND (“not used” OR “delayed” OR
“inadequate” OR “not deployed”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents the
improper use of emergency
equipment.
Notes

Table 237: Improper Use of Emergency Floats Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Emergency Floats
This trigger represents the improper use of emergency floats
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23002: Emergency floats AND (“not deployed” OR “not activated”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates that the
pilot failed to deploy the floats
in a timely manner when
executing a water landing.
Notes

Table 238: Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher
This trigger represents the incorrect use of a fire extinguisher
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher
This trigger represents the incorrect use of a fire extinguisher
22800: Fire extinguishing equipment AND (“not possible”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

This code indicates the
improper use of the fire
extinguishing equipment.
Notes

Table 239: Engine Compressor Stall/Surge Trigger Definition
Engine Compressor Stall/Surge
This trigger represents the failure of the engine compartment
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16911: Engine compressor stall/surge
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents a
compressor stall.
Notes

Table 240: Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation Trigger Definition
Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation
This trigger represents engine pre-ignition/detonation
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16912: Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents a preignition/detonation in the
engine.
Notes

Table 241: Uncontained Engine Failure Trigger Definition
Uncontained Engine Failure
This trigger represents uncontained engine failure
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16913: Uncontained engine failure
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
343: Uncontained engine failure

Notes
This code represents the
uncontained failure of the
engine.
Notes
This code represents the
uncontained failure of the
engine.

Table 242: Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing Trigger Definition
Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of furnishings
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of furnishings
17100: Miscellaneous-equipment/furnishing
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

This code represents the failure
of on-board furnishing.
Notes

Table 243: Entanglement of Cargo Restraints Trigger Definition
Entanglement of Cargo Restraints
This trigger represents the entanglement of cargo restraints
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17102: Miscellaneous-cargo restraints AND (“entangled”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents the
entanglement of cargo
restraints.
Notes

Table 244: Improper Use/Failure of Rafts Trigger Definition
Improper Use/Failure of Rafts
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of rafts
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17107: Miscellaneous-rafts
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates the
improper use/failure of life raft
after water landing.
Notes

Table 245: Improper Use/Failure of Seat Belts Trigger Definition
Improper Use/Failure of Seat Belts
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of seat belts
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17110: Miscellaneous-seat belt
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code represents the
improper use/failure of the seat
belt.
Notes

Table 246: Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness Trigger Definition
Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of shoulder harness
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17111: Miscellaneous-shoulder harness

Notes
This code indicates
failure/improper use of the
shoulder harness.
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Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of shoulder harness
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes

Table 247: Improper Use of Engine Inlet Covers Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Engine Inlet Covers
This trigger represents the improper use of engine inlet covers
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17119: Miscellaneous-engine inlet covers
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code indicates improper
use of engine inlet covering.
Notes

Table 248: Entanglement of Helmet Trigger Definition
Entanglement of Helmet
This trigger represents the entanglement of the helmet
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17120: Miscellaneous-helmet AND (“entangled”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This code suggest helmet
entanglement.
Notes

Table 249: Entanglement of Helmet Trigger Definition
Not Possible
This trigger represents situations where the NTBS used the “not possible” modifier to indicate that the
pilot could not have executed a particular action.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
The NTSB used this modifier
to indicate that the pilot could
not have possibly carried out a
particular action. For example,
they used this code with
3131: Not possible (modifier)
subject codes for aircraft
control and rotor RPM. Both
cases suggest that the pilots
found it “impossible” to
maintain control or RPM.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB used this modifier
to indicate that the pilot could
not have possibly carried out a
particular action. For example,
021: Not possible (modifier)
they used this code with
subject codes for aircraft
control and rotor RPM. Both
cases suggest that the pilots
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Not Possible
This trigger represents situations where the NTBS used the “not possible” modifier to indicate that the
pilot could not have executed a particular action.
found it “impossible” to
maintain control or RPM.

Table 250: Incorrect Use of Throttle and/or Collective Input Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Throttle and/or Collective Input
This trigger represents improper throttle setting and/or collective input that triggers an improper RPM
hazardous state.
User-defined Code
Notes
This trigger is inferred only if a
trigger is not available from
the accident report.
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers:
 Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
This trigger is used when
helicopter engine is
 Improper use of collective
operational, and when there is
no mechanical issue with the
collective control.

Table 251: Incorrect Use of Collective and/or Cyclic Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Collective and/or Cyclic
This trigger improper use of the collective or cyclic that can trigger an improper autorotation or inflight
loss of control.
User-defined Code
Notes
This trigger is inferred only if a
trigger is not available from
the accident report.
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers:
 Improper use of collective
 Improper use of cyclic

This trigger can cause the
system to transition to an
inflight loss of control state.
It can also trigger an improper
autorotation after a loss of
engine power (or during
simulated autorotation).

Table 252: Impossible/reduced control authority after system failure Trigger Definition
Impossible/reduced control after system failure
This trigger represents the situations where the pilot has limited or no control over the aircraft after the
failure of critical flight control components
User-defined Code
Notes
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Impossible/reduced control after system failure
System failure is associated
with several accidents
(including those that involved
inflight loss of control). Failure
of critical flight control
components (e.g., cyclic)
afford the pilot reduced control
authority over the aircraft (if
not impossible to control).
I defined this trigger by:
 System failure state appears before inflight loss of control

I inferred this trigger if: the
NTSB did not use the “not
possible” modifier, and the
accident involved an inflight
loss of control after a system
failure.
I capture this situation by
defining the
“Impossible/reduced control
authority after system failure”
trigger.

Table 253: No/Failed Recovery Action from Uncontrolled Descent Trigger Definition
No/Failed Recovery Action from Uncontrolled Descent
This trigger represents no action/failed attempt by the pilot to recover from an inflight loss of control,
and triggers an end state.
User-defined Code
Notes
Many accident reports do not
specify the types of pilot action
that causes (triggers) the
system to move from an
inflight loss of control state to
an end state.
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers:
 Lack of action by the pilot
 Improper remedial action by the pilot

For completeness, I defined
the “No/failed recovery action
from uncontrolled descent”
trigger.
This trigger is inferred when
the NTSB accident report does
not mention any remedial
action by the pilot to recover
from the inflight loss of control
state.
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Table 254: Improper Load Jettison Trigger Definition
Improper Load Jettison
This trigger represents an improper jettison of external load by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This code represents incorrect
24540: Load jettison
or delayed jettison of external
load/attachment by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 255: Improper Remedial Action Trigger Definition
Improper Remedial Action
This trigger represents an improper corrective action by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24542: Remedial action
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
060: Attempted remedial action

Notes
This trigger, as the name
suggests, represents
incorrect/insufficient remedial
action by the pilot.
Notes
This trigger, as the name
suggests, represents
incorrect/insufficient remedial
action by the pilot.

Table 256: Improper Pull-up Trigger Definition
Improper Pull-up
This trigger represents an improper pull-up by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24547: Pull-up
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger suggests incorrect
pull-up action by the pilot.
Notes

Table 257: Improper Recovery from Bounced Landing Trigger Definition
Improper Recovery from Bounced Landing
This trigger represents an improper recovery from a bounced landing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24562: Recovery from bounced landing
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger represents the
inability of the pilot to recover
from a bounced landing.
Notes

Table 258: Improper Touch-and-go Trigger Definition
Improper Touch-and-go
This trigger represents an improper touch-and-go.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Improper Touch-and-go
This trigger represents an improper touch-and-go.
24563: Touch-and-go
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

This trigger indicates that the
pilot did not perform a proper
touch-and-go maneuver.
Notes

Table 259: Improper Use of/Inadequate Flight Advisories Trigger Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate Flight Advisories
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate flight advisories.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24605: Flight advisories
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
pilot failed to follow advisories
during flight.
Notes

Table 260: Improper Use of/Inadequate ARTCC Service Trigger Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate ARTCC Service
This trigger represents improper use of or inadequate ARTCC service.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24606: ARTCC service
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that pilot
did not use/receive sufficient
information from the ARTCC
service.
Notes

Table 261: Improper Use of/Inadequate Traffic Advisory Trigger Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate Traffic Advisory
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate traffic advisory.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24612: Traffic advisory
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
pilot did not use/receive proper
traffic information.
Notes

Table 262: Improper Use of/Inadequate Safety Advisory Trigger Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate Safety Advisory
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate traffic advisory.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24615: safety advisory
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
pilot did not use/receive proper
safety advisory.
Notes
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Table 263: Improper Use of/Inadequate Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft Trigger
Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft
This trigger represents improper use of/inadequate radar assistance to VFR aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This trigger indicates that the
24616: Radar assistance to VFR aircraft
pilot did not use/receive proper
radar assistance.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 264: Improper Use of/Inadequate Assistance from Flight Service Station Trigger
Definition
Improper Use of/Inadequate Assistance from Flight Service Station
This trigger represents improper use of/inadequate assistance from flight service station.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This trigger indicates that the
24613: Flight service station (FSS) service
pilot did not use/receive proper
FSS service.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 265: Improper Use of Inflight Weather Information Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Inflight Weather Information
This trigger represents improper use of inflight weather information.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24620: Improper inflight weather information
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
pilot did not properly use the
inflight weather information.
Notes

Table 266: Improper Crew Coordination Trigger Definition
Improper Crew Coordination
This trigger represents improper crew coordination.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24624: Crew/group coordination
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
crew did not coordinate
properly.
Notes

Table 267: Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing Trigger Definition
Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing
This trigger represents improper crew or passenger briefing.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24625: Crew/group briefing

Notes
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Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing
This trigger represents improper crew or passenger briefing.
I identified these codes by
searching for the word
“briefing”. I excluded weather
briefings.
Notes

24626: Passenger briefing
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Table 268: Not Recognizing Hazardous Condition Trigger Definition
Not Recognizing Hazardous Condition
This trigger represents the crew not recognizing or heeding a hazardous condition/warning.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
24628: Unsafe hazardous condition
The NTSB used these generic
codes to suggest that the pilot
failed to recognize (and act) on
24629: Unsafe/hazardous condition warning
hazardous condition warnings.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 269: Disturbance Trigger Definition
Disturbance
This trigger represents a disturbance/disruptive event for the crew/pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
Trigger indicates disturbance
24701: Disturbance
by another crew member or
passenger.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 270: Control Interference Trigger Definition
Control Interference
This trigger represents control interference during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24705: Control interference
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates the pilot
experienced some form of
interference with the aircraft
flight controls.
Notes

Table 271: Relinquishing Control Trigger Definition
Relinquishing Control
This trigger represents relinquishing control of the aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

Notes
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Relinquishing Control
This trigger represents relinquishing control of the aircraft.
This trigger indicates that the
pilot relinquished control of
the aircraft improperly.
Notes

24706: Relinquishing control
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Table 272: Suicide Trigger Definition
Suicide
This trigger represents suicide by the pilot or passenger.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24707: Suicide
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates suicide by
occupant/pilot.
Notes

Table 273: Improper Security Trigger Definition
Improper Security
This trigger represents improper security of the aircraft.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24711: Security
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates lack of
security.
Notes

Table 274: Sabotage Trigger Definition
Sabotage
This trigger represents sabotage before or during flight.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24710: Sabotage
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates intentional
tampering with the system to
cause harm.
Notes

Table 275: Improper Rescue/Evacuation Trigger Definition
Improper Rescue/Evacuation
This trigger represents improper rescue and evacuation.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24712: Evacuation
24714: Rescue
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
The NTSB used the codes to
indicate improper evacuation
or rescue of occupants after an
accident.
Notes
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Table 276: Encounter with Jet/Propeller Blast Trigger Definition
Encounter with Jet/Propeller Blast
This trigger represents improper rescue and evacuation.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
24718: Propeller/jet blast encounter
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates that a crew
member/passenger encountered
the rotor blades.
Notes

Table 277: Mast Bumping Trigger Definition
Mast Bumping
This trigger represents mast bumping.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

24806: Mast bumping

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates that the main
rotor made contact with the
fuselage of the aircraft.
Generally occurs during blade
divergence.
Notes

Table 278: Engine Tearaway Trigger Definition
Engine Tearaway
This trigger represents engine tearaway.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
355: Engine tearaway
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates that
separation of the engine from
the aircraft fuselage.
Notes

Table 279: Fire Warning System Failure Trigger Definition
Fire Warning System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the fire warning system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12400: Fire warning system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
warning system.
Notes

Table 280: Oxygen System Failure Trigger Definition
Oxygen System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the oxygen system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12500: Oxygen system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
oxygen system.
Notes
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Oxygen System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the oxygen system.
No code available

Table 281: Improper Use of Cabin Heater Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Cabin Heater
This trigger represents the improper use of cabin heater.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12910: Cabin heater AND (“not activated”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates improper use
of cabin heating.
Notes

Table 282: Fire Extinguisher Failure Trigger Definition
Fire Extinguisher Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the fire extinguisher.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12606: Fire extinguisher—portable AND (“exhaustion” OR
“improper” OR “inadequate”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
fire extinguisher.
Notes

Table 283: Fire Extinguisher Failure Trigger Definition
Air conditioning System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the air conditioning system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
12901: Air conditioning/heating/pressurization
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of AC
system.
Notes

Table 284: Tail Boom Failure Trigger Definition
Tail boom Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the tail boom.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13007: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail boom
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates tailboom
failure
Notes

Table 285: Tail Cone Failure Trigger Definition
Tail Cone Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the tail cone.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13009: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail cone
NTSB Codes (post-2008)

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
tail cone.
Notes
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Tail Cone Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the tail cone.
No code available

Table 286: Tail Pylon Failure Trigger Definition
Tail Pylon Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the tail pylon.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13008: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail pylon
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of tail
pylon
Notes

Table 287: Improper Use/Failure of Emergency Floatation Gear Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Floatation Gear
This trigger represents the improper use of floatation gear.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13006: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—floatation gear
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates
failure/improper use of
emergency floatation gear.
Notes

Table 288: Improper Use of Chip Detector System Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Chip Detector System
This trigger represents the improper use of chip detector system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13010: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—chip detector system—gear box
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates improper use
of chip detector system.
Notes

Table 289: Transmission Tube Failure Trigger Definition
Transmission Tube Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the transmission tube.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13014: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—transmission support
tube/attachment
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
transmission tube.
Notes

Table 290: Pitot-Static System Failure Trigger Definition
Pitot-static System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the pitot-static system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
13101: Pitot/Static system

Notes
Trigger indicates failure of the
pitot/static system.
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Pitot-static System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the pitot-static system.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes

Table 291: Improper Use of Flight Controls Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Flight Controls
This trigger represents the improper use of flight controls.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22100: Flight controls AND (“improper use of” OR “improper” OR
“restricted” OR not possible” OR “not received”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates improper use
of flight controls.
Notes

Table 292: Pitot-Static System Failure Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Trim Setting
This trigger represents the improper use of trim setting by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
22120: Trim setting
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
Trigger indicates improper use
of the trim setting by the pilot.
Notes

Table 293: Improper Use of Unspecified Fluid Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Unspecified Fluid
This trigger represents the improper use of unspecified fluid.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

17000: Fluid

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
The NTSB used the general
“fluid” code to suggest some
form of
contamination/improperly used
fluid.
Notes

Table 294: Unspecified Engine Component Failure Trigger Definition
Unspecified Engine Component Failure
This trigger represents the failure of an unspecified engine component.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
16900: Miscellaneous
16910: Miscellaneous—engine
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
These codes indicate that an
engine component failed. The
NTSB codes do not always
specify the component that
failed.
Notes
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Table 295: Improper Use of the Parachute/Drag Chute Trigger Definition
Improper Use of Parachute/Drag Chute
This trigger represents the improper use of the drag chute
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
17115: Miscellaneous equipment/furnishing—parachute/drag chute
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates the
improper use of the parachute.
Notes

Table 296: Improper Use of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Trigger Definition
Improper Use of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

23303: Auxiliary power unit (APU)

NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates the
improper use of the APU.
Generally, this subject code is
associated with failing to
remove APU tubes before
departure (in helicopter
operations).
Notes

Table 297: Improper/Inadequate Radar Altimeter Trigger Definition
Improper/Inadequate Radar Altimeter
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
23102: Radar altimeter AND (“poor”)
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
No code available

Notes
This trigger indicates a
malfunctioning altimeter
Notes

Table 298: Not Identifying Crosswind Component Trigger Definition
Not Identifying Crosswind Component
This trigger represents the pilot’s failure to recognize the crosswind component during flight
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This trigger indicates the
pilot’s failure to recognize (and
24579: Crosswind component AND (“not identified”)
correct for) the crosswind
component during flight
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available
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Table 299: Disregarding Minimum Descent Altitude Trigger Definition
Disregarding Minimum Descent Altitude
This trigger represents the pilots disregard for the minimum descent altitude.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
This trigger indicates that the
24529: Minimum descent altitude
pilot disregarded the minimum
descent altitude.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
No code available

Table 300: Tailstrike Trigger Definition
Tailstrike
This trigger represents the tail striking an object or terrain.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
091: Tailstrike

Notes
This trigger indicates that the
tail struck an object/terrain
(generally the ground during
an improper flare).
Notes
This trigger indicates that the
tail struck an object/terrain
(generally the ground during
an improper flare).

Table 301: Oil System Failure Definition
Oil System Failure
This trigger represents the failure of the oil system.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
01057261XX: Oil system

Notes
Notes
This trigger indicates the
failure of the oil system.

Table 302: Incorrect Action Selection Definition
Incorrect Action Selection
This trigger represents an incorrect choice made by the pilot to perform a particular action.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
This trigger is not informative.
02041010XX: Action—incorrect action selection
It only suggests that he pilot
“did something wrong”.

Table 303: Incorrect Sequence of Actions Definition
Incorrect Sequence of Action
This trigger represents an incorrect sequence of actions taken by the pilot/maintenance personnel.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
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Incorrect Sequence of Action
This trigger represents an incorrect sequence of actions taken by the pilot/maintenance personnel.
This trigger indicates that the
80400: Conditions/step(s)—improper sequence
pilot performed an incorrect
sequence of actions.
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
This trigger indicates that the
02041010XX: Action—incorrect action sequence
pilot performed an incorrect
sequence of actions.

Table 304: Delayed Action Definition
Delayed Action
This trigger represents delayed action by the pilot.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)

No code available

NTSB Codes (post-2008)

02041025XX: Action—delayed action

Notes
Note that in the pre-2008
system, the NTSB indicated
delayed action as a modifier.
This modified was associated
with subject codes. For
example, “Collective—
delayed” would be a subjectmodifier combination.
Notes
The NTSB had a separate
subject code for the nature of
action taken by the pilot. It no
longer uses “delayed” as a
modifier.

Table 305: Lack of Action Definition
Lack of Action
This trigger represents delayed action by the pilot/maintenance personnel.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
Note that in the pre-2008
system, the NTSB did not
explicitly point out a “lack of”
No code available
action. They used the “lack of”
modifier with multiple subject
codes (e.g., fuel, collective
control).
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB had a separate
subject code for the nature of
02041030XX: Action—lack of action
action taken by the pilot. It no
longer uses “lack of” as a
modifier.
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Table 306: Forgotten Action/Omission Definition
Forgotten Action/Omission
This trigger represents a missed/forgotten action by the pilot/maintenance personnel.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
The NTSB did not use a
subject code specify
No code available
forgotten/omitted actions in the
pre-2008 system
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB had a separate
02041035XX: Action—forgotten action/omission
subject code to indicate
forgotten or omitted actions.

Table 307: Incomplete Action Definition
Incomplete Action
This trigger represents an action that the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to complete.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB had a separate
02041040XX: Action—incomplete action
subject code to indicate
incomplete actions.

Table 308: Unnecessary Action Definition
Unnecessary Action
This trigger represents an action that the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to complete.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
No code available
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
The NTSB had a separate
02041040XX: Action—unnecessary action
subject code to indicate
unnecessary actions.
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APPENDIX C. SEQUENCING OF HAZARDOUS STATES

Table 309: Sequencing Rules for Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State
Disoriented/lacking Awareness State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct altitude/clearance from terrain or objects.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Lack of visual lookout/distracted
After becoming disoriented,
pilots were generally not able to
Improper airspeed
maintain visual reference.
Improper RPM
Improper altitude/clearance
In some accidents, the pilots
Improper descent
failed to monitor key flight
parameters (e.g., airspeed,
Inflight loss of control
RPM).

Table 310: Sequencing Rules for Improper Climb State
Improper Climb State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was
incorrect.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
Failure to maintain proper
climb can result in descent and
Improper descent
improper altitude/clearance.
Improper airspeed
Improper rotor RPM
In many accidents, pilots failed
Inflight loss of control
to recognize that they were in a
hazardous climb state, and
failed to take appropriate
remedial actions that triggered
On-ground loss of control
other hazardous states such as
improper airspeed, improper
RPM, and inflight loss of
control.

Table 311: Sequencing Rules for Improper Distance State
Improper Distance State
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper flare
After aircraft entered an
improper distance state, pilots
Improper level-off
tried to take corrective
measures by flaring
On-ground loss of control
excessively, or were unable to
level-off in time.
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Table 312: Sequencing Rules for Improper Descent State
Improper Descent State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
In many accidents that did not
involve vortex ring state or
Improper airspeed
clipping object/terrain, the
Vortex ring state
positions of improper
Improper RPM
altitude/clearance and
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness
improper descent are
Inflight loss of control
interchangeable.
Improper flare
Improper level-off

If the accident sequence
involves the loss of engine
power state, then the improper
descent follows.

Table 313: Sequencing Rules for Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state
Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Disoriented/lacking awareness
After intentional/inadvertent
flight through poor weather
Lack of visual lookout/distracted
states, pilots generally were
Exceeding helicopter hover performance
disoriented and unable to
Improper altitude/clearance
maintain visual reference.
Improper descent
Improper airspeed
In some accidents, pilots
Improper RPM
exceeded the helicopter’s
Vortex ring state
hover performance capabilities
System failure
after flight through poor
Loss of engine power
weather.
Improper autorotation
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness
In certain accidents, the
Aircraft stall/spin state
subsequent state could have
Inflight loss of control
been as a result of the impact
of poor weather on the aircraft
Improper flare
(e.g., system failure, loss of
engine power).

Table 314: Sequencing Rules for Prevailing/Existing weather state
Prevailing/Existing weather and light state
Hazardous weather state that existed during the flight.
States that can appear immediately after are
Improper vertical takeoff
Disoriented/lacking awareness
Lack of visual lookout/distracted
Exceeding helicopter hover performance
Improper altitude/clearance
Improper descent
Improper airspeed

Notes
After flight through prevailing
weather and light states, pilots
generally were disoriented and
unable to maintain visual
reference.
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Prevailing/Existing weather and light state
Improper RPM
Vortex ring state
System failure
Loss of engine power
Improper autorotation
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness
Aircraft stall/spin state
Inflight loss of control
Improper flare

In some accidents, pilots
exceeded the helicopter’s
hover performance capabilities
after flight through poor
weather.
In certain accidents, the
subsequent state could have
been as a result of the impact
of poor weather on the aircraft
(e.g., system failure, loss of
engine power).

Table 315: Sequencing Rules for Improper Altitude/Clearance State
Improper Altitude/Clearance State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct altitude/clearance from terrain or objects.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Midair collision
In many accidents, pilots failed
to maintain altitude, followed
Improper descent
by the loss of airspeed or RPM.
Exceeding aircraft yaw performance
Improper airspeed
Subsequently, the aircraft enters
Improper RPM
the LOC state.
Aircraft stall/spin state
Inflight loss of control
Generally, if an accident did not
involve LOC, but cited
improper RPM improper
airspeed, the: improper airspeed
Improper flare
or improper RPM can appear
before improper
altitude/clearance.

Table 316: Sequencing Rules for Wake Turbulence state
Wake turbulence State
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Loss of engine power
In some accidents, the aircraft
engine “flamed out” after
flying through wake
turbulence.

Inflight loss of control

Flight through wake turbulence
resulted in the pilot losing
control of the aircraft. In the
post-2008 system, the NTSB
introduced the “inflight upset”
code, which I use to trigger the
system from the wake
turbulence state, and into the
LOC state.
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Table 317: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Loss of engine power
In one accident, the aircraft
entered a state where it was
Improper airspeed
operating its design yaw
Improper RPM
capabilities. When in this state,
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
an engine component failed,
triggering a loss of engine
power state.

Inflight loss of control

In many accidents, pilots failed
to recognize the exceeding yaw
performance state, and
subsequently failed to maintain
airspeed, rotor RPM.
As mentioned in the rules for
airspeed and RPM, failure to
maintain either of these
parameters resulted in LTE or
LOC.

Table 318: Sequencing Rules for Improper Turn/Bank state
Improper Turn/Bank State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
Similar to the improper climb
states, not executing a proper
Improper descent
turn can be followed by an
Improper airspeed
improper descent and/or loss of
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
altitude.

Inflight loss of control

Not correcting for an improper
turn can results in a loss of
airspeed and decay in rotor
RPM.
As mentioned in the rules for
airspeed and RPM, failure to
maintain either of these
parameters resulted in LTE or
LOC.

Table 319: Sequencing Rules for Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State
Hazardous state where the helicopter tail rotor does not provide the requisite thrust to maintain
directional control.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In many accidents that
Inflight loss of control
involved loss of tail rotor
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Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State
effectiveness, the pilot was
unable to recover the aircraft
and subsequently lost control.

Table 320: Sequencing Rules for Loss of Engine Power State
Loss of Engine Power State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s engine is not operational.
States that can appear immediately after are
Improper autorotation
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability
Improper altitude/clearance
Improper descent
Improper airspeed
Improper RPM
Hazardous height-velocity regime
Vortex ring state
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
Aircraft stall/spin state
Inflight loss of control

Notes
In accidents that involved
loss of engine power,
improper autorotations
generally followed.
If the codes do not suggest an
improper autorotation, then
any of the states (that
compose the key elements of
an improper autorotation) can
follow.
A combination of improper
descent and airspeed can
result in a vortex ring state.

Improper flare

As mentioned in the rules for
airspeed and RPM, failure to
maintain either of these
parameters resulted in LTE or
LOC.

Table 321: Sequencing Rules for System Failure State
System Failure State
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper autorotation
In accidents that involved
system failure, improper
Improper altitude/clearance
autorotations generally
Improper descent
followed.
Improper airspeed
Vortex ring state
If the codes do not suggest an
Improper RPM
improper autorotation, then
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
any of the states (that
Aircraft stall/spin state
compose the key elements of
Inflight loss of control
an improper autorotation) can
follow.
Improper flare

Note that in the case of many
system failure accidents, the
pilots are not able to maintain
flight parameters (e.g., RPM,
airspeed). These accidents
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System Failure State
generally have the “not
possible” trigger.
In many accidents where the
LOC state followed system
failure, pilots were not able to
control the aircraft.

Table 322: Sequencing Rules for Improper Autorotation State
Improper Autorotation
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to execute a safe autorotative landing.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Vortex ring state
If the aircraft enters an
improper autorotation state,
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
then the hazardous states that
Aircraft stall/spin state
can follow are: vortex ring
state, loss of tail rotor
effectiveness, stall/spin, or
inflight loss of control.
Inflight loss of control

Note that, generally, LOC
followed improper autorotation
if an accident involved loss of
engine power or system
failure.

Table 323: Sequencing Rules for Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
After the blade/aircraft stall or
Inflight loss of control
spin, the aircraft enters the
inflight loss of control state.

Table 324: Sequencing Rules for Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was
distracted.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
A pilot in this state generally
Improper descent
failed to maintain clearance
Midair collision
from objects/terrain or failed to
Low fuel state
monitor key flight parameters.
Improper airspeed
In some cases, the NTSB used
Improper RPM
this code to describe the
Inflight loss of control
distracted nature of
On-ground loss of control
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Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
maintenance personnel. The
state-based approach uses the
information code for the
“personnel” associated with
this state.

Improper distance

Table 325: Sequencing Rules for Low Fuel State
Low Fuel State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level.
States that can appear immediately after are
Loss of engine power

Notes
After the aircraft entered the
low fuel state, it generally
experienced a fuel
exhaustion, triggering a loss
of engine power.

Intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather
In one accident, the low fuel
state promoted the pilot to
make an incorrect decision
and fly into IMC conditions.

Table 326: Sequencing Rules for Low Oil State
Low Oil State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level.
States that can appear immediately after are
Loss of engine power

System failure

Notes
After the low oil state, the oil
starvation/exhaustion can
trigger a loss of engine
power.
In some cases, depending on
the nature of oil (e.g.,
transmission oil), the system
transitioned to the system
failure state.

Table 327: Sequencing Rules for Low Hydraulic Fluid State
Low Hydraulic Fluid State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low hydraulic fluid level.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
After the low hydraulic fluid
System failure
state, the system transitioned to
the system failure state.
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Table 328: Sequencing Rules for Improper Height-Velocity Regime State
Improper Height-Velocity Regime State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
This hazardous indicates that
the system was operating in
Improper descent
hazardous region of the heightImproper airspeed
velocity curve.
Improper RPM
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE)
This state is part of the
definition for the improper
autorotation state.
Inflight loss of control

If the accident codes do not
mention 24520: Autorotation,
then the improper heightvelocity curve state can appear
by itself in an accident.

Table 329: Sequencing Rules for Improper Heading State
Improper Heading State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course.
States that can appear immediately after are

Inflight loss of control

Notes
After entering the improper
heading state, and failing to
correct improper heading can
trigger an inflight loss of
control.

Table 330: Sequencing Rules for Improper Lift-off State
Improper Lift-off State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly.
States that can appear immediately after are
Exceeding aircraft takeoff capability
Inflight loss of control

Notes
In helicopter accidents, an
improper lift-off was
immediately followed by
exceeding takeoff capability, or
inflight loss of control.

On-ground loss of control
In some situations, improper
lift-off resulted in loss of
control when on the ground.
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Table 331: Sequencing Rules for Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper turn
This hazardous state translates
from the generic “operation of
Loss of engine power
rotorcraft” code in the NTSB
coding manual.
In helicopter accidents, this
state was followed by improper
turn, loss of engine power, or
system failure state.

System failure

Table 332: Sequencing Rules for On-ground Poor Weather
On-ground Poor Weather State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course.
States that can appear immediately after are
Inflight loss of control

Notes
The aircraft encountered poor
weather during takeoff and
subsequently lost control.

Table 333: Sequencing Rules for Improper Run-on Landing State
Improper Run-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
This state is always followed by an end state

Table 334: Sequencing Rules for Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Lack of visual lookout/distracted
After an improper vertical
takeoff, pilots failed to maintain
Improper altitude/clearance
visual look out for objects.
Improper airspeed
Improper RPM
Failing to maintain lookout
(and take corrective action)
transitioned the system to the
improper altitude/clearance
state.
Vortex ring state (VRS)
In some accidents, pilots failed
to correct the improper vertical
takeoff and transitioned to an
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Improper Vertical Takeoff State
improper airspeed or improper
RPM state.

Table 335: Sequencing Rules for Improper Go-around State
Improper Go-around State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around.
States that can appear immediately after are
Improper descent
Improper airspeed
Improper RPM

Notes
Pilots perform a go-around to
abort an approach into an
airport/landing site.
After an improper go-around, in
many accidents, pilots were not
able to arrest the descent.

Inflight loss of control

In some accidents, pilots failed
to maintain airspeed, or rotor
RPM. Failing to maintain these
flight parameters subsequently
resulted in LOC.

Table 336: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Design Stress Limits State
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Loss of engine power
When pilots operated aircraft
outside the design stress range,
it generally resulted in a loss of
System failure
engine power or system failure.

Table 337: Sequencing Rules for Improper Translational Lift State
Improper Translational Lift State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper airspeed
Translational lift state happens
when the helicopter transitions
Improper RPM
from vertical flight to forward
Vortex ring state
flight.
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness

Inflight loss of control

A Federal Aviation Advisory
Circular states that “loss of
translational lift results in
increased power demand” and
“while operating near
maximum power demand, the
increased power demand could

247
Improper Translational Lift State
result in decreased rotor RPM”
(NTSB ID: CHI00LA132).
In many accidents, pilots failed
to maintain rotor RPM or
airspeed after not attaining
proper translational lift.

Table 338: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper altitude/clearance
When a helicopter is operated
in excess of its hover
Improper descent
performance capabilities,
Improper translational lift
generally, it experiences a loss
Improper airspeed
of altitude and begins to
Vortex ring state
descend.
Improper RPM
Inflight loss of control
After exceeding hover
performance, pilots are
On-ground loss of control
generally not able to maintain
translational lift.

Table 339: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Loss of engine power
When a helicopter exceeds its
takeoff performance, it can
Improper vertical takeoff
result in an improper takeoff.
Improper RPM
Improper autorotation
In some cases, after exceeding
takeoff performance, the
aircraft experienced a loss of
engine power, failed to
maintain RPM, or improper
autorotation.
Inflight loss of control
In some accidents, if the aircraft
took-off after exceeding takeoff
performance, the pilots lost
control.
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Table 340: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Exceeding design stress limits
After exceeding the landing
performance, the aircraft can
Ground resonance
enter the state where it was
System failure
being operated beyond its stress
limits.
In some cases, the NTSB codes
indicated that the helicopter
entered a ground resonance
state, which was generally
followed by a system failure.
Inflight loss of control
In some accidents, the pilot lost
control of the aircraft after the
landing performance had
deteriorated (the report
indicated that helicopter had
flown into the rotor wash of a
larger helicopter—not captured
in the codes)

Table 341: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper descent
This state is obtained from the
generic NTSB code “17300:
Improper altitude/clearance
Aircraft performance
System failure
(general)”. Generally, after this
Improper airspeed
state, the aircraft can experience
Improper rotor RPM
a loss of altitude or improper
descent.

Inflight loss of control

In some cases, the pilots were
not able to fly in the prevailing
weather conditions, failed to
maintain requisite RPM,
airspeed, or subsequently lost
control.

Table 342: Sequencing Rules for Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper turn/bank
This state is obtained from the
generic NTSB code “24800:
System failure
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Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Rotorcraft operations”. The
NTSB used this code to
indicate that the “rotorcraft was
not operated correctly”.
From accident data, the states
that can follow are, improper
turn/bank or a system failure
state.

Table 343: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Exceeding design stress limits
System failure
Exceeding yawing performance
Improper airspeed
frequently in inflight loss of
control.
Improper RPM
Inflight loss of control

Table 344: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of
engine power.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
This state usually appears in
multi-engine aircraft.

Improper autorotation

This state can appear after a
loss of engine power state, and
is used to indicate exceeding
performance limits with one
engine inoperative.

Table 345: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Exceeding design stress limits
If the pilot failed to recognize
that the aircraft was being
operated beyond its crosswind
performance limits, the system
could transition to an improper
Inflight loss of control
airspeed, improper RPM, or
eventually an inflight loss of
control.
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Table 346: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 347: Sequencing Rules for Wheels-up Landing State
Wheels-up Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 348: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Slope Limitation State
Exceeding Slope Limitation State
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped
terrain.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
After entering the state where
the helicopter had exceeded its
slope limitations, the aircraft
On-ground loss of control
either experienced an onground loss of control or
transitioned to an end state.

Table 349: Sequencing Rules for Runway Overshoot State
Runway Overshoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 350: Sequencing Rules for Improper Power-on Landing State
Improper Power-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper flare
Improper flare or failure to
level-off correctly can appear
after the pilot performs an
incorrect power-on landing.
The NTSB used the power-on
Improper level-off
landing code similar to the runon landing/precautionary
landing code.
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Table 351: Sequencing Rules for Runway Undershoot State
Runway Undershoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway.
States that can appear immediately after are
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Notes

Table 352: Sequencing Rules for Runway Incursion State
Runway Incursion State
Hazardous state where the aircraft entered runway incorrectly/without clearance
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 353: Sequencing Rules for On-ground Loss of Control State
On-ground Loss of Control State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the
ground.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 354: Sequencing Rules for Improper Level-off State
Improper Level-off State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to bring the helicopter to a level attitude (usually in preparation for
a landing).
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.

Table 355: Sequencing Rules for Low Coolant State
Low Coolant State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level.
States that can appear immediately after are
System failure

Loss of engine power

Notes
After entering a low coolant
state, the system can enter a
loss of engine power state or
system failure state.
Generally, the failure occurs
due to overheating.

Table 356: Sequencing Rules for Low Grease State
Low Grease State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease level.
States that can appear immediately after are
System failure
Loss of engine power

Notes
In some accidents, engine or
system components fail
during the low grease state,
transitioning the system to a
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Low Grease State
system failure or loss of
engine power state.

Table 357: Sequencing Rules for Improper Precautionary Landing State
Improper Precautionary Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Improper airspeed
These states can appear after an
improper precautionary
Improper rotor RPM
landing.
In some accidents, the pilot
failed to execute a proper
precautionary landing, which
was followed by an improper
flare.
Improper flare

The positions of RPM and/or
airspeed can be interchanged
with the position of the
improper precautionary landing
state (in accidents where failure
to maintain RPM or airspeed
resulted in an improper
precautionary landing state)

Table 358: Sequencing Rules for Hazardous Powerplant Operation State
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational
limits.
States that can appear immediately after are
Notes
Loss of engine power
This code translates from the
NTSB subject code that
suggests operation of aircraft
System failure
powerplant beyond its
capabilities.
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APPENDIX D. RULES LINKING HAZARDOUS STATES AND
TRIGGERS

Table 359: Triggers into the Intentional/Inadvertent Flight through Poor Weather State
Intentional/Inadvertent Flight through Poor Weather State
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
These triggers cause the system
Improper weather evaluation
to enter the
Improper use of procedures/directives
intentional/inadvertent flight
Incorrect action selected
into poor weather state.
Incorrect action performed
Note that some of the triggers
Incorrect sequence of actions
(e.g., inflight planning/decisionDelayed action
making, delayed action) for this
Lack of action
state can be applied to multiple
Forgotten/omitted action
states in the same accident.
Unnecessary action

Table 360: Triggers into the Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State
Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State
Hazardous state where the pilot is lost, disoriented, unable to maintain visual reference/perception
Triggers into this state are
Notes
In many cases, the system
transitions to a disoriented state
by virtue of the time spent in
Time spent in poor weather
poor weather. I use a timebounded trigger to represent the
system moving into the
disoriented state.

Table 361: Triggers into the Improper RPM State
Improper RPM State
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high)
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
Improper use of collective can
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls
trigger an improper RPM state.
Improper use of cyclic
Improper remedial action
Improper use of
Improper use of flight controls
throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
triggers improper RPM only
Incorrect action selected
when the engine is operational.
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
In some cases, the pilot failed
Delayed action
put in the requisite cyclic
Lack of action
control to maintain rotor RPM.
Forgotten/omitted action
Note that in accidents involving
Incomplete action
the LOC state, this trigger can
Unnecessary action
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Improper RPM State
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high)
Not possible
cause the system to enter the
LOC state as well.
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
The NTSB used generic codes
that translated to improper use
of rotorcraft flight controls and
improper use of flight control.



No action after disoriented state


Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or cyclic
can be inferred if there
was no engine power
No action after
disoriented state can be
inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight planning/decisionmaking, delayed action) for this
state can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 362: Triggers into the Improper Autorotation State
Improper Autorotation State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent,
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
Improper use of collective can
Improper use of cyclic
trigger an improper autorotation
Improper remedial action
where the pilot failed to
Improper use of flight controls
maintain rotor RPM.
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
Incorrect action selected
In some cases, the pilot failed
Incorrect action performed
put in the requisite cyclic
Incorrect sequence of actions
control to maintain heading,
descent angle/rate, rotor RPM.
Delayed action
Lack of action
Note that in accidents involving
Forgotten/omitted action
the LOC state, this trigger can
Incomplete action
cause the system to enter the
Unnecessary action
LOC state as well.
Not possible
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
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Improper Autorotation State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent,
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation.
Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation)
The NTSB used generic codes
that translated to improper use
of rotorcraft flight controls and
improper use of flight control.



No action after disoriented state


Improper use of
collective (during
simulated autorotation)
can be inferred as long
as there was no loss of
engine power and the
accident sequence
began with a simulated
autorotation.
Improper use of
collective and/or cyclic
can be inferred if there
was no engine power.
No action after
disoriented state can be
inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight planning/decisionmaking, delayed action) for this
state can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 363: Triggers into the Vortex Ring State
Vortex Ring State
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use of the cyclic can
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls
cause an unusual attitude for
Improper use of collective
helicopter, which may be
Improper remedial action
conducive for vortex ring state.
Improper use of flight controls
Improper use of the throttle can
Incorrect action selected
result in airspeed that is
Incorrect action performed
conducive to the vortex ring
state.
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Improper use of collective can
Lack of action
affect the RPM (which, along
Forgotten/omitted action
with other parameters)
Incomplete action
triggering a vortex ring state.
Unnecessary action
Not possible
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Vortex Ring State
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnutshaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift.
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
The NTSB used generic codes
that translated to improper use
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
of rotorcraft flight controls and
improper use of flight control.




No action after disoriented state



Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or cyclic
can be inferred if there
was no engine power.
No action after
disoriented state can be
inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight planning/decisionmaking, delayed action) for this
state can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 364: Triggers into the Improper Altitude/Clearance State
Improper Altitude/Clearance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating too close to the ground, terrain, water, or object.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
 Improper use of the
Improper remedial action
cyclic can cause an
unusual attitude for
Improper use of flight controls
helicopter, which can
Incorrect action selected
trigger a loss of
Incorrect action performed
altitude/clearance.
Incorrect sequence of actions
 Improper use of
Delayed action
throttle and/or
Lack of action
collective input can be
Forgotten/omitted action
inferred as long as
Incomplete action
there was no loss of
Unnecessary action
engine power.
Not possible
 Improper use of
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
collective and/or
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.
No action after disoriented state
 No action after
disoriented state can
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Improper Altitude/Clearance State
be inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.
Note that some of the
triggers (e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this
state can be applied to
multiple states in the same
accident.

Table 365: Triggers into the Improper Climb State
Improper Climb State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was
incorrect.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
To execute a proper climb,
pilots need to lower the
Improper use of collective
collective, control the cyclic to
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls
maintain attitude, and maintain
Improper remedial action
appropriate throttle setting.
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
 Improper use of
Incorrect action performed
throttle and/or
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective input can be
Delayed action
inferred as long as
Lack of action
there was no loss of
Forgotten/omitted action
engine power.
Incomplete action

Improper use of
Unnecessary action
collective and/or
Not possible
cyclic can be inferred
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
if there was no engine
power.

Improper use of throttle and/or collective input

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 366: Triggers into the Improper Distance State
Improper Distance State
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
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Improper Distance State
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use of collective
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Not possible
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
Improper use of Throttle and/or Collective Input

In order to maintain proper
distance from the landing site,
pilots need to coordinate
cyclic, collective, and throttle
input. Failure to use any one of
them correctly can trigger this
hazardous state.






No action after disoriented state

Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.
No action after
disoriented state can
be inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 367: Triggers into the Improper Heading State
Improper Heading State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course.
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control
Improper compensation for winds
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Not possible

Notes
In order to maintain correct
heading or course, pilots need
to use collective control or use
the anti-torque pedals.




Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.
No action after
disoriented state can
be inferred if the
preceding state was
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Improper Heading State
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
No action after disoriented state

Improper use of anti-torque control



“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.
Improper use of antitorque control can be
inferred when the
improper heading
state is preceded by
LTE or exceeding
crosswind component
states.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 368: Triggers into the Improper Airspeed State
Improper Airspeed State
Hazardous state where the aircraft airspeed is either too low (or too high).
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Choosing the correct throttle
setting, and cyclic control input
Improper use of cyclic
are key to maintaining airspeed
Improper remedial action
during forward flight.
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
 Improper use of
Incorrect action performed
throttle and/or
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective input can be
Delayed action
inferred as long as
Lack of action
there was no loss of
Forgotten/omitted action
engine power.
Incomplete action

Improper use of
Unnecessary action
collective and/or
Not possible
cyclic can be inferred
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
if there was no engine
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
power.

No action after disoriented state

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 369: Triggers into the Improper Descent State
Improper Descent State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
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Improper Descent State
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque
Improper maneuvering
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Not possible
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
No action after disoriented state

In a normal descent, a
helicopter loses altitude at a
controlled rate in a controlled
attitude (FAA. 2016).
To execute a proper a descent,
the pilot should lower the
collective to maintain RPM,
cyclic control for airspeed, and
anti-torque pedals to maintain
attitude. Not performing any of
these actions correctly can
trigger an improper descent.




Improper use of anti-torque control



Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
irrespective of the
state of the engine.
If the accident did not
involve a loss of
engine power or
improper RPM state
(but involved
improper descent),
then I inferred the
improper use of antitorque control.
No action after
disoriented state can
be inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 370: Triggers into the Wake Turbulence state
Wake turbulence State
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
This state occurred when the
Improper maneuvering
helicopter flew into the wake
Improper remedial action
of a preceding aircraft.
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
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Wake turbulence State
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 371: Triggers into the Improper Turn/Bank state
Improper Turn/Bank State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
Amount of bank depends on
cyclic input
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque control
Proper use of anti-torque
Improper compensation for winds
essential during turn.
Improper maneuvering
Improper remedial action
Both, improper use of
Improper use of flight controls
collective and/or cyclic, and
Incorrect action selected
improper anti-torque control
Incorrect action performed
could be inferred. Preference is
Incorrect sequence of actions
given to anti-torque control if
Delayed action
the accident involved LTE.
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Note that some of the triggers
Incomplete action
(e.g., inflight
Unnecessary action
planning/decision-making,
Not possible
delayed action) for this state
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
can be applied to multiple
Improper use of anti-torque control
states in the same accident.

Table 372: Triggers into the Runway Overshoot State
Runway Overshoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper planned approach
 Improper use of
Improper use of cyclic
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
inferred as long as
Improper maneuvering
there was no loss of
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
engine power.
 Improper use of
collective and/or
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.

Table 373: Triggers into the Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state.
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Aircraft Stall/Spin State
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of collective
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use of deicing system
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input

Notes
Improper RPM is one of main
reasons for blade stall.
Excessive rotor RPM decay
can stall all rotor blades and
render the helicopter
uncontrollable.
The pilot can control the RPM
by collective pitch control,
proper use of powerplant
controls (when the engine is
operational).




Improper use collective and/or cyclic

Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can
be inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 374: Triggers into the Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was
distracted.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Disturbance
 Time spent in poor
Not possible
weather state can
trigger lack of visual
Time spent in poor weather state
lookout/distracted
state only if the
accident did not
mention disoriented
state.
No action after disoriented state
 No action after
disoriented state can
be inferred if the
preceding state was
“disoriented/lacking
awareness”.
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Table 375: Triggers into the Exceeding Slope Limitation State
Exceeding Slope Limitation State
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped
terrain.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Choosing unsuitable terrain for takeoff/landing
The pilot must exercise
extreme caution when
Improper use of cyclic
landing/taking off from
Improper use of collective
inclined surfaces.
Improper touchdown
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Exceeding the slope limitation
Incorrect action selected
(without
appropriate corrective
Incorrect action performed
action)
can
transition the
Incorrect sequence of actions
system
to
a
rollover end state.
Delayed action
Lack of action
Note that some of the triggers
Forgotten/omitted action
(e.g., inflight
Incomplete action
planning/decision-making,
Unnecessary action
delayed action) for this state
Not possible
can be applied to multiple
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
states in the same accident.

Table 376: Triggers into the Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State
Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s balance is affected due to improper loading or shifting of the center
of gravity.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper load jettison
In some accidents, the pilots
failed to/improperly jettison the
Improper cargo loading/tie-down
load.
Improper preflight planning

In some cases, improper
preflight planning, or improper
loading of cargo triggered this
hazardous state.

Table 377: Triggers into the Wheels-up Landing State
Wheels-up Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Gear not extended
The pilot’s failure to extend the
Improper use of landing gear
gear before landing or improper
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
use of the landing gear can
Incorrect action selected
trigger a wheels-up landing.
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Note that some of the triggers
Delayed action
(e.g., inflight
Lack of action
planning/decision-making,
Forgotten/omitted action
delayed action) for this state
Incomplete action
can be applied to multiple states
Unnecessary action
in the same accident.
Not possible
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Table 378: Triggers into the Improper Run-on Landing State
Improper Run-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
 Improper use of
Improper use of collective
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
inferred as long as
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
there was no loss of
Incorrect action selected
engine power.
Incorrect action performed

Improper use of
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective and/or
Delayed action
cyclic can be inferred
Lack of action
if there was no engine
Forgotten/omitted action
power.
Incomplete action

No/failed remedial
Unnecessary action
action after LOC can
Not possible
be inferred if LOC was
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
the preceding state.
Improper use collective and/or cyclic

No/failed remedial action after LOC

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 379: Triggers into the Low Fuel State
Low Fuel State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level.
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of powerplant controls
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Improper use of procedures/directives
Improper fuel consumption calculation
Improper refueling
Improper maintenance

Improper preflight planning

Notes
These triggers can cause the
system to enter a low-fuel
state. Note that a fuel system
failure (e.g., fuel leak) will
trigger a system failure state.
The improper
maintenance/improper
refueling trigger can be used
when maintenance/ground
personnel do not fill the
correct amount of fuel. In
this scenario, low oil state
will be classified as a
preflight hazardous state.

Table 380: Triggers into the Low Oil State
Low Oil State
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare/level-off prior to landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of powerplant controls
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Low Oil State
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Improper use of procedures/directives
Improper maintenance

Improper preflight planning

These triggers can cause the
system to enter a low-oil
state. Note that an oil system
failure (e.g., oil leak) will
trigger a system failure state.
The improper maintenance
trigger can be used when
maintenance/ground
personnel do not fill the
correct amount of oil. In this
scenario, low oil state will be
classified as a preflight
hazardous state.

Table 381: Triggers into the Low Hydraulic Fluid State
Low Hydraulic Fluid State
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare/level-off prior to landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
These triggers can cause the
system to enter a low hydraulic
Improper maintenance
fluid state. Note that an oil
Improper preflight planning
system failure (e.g., hydraulic
fluid leak) will trigger a system
failure state.

Improper use of procedures/directives

The improper maintenance
trigger can be used when
maintenance/ground personnel
do not fill the correct amount of
hydraulic fluid. In this scenario,
low hydraulic fluid state will be
classified as a preflight
hazardous state.

Table 382: Triggers into the Low Coolant State
Low Coolant State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level.
Triggers into this state are
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Improper maintenance
Improper preflight planning

Improper use of procedures/directives

Notes
These triggers can cause the
system to enter a low coolant
state.
The improper maintenance
trigger can be used when
maintenance/ground
personnel do not fill the
correct amount of coolant
liquid. In this scenario, low
coolant fluid state will be
classified as a preflight
hazardous state.
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Table 383: Triggers into the Low Lubricant State
Low Lubricant State
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease/lubricant level.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
These triggers can cause the
system to enter a low
Improper maintenance
lubricant fluid state. Note
Improper preflight planning
that a lubricating system
failure (e.g., lubricating fluid
leak) will trigger a system
failure state.

Improper use of procedures/directives

The improper maintenance
trigger can be used when
maintenance/ground
personnel do not fill/apply
the correct amount of
lubricant. In this scenario,
low lubricant fluid state will
be classified as a preflight
hazardous state.

Table 384: Triggers into the Improper Flare State
Improper Flare State
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare prior to landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
In preparation for touchdown,
pilots are instructed to flare the
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
aircraft and “cushion” the
Improper maneuvering
landing.
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
 Improper use of
Incorrect action selected
throttle and/or
Incorrect action performed
collective input can be
Incorrect sequence of actions
inferred as long as
Delayed action
there was no loss of
Lack of action
engine power.
Forgotten/omitted action

Improper use of
Incomplete action
collective and/or
Unnecessary action
cyclic can be inferred
Not possible
if there was no engine
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
power.
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
 No/failed remedial
action after LOC can
be inferred if LOC was
the preceding state.
No/failed remedial action after LOC

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.
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Table 385: Triggers into the Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State
Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
 Improper use of
Improper use of collective
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of cyclic
inferred as long as
Improper use of flight controls
there was no loss of
Improper maneuvering
engine power.
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
 Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
if there was no engine
power.

Table 386: Triggers into the On-ground Poor Weather
On-ground Poor Weather State
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course.
Triggers into this state are
Improper weather evaluation
Improper use of inflight weather information
Improper use of inflight weather advisories
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Notes
These triggers can cause the
system to enter an on-ground
poor weather state.
Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple
states in the same accident.

Table 387: Triggers into the Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls

Improper use of collective
Improper use of cyclic
Improper maneuvering
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed

Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action

Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.
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Improper Vertical Takeoff State
Unnecessary action
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
Improper use collective and/or cyclic

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 388: Triggers into the Improper Go-around State
Improper Go-around State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around.
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of collective
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use of flight controls
Improper maneuvering
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Not possible
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
Improper use collective and/or cyclic

Notes




Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.
Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if there was no engine
power.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 389: Triggers into the Exceeding Design Stress Limits State
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
These triggers can put the
Improper use of cyclic
system in a state where the
aircraft exceeds its design stress
Improper use of flight controls
limits.
Improper maneuvering

Table 390: Triggers into the Improper Translational Lift State
Improper Translational Lift State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
 Improper use of
Improper use of collective
throttle and/or
Improper use of cyclic
collective input can be
inferred as long as
Improper use of flight controls
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Improper Translational Lift State
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Not possible
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input

there was no loss of
engine power.
Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 391: Triggers into the Improper Precautionary Landing State
Improper Precautionary Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
 Improper use of
Improper use of collective
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of cyclic
inferred as long as
Improper use of flight controls
there was no loss of
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
engine power.
Improper remedial action
 Improper use of
Incorrect action selected
collective and/or
Incorrect action performed
cyclic can be inferred
Incorrect sequence of actions
if there was no engine
Delayed action
power.
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Note that some of the triggers
Incomplete action
(e.g., inflight
Unnecessary action
planning/decision-making,
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
in the same accident.

Table 392: Triggers into the Hazardous Powerplant Operation State
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational
limits.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of throttle and/or
collective input can be inferred.
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input

Table 393: Triggers into the Near Midair Collision State
Near Midair Collision State
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft almost collided with each other during flight.
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Near Midair Collision State
Triggers into this state are
No action after being disoriented
Not complying/obtaining ATC instructions
Improper communication
Correct traffic advisory not used/obtained
Correct safety advisory not used/obtained
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Notes

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 394: Triggers into the Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of collective
 Improper use of
Improper use of cyclic
throttle and/or
Improper use of flight controls
collective input can be
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
inferred as long as
Improper remedial action
there was no loss of
Incorrect action selected
engine power.
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Note that some of the triggers
Delayed action
(e.g., inflight
Lack of action
planning/decision-making,
Forgotten/omitted action
delayed action) for this state
Incomplete action
can be applied to multiple states
Unnecessary action
in the same accident.
Not possible
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input

Table 395: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
These triggers can cause the
Improper use of collective
system to enter a state where it
Improper use of cyclic
is being operated beyond its
Improper use of flight controls
takeoff capability.
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
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Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State
Improper remedial action
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Improper use of throttle and/or collective input



Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred if none of the
database triggers are
available, and as long
as there was no loss of
engine power. Note
that a loss of engine
power can potentially
occur after exceeding
take off capability.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident

Table 396: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
 Improper use of
Improper use of collective
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of cyclic
inferred as long as
Improper use of flight controls
there was no loss of
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
engine power.
Improper remedial action
 Improper use of
Incorrect action selected
collective and/or
Incorrect action performed
cyclic can be inferred
Incorrect sequence of actions
if there was no engine
Delayed action
power.
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Note that some of the triggers
Incomplete action
(e.g., inflight
Unnecessary action
planning/decision-making,
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
in the same accident.

Table 397: Triggers into the Improper Lift-off State
Improper Lift-off State
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly.
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of cyclic

Notes
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Improper Lift-off State
Improper use of collective
Improper use of flight controls
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input



Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 398: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of flight controls
These triggers can put the
system in state where it is
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
operating beyond its
Improper remedial action
performance limits.
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
I do not use triggers relating to
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective, cyclic, or throttle
Delayed action
control as this state (which is
Lack of action
derived from a generic NTSB)
Forgotten/omitted action
code, does not clearly indicate
Incomplete action
an aspect of performance that
Unnecessary action
was exceeded (e.g., climb
Not possible
performance)

Table 399: Triggers into the Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of flight controls
These triggers can put the
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
system in state where it is not
Improper remedial action
being operated properly.
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
I do not use triggers relating to
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective, cyclic, or throttle
Delayed action
control as this state (which is
Lack of action
derived from a generic NTSB)
Forgotten/omitted action
code, does not clearly indicate
Incomplete action
an aspect of rotorcraft operation
Unnecessary action
that was not correct.
Not possible
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Table 400: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of cyclic
In order to maintain yaw
performance, pilots need to use
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control
collective control or use the
Improper compensation for winds
anti-torque pedals.
Improper remedial action
Improper use of flight controls
 Improper use of
Incorrect action selected
collective and/or
Incorrect action performed
cyclic can be inferred
Incorrect sequence of actions
if there was no engine
Delayed action
power.
Lack of action

No action after
Forgotten/omitted action
disoriented state can
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
be inferred if the
Incomplete action
preceding state was
Unnecessary action
“disoriented/lacking
Not possible
awareness”.
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
 Improper use of antiNo action after disoriented state
torque control can be
inferred when the
improper yaw
performance state is
preceded by LTE or
exceeding crosswind
component states.
Improper use of anti-torque control
Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 401: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of
engine power.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
These triggers can cause the
Improper use of cyclic
system to move to state where it
Improper remedial action
has exceeded its performance
Improper use of flight controls
limits when one or more
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls
engine(s) is/are not operational.
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
 Improper use of
collective and/or
Incorrect sequence of actions
cyclic can be inferred
Delayed action
if there was no engine
Lack of action
power.
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
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Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State
Unnecessary action
Not possible
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.

Table 402: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Not identifying crosswind component
These triggers can cause the
system to move into a state
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control
where it has exceeded its
Improper compensation for winds
crosswind performance
Improper remedial action
capability.
Improper use of flight controls
Incorrect action selected
 Improper use of
Incorrect action performed
collective and/or
Incorrect sequence of actions
cyclic can be inferred
Delayed action
if there was no engine
Lack of action
power.
Forgotten/omitted action

No action after
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
disoriented state can
Incomplete action
be inferred if the
Unnecessary action
preceding state was
Not possible
“disoriented/lacking
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic
awareness”.
No action after disoriented state
 Improper use of antitorque control can be
inferred if the accident
involved improper
heading, LTE, or
Improper use of anti-torque control
exceeding yaw
performance. This
trigger can be assigned
to multiple states.

Table 403: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of flight controls
These triggers can put the
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
system in state where it is being
Improper remedial action
operated beyond its capability
Incorrect action selected
for the given configuration
Incorrect action performed
I do not use triggers relating to
Incorrect sequence of actions
collective, cyclic, use of
Delayed action
landing gear, or throttle control
Lack of action
as this state (which is derived
Forgotten/omitted action
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Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

from a generic NTSB) code,
does not clearly indicate the
configuration (e.g., gear
position)

Table 404: Triggers into the Improper Power-on Landing State
Improper Power-on Landing State
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
 Improper use of
Improper use of cyclic
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper use of collective
inferred as long as
Improper use of flight controls
there was no loss of
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
engine power (powerIncorrect action selected
on landing indicates
Incorrect action performed
engine was
Incorrect sequence of actions
operational).
Delayed action
Lack of action
Note that some of the triggers
Forgotten/omitted action
(e.g., inflight
Incomplete action
planning/decision-making,
Unnecessary action
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
in the same accident.

Table 405: Triggers into the Runway Undershoot State
Runway Undershoot State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway.
Triggers into this state are
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of cyclic
Improper use of collective
Improper use of flight controls
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
Delayed action
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic

Notes




Improper use of
throttle and/or
collective input can be
inferred as long as
there was no loss of
engine power
Improper use of
collective and/or
cyclic can be inferred
if the accident
involved a loss of
engine power.

Note that some of the triggers
(e.g., inflight
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.
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Table 406: Triggers into the Wheels-down Landing in Water State
Wheels-down Landing in Water State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed on water with the wheels down.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
These triggers can cause the
Delayed action
system to enter a wheels-down
landing in water state.
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Table 407: Triggers into the Wheels-up Landing State
Wheels-down Landing in Water State
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed without extending the landing gear.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
Incorrect action selected
Incorrect action performed
Incorrect sequence of actions
These triggers can cause the
Delayed action
system to land without
extending landing gear.
Lack of action
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Unnecessary action

Table 408: Triggers into the On-ground Loss of Control State
On-ground Loss of Control State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the
ground.
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
Improper use of collective
 Improper use of
Improper use of cyclic
throttle and/or
Improper use of flight controls
collective input can be
Improper inflight planning/decision-making
inferred as long as
Improper remedial action
there was no loss of
Incorrect action selected
engine power.
Incorrect action performed
Note that some of the triggers
Incorrect sequence of actions
(e.g., inflight
Delayed action
planning/decision-making,
Lack of action
delayed action) for this state
Forgotten/omitted action
can be applied to multiple states
Incomplete action
in the same accident.
Unnecessary action
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
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Table 409: Triggers into the Improper Level-off State
Improper Level-off State
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to bring the helicopter to a level attitude (usually in preparation for
a landing).
Triggers into this state are
Notes
Improper use of collective
 Improper use of
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls
throttle and/or
collective input can be
Improper maneuvering
inferred as long as
Improper remedial action
there was no loss of
Improper use of flight controls
engine power.
Incorrect action selected

Improper use of
Incorrect action performed
collective and/or
Incorrect sequence of actions
cyclic can be inferred
Delayed action
if there was no engine
Lack of action
power.
Forgotten/omitted action
Incomplete action
Note that some of the triggers
Unnecessary action
(e.g., inflight
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input
planning/decision-making,
delayed action) for this state
Improper use collective and/or cyclic
can be applied to multiple states
in the same accident.
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APPENDIX E. DEFINITIONS OF INFORMATION CODES

Table 410: Information about the Objects that Aircraft Collided with in Accidents
Information about Terrain
Information about the nature of terrain that aircraft collided with during accidents.
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Notes
Ground
None suitable
Mountainous/hilly
Rough/uneven
Water
Soft
High vegetation
Open field
High obstruction(s)
Snow covered
Water, rough
Crop
Downhill
Grass
Rising
High terrain
Water, glassy
These codes are modifiers
Uphill
associated with the subject code
Wet
“19200: Terrain” in the preDirt bank/rising embankment
2008 coding system.
Runway
Roadway/highway
The NTSB used this subject
Congested/confined area
code (along with modifiers) to
Hidden obstruction(s)
provide additional information
Ditch
regarding the terrain that the
Rock(s)/boulder(s)
aircraft clipped/collided with
Loose gravel/sandy
during flight.
Swampy
Berm
Drop-off/descending embankment
Muddy
Residential area
Pinnacle
Tree(s)
Ravine
Icy
Loose objects
Snowbank
Tundra
Other
Cliff
Large wave/swell
Sand bar
Water, frozen
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Information about Terrain
Information about the nature of terrain that aircraft collided with during accidents.
Blind/box canyon
Construction area
Plowed/furrowed
Weak ice
Not specified in NTSB manual
Short runway/landing area
Frozen
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Notes
Mountainous/hilly terrain
Accident recorded under the
Rough terrain
current system used codes in
Sloped/uneven
the terrain hierarchy, ranging
Water
from “03020000XX: TerrainHigh elevation
general” to “03021035XX:
Snowy/icy
Terrain-wet/muddy”
Wet/muddy

Table 411: Information about Airport Facilities
Information about Airport Facilities
Information about the landing area condition at airports
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Inadequate
Unavailable
Congested
Snow covered
Downhill
Rough/uneven
High terrain
Rising
Ground
Soft
Grass
None suitable
Runway
Congested/confined area
High vegetation
Wet
Other
Loose objects
Short runway/landing area
Mountainous/hilly
Foreign substance covered
Open field
High obstruction(s)
Airport facility
Unavailable
Not specified in NTSB manual
Lack of frangibility
Hard/paved surface
Inoperative

Notes

These code are modifiers
associated with the subject
codes ranging from “18500:
Control tower” to “19028:
Airport facilities—refueling
truck”
The NTSB used these subject
codes (along with modifiers) to
provide additional information
regarding the airport/landing
site.
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Information about Airport Facilities
Information about the landing area condition at airports
False/incorrect indication
Not maintained
Exposed runway lip/edge
Not operating
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Airport lighting
Runway lighting
Taxiway lighting
Obstruction markings/lighting
Runway markings/signage
Runway/landing area condition
Runway/landing area length
Taxiway markings/signage
Taxiway condition
Airport communication
Ramp facilities
Emergency/fire/rescue services
Fuel service/equipment
Ground support/equipment
Snow removal service/equipment
Security

Notes

For accidents recorded under
the current system, I grouped
codes ranging from
“03010000XX: Operating
environment-general” to
“03017035XX: Operating
environment-airport
facilities/designrunway/landing area condition”

Table 412: Information about Phase of Flight
Information about Phase of Flight
Information about the landing area condition at airports
NTSB Codes (pre-2008)
Standing—engine(s) not operating
Taxi—aerial
Climb
Maneuvering—holding (IFR)
Approach
Go-around (VFR)
Missed approach (IFR)
Landing—aborted
Maneuvering—aerial application
Hover—out of ground effect
Standing—idling rotors
Taxi
Taxi—pushback/tow
Taxi—to takeoff
Taxi—from landing
Takeoff
Takeoff—roll/run
Takeoff—initial climb
Takeoff—aborted
Climb—to cruise
Cruise
Cruise—normal
Descent
Descent—normal
Descent—emergency

Notes

These codes provide
information about the different
phases of flight in an accident.
These codes remain information
codes unless they are used in
the rules to define a hazardous
state.
Note that in addition to the
phase of flight code for
“hover—out of ground effect”, I
included the subject code
“24808: Out of ground effect”
as an information code.
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Information about Phase of Flight
Information about the landing area condition at airports
Approach—VFR pattern—downwind
Approach—VFR pattern—turn to base
Approach—VFR pattern—base leg/base to final
Approach—VFR pattern—final approach
Approach—Initial approach fix (IAF) to final approach fix
(FAF)/outer marker (IFR)
Approach—final approach fix (FAF)/outer marker to threshold (IFR)
Approach—circling (IFR)
Landing
Landing—flare/touchdown
Landing—roll
Emergency landing
Emergency landing after takeoff
Emergency descent/landing
Maneuvering
Maneuvering—turn to reverse direction
Maneuvering—turn to landing area (emergency)
Hover
Hover—in ground effect
Other
Unknown
NTSB Codes (post-2008)
Standing
Standing—engine not operational
Standing—engine start-up
Standing—engine operating
Standing—engine shutdown
Pushback/towing
Pushback/tow—engine not operational
Pushback/tow—engine start-up
Pushback/tow—engine operational
Pushback/tow—engine shutdown
Taxi
Taxi—to runway
Taxi—into takeoff position
Taxi—from runway
Takeoff
Takeoff—rejected takeoff
Initial climb
Enroute—Climb to cruise
Enroute—Cruise
Enroute—Change of cruise level
Enroute—Descent
Enroute—Holding (IFR)
Maneuvering
Maneuvering—Aerobatics
Maneuvering—Low—alt flying
Maneuvering—Hover
Approach
Approach—IFR Initial Approach
Approach—IFR Final Approach
Approach—Circling (IFR)

Notes

These codes provide
information about the different
phases of flight in an accident.
These codes remain information
codes unless they are used in
the rules to define a hazardous
state.
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Information about Phase of Flight
Information about the landing area condition at airports
Approach—IFR Missed Approach
Approach—VFR Pattern Crosswind
Approach—VFR Pattern Downwind
Approach—VFR Pattern Base
Approach—VFR Pattern Final
Approach—VFR Go-Around
Landing
Landing—Flare/Touchdown
Landing—Landing Roll
Emergency descent
Post-Impact
After Landing
Other
Unknown
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APPENDIX F. OCCURRENCE CHAIN DATA

Table 413: Permissible Accident Codes (Pre-2008)
Pre-2008

Meaning

150

Ditching

160

Dragged wing, rotor, pod, float or tail/skid

170

Fire/explosion

171

Fire

172

Explosion

180

Forced landing

190

Gear collapsed

191

Main gear collapsed

192

Nose gear collapsed

193

Tail gear collapsed

194

Complete gear collapsed

195

Other gear collapsed

198

Gear retraction on ground

200

Hard landing

220

In flight collision with object

230

In flight collision with terrain/water

231

Wheels down landing in water

232

Wheels up landing

270

Midair collision

271

Collision between aircraft (other than midair)

290

Nose down

300

Nose over

310

On ground/water collision with object

320

On ground/water collision with terrain/water

380

Roll over

400

Undetermined

Table 414: Permissible Accident Codes (Post-2008)
Post-2008

Meaning

0

Unknown or undetermined

91

Tailstrike

92

Hard landing

94

Landing gear collapse

96

Nose over/nose down

97

Roll over
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Post-2008

Meaning

120

Control flight into terrain/object

160

Explosion (non-impact)

170

Fire/smoke (post-impact)

180

Explosion (post-impact)

200

Ground collision

231

Dynamic Rollover

245

Mast bumping

250

Midair collision

300

Runway excursion

441

Ditching

470

Collision with terrain/object (non-CFIT)

490

Collision during takeoff/land
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